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Abstract 
Transit properties in the USA have historically experienced loss of market 
share and low levels of farebox recovery. They resorted to service expansion 
to maximize subsidies. Experience suggests that: (a) fare increases have not 
had the desired eﬀect; (b) fare reductions can boost ridership but can also re­
duce revenue and increase subsidies. The challenge lies with the adoption of such 
strategies as deep discount group pass programs that can produce more marginal 
revenue than cost. Deep discount transit pass programs provide groups of peo­
ple with unlimited-ride transit passes in exchange for a contractual payment for 
or on behalf of pass users by an employer or other organizing body. Although 
successes of deep discount group pass programs are documented, there is sub­
stantial skepticism toward their wide-scale deployment because transit manage­
ment perceives them as “special treatments” or ”favors” to participants. Man­
agement fears such perception could raise questions about equity because they 
fail to see the fundamental diﬀerence in the fare structure of the ”group pass” 
from individual ticket purchases. Group passes operate in a manner analogous 
to insurance programs. The deep discount program cases studied consistently 
revealed either higher revenues per boarding than the system-wide average or 
higher total revenues from target markets with the program than without it. 
Employment-based programs yielded the highest net revenues to operators. Al­
though agencies recognize the factors for price determination, research reveals 
that no systematic methodology exists and pass prices are largely determined by 
watching what others have done. This dissertation has developed a methodol­
ogy to aid operators in determining deeply discounted but favorable pass prices. 
The methodology considers: revenue lost from existing riders at prevailing fares; 
level of patronage in the primary location of transit use; any additional costs 
necessitated by the program; attractiveness of program terms to participants; 
and a policy goal of increasing operating revenue. The methodology permits the 
investigation of alternative objective functions and thus can serve as a common 
tool for transit agencies, employers and other constituents who may choose to 
maximize or minimize either the price of the pass or the number of participants 
subject to sets of constraints. 
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Transit properties in the USA have historically experienced loss of market share and low 
levels of farebox recovery. They resorted to service expansion to maximize subsidies. 
Experience suggests that: (a) fare increases have not had the desired effect; (b) fare 
reductions can boost ridership but can also reduce revenue and increase subsidies. The 
challenge lies with the adoption of such strategies as deep discount group pass programs
that can produce more marginal revenue than cost. Deep discount transit pass programs
provide groups of people with unlimited-ride transit passes in exchange for a contractual 
payment for or on behalf of pass users by an employer or other organizing body.  
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Although successes of deep discount group pass programs are documented, there is 
substantial skepticism toward their wide-scale deployment because transit management
perceives them as “special treatments” or “favors” to participants. Management fears 
such perception could raise questions about equity because they fail to see the 
fundamental difference in the fare structure of the “group pass” from individual ticket 
purchases. Group passes operate in a manner analogous to insurance programs. 
The deep discount program cases studied consistently revealed either higher revenues per 
boarding than the system-wide average or higher total revenues from target markets with 
the program than without it. Employment-based programs yielded the highest net 
revenues to operators. 
Although agencies recognize the factors for price determination, research reveals that no 
systematic methodology exists and pass prices are largely determined by watching what
others have done. This dissertation has developed a methodology to aid operators in 
determining deeply discounted but favorable pass prices. The methodology considers: 
revenue lost from existing riders at prevailing fares; level of patronage in the primary 
location of transit use; any additional costs necessitated by the program; attractiveness of
program terms to participants; and a policy goal of increasing operating revenue. The 
methodology permits the investigation of alternative objective functions and thus can 
serve as a common tool for transit agencies, employers and other constituents who may 
choose to maximize or minimize either the price of the pass or the number of participants 
subject to sets of constraints. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 PREAMBLE
Transit ridership in the U.S.A. declined precipitously over the last half century 
necessitating steep subsidies to keep it operational.  Despite transit’s poor financial 
performance, society has compelling reasons to maintain public transportation. However 
subsidies have escalated and may not be sustainable. There is also an ethical obligation to 
use public subsidies to increase efficiency. Thus it becomes necessary to find innovative 
ways to finance transit operations. One form of innovative financing is the “deep discount 
group pass” (DDGP). The DDGP is similar to the monthly transit pass in common use 
around the nation. Its differences from the regular monthly pass include the fact that the 
DDGP always allows unlimited use, it is sometimes issued for longer periods of time, it 
often covers all members of a group and it charges very low fares per use relative to other 
forms of transit fare media. 
This study postulates that the deep discount group pass may be an instrument for 
increasing operating revenues and hence system efficiency. Everything else being equal, 
the more revenue that is raised, the less society might need to subsidize operations. 
The aim of this study is to find a way to increase operating revenues and thus transit 
system efficiency. However, the proposed method, the deep discount group pass, can also 
increase ridership. Thus is the origin of the title of the research. It is estimated that only 
about 27% of seat-miles on transit vehicles are in use nationwide (Brown, Hess and 
Shoup, 1999). There are major variations in occupancy between metropolitan areas and 
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by time of day. Most of the operating cost is incurred in moving vehicles up and down 
the service routes. In many circumstances, increase in ridership would mainly fill up 
available capacity. If ridership increases in the cases where capacity is under utilized, one 
would expect it to result in minimal marginal cost, if any. If so, it would increase system
efficiency. 
1.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
This dissertation is a policy study into the modus operandi and effectiveness of deep 
discount transit pass programs. Broadly, this research is interested in finding out (a) how 
the programs work; (b) changes in travel behavior of those to whom the pass becomes
available; (c) impacts on and implications for parking; and (d) the costs and benefits to 
providers and recipients of the programs. In addition, this study has sought to develop a 
methodology for setting pass prices. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTION TO SURFACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
The main contributions of this dissertation to surface transportation policy are twofold: 
1.	 First this research has identified one transportation problem that is widespread in 
the nation and decided to investigate one possible solution. While the primary 
motivation is to find a way to increase operating revenues and thus transit system
efficiency, the proposed method, the deep discount group pass, can also increase 
ridership. 
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2.	 Second, this research has developed a methodological tool for setting prices for 
deep discount group passes that would ensure no net loss in revenue to transit 
agencies. The key lies in deeply discounted yet favorable pass prices. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
•	 Chapter 2 describes the background and motivation for the research. It also
includes definitions of key terms used in this dissertation. 
•	 Chapter 3 is a review of previous studies that include both program reviews and 
general transit agency case overviews. Transit industry case reviews looked at the 
historical dynamics of fares vs. ridership levels in the Los Angeles and New York 
transit systems and at historical trends in net revenues vs. subsidies in the Boston 
and Chicago transit systems. Deep discount case studies included reviews of past
programs at Connecticut, Ottawa, and Columbus as well as modern day programs
covered by the case studies of this research. The literature review differentiated
between general discount fare programs and true deep discount group pass
programs. The latter is the subject of this dissertation. 
•	 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 set the theoretical framework for the study. This intellectual 
overview is an extension of the literature review and covers theories and issues 
related to the subject of pricing in transit. The discussion in Chapter 4 therefore
covers such topics as: the case for and limitations of marginal cost pricing in
transit; the case for and limitations of Ramsey pricing in transit; marginal cost vs.
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price discrimination in transit; traditional methods of cost recovery in transit; why 
transit operates at a loss; and the concept of opportunity cost in relation to deep 
discount programs. In Chapter 5, the review draws analogies between deep 
discount pass programs and existing concepts on insurance and risk pooling, 
which explain how the programs can result in increased revenue. Chapter 6 
explains through the economic concepts of elasticity, income and substitution
effects how the programs can result in increased ridership. 
•	 Chapters 7, 8 and 9 cover areas of original research contributions that involved 
review and analyses of operating and survey data to glean lessons from three 
major case studies that represent the key types of deep discount programs in 
existence. Chapter 7 covers the assortment of programs systematically introduced 
by the Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD) over a period of about a
decade, beginning in 1991. The RTD programs fall into four categories: the 
employment-based ECO Pass, the Neighborhood ECO Pass, the campus-based
College Pass, and the TeenPass that is sold through middle and high schools. 
Chapter 8 is a case study of the University of California Student Class Pass 
program offered by the Alameda-Contra Costa (AC) Transit District. Campus-
based programs are by far the largest and most rapidly expanding group of deep 
discount programs around the nation. Chapter 9 is the case study of the City of 
Berkeley Employee Eco Pass program also offered by AC Transit. The City of 
Berkeley program uses the magnetic dip fare card, a novelty with such programs 
that offers opportunities for rich travel data on program participants. 
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• Chapter 10 is an evaluation of policy implications that documents the effects of 
deep discount pass programs in terms of pertinent policy questions on: the terms 
and conditions of the programs; effect on mode choice; direct operating and 
maintenance cost implications; net revenue effects; effect on parking; effect on 
the environment; opinions, perceptions and equity concerns; and benefits to 
providers and recipients. Ultimately, the various policy questions translate into 
effects on the use of transit and the automobile. This in turn has implications for 
parking and for the costs and benefits to service providers and recipients. 
• Chapter 11 presents the proposed pricing methodology. The objective of the
methodology is to safeguard at least and preferably increase revenue receipts 
following implementation of the program.  The safeguard is ensuring that the new
revenue received from a qualified group is higher than the sum of the revenue lost 
from existing transit riders in the group and the additional operating costs 
associated with program implementation.   
• Chapter 12 presents the conclusions of the dissertation and suggests directions for
future research to complement this work. 
• The key references used in this dissertation follow the last chapter. They are 
organized into four groups covering: (a) evaluations of deep discount programs;
(b) the evolution and reviews of transit in the USA; (c) pricing; and (d) choice 
modeling. Inevitably, some references appear in more than one group. 
• Finally, there is a comprehensive section of appendices that present data and details 
of analyses. The materials are identified for specific chapters and cover: the 
5
 
 literature review, Chapter 3; the areas of original research contributions that 
include the case studies, Chapters 7, 8 and 9; as well as the evaluations, Chapter 
10; and the proposed methodology, Chapter 11. 
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2. BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION 
2.1 DEFINITION OF DEEP DISCOUNT PROGRAMS 
Deep Discount Transit Pass Programs provide a group of people with unlimited ride 
transit passes in exchange for some contractual payment for or on behalf of pass users by 
an employer, other governing body or other organizing body. The deep discount transit 
“group pass” program is one of various forms of unlimited-use transit pass programs in 
operation around the country. They are termed “unlimited-use” because transit patrons do
not have to make on-the-spot payments every time the service is used within the period 
defined for the specific program. A transit patron can pay $3.50 for a “day-pass” in the 
Baltimore metropolitan area to gain unlimited use on that day of bus, light rail and Metro
rail transit services operated by the Maryland Transit Administration. For a rider 
expecting to make more than two one-way trips a day, this pass is a bargain when 
compared to the one-way transit fare of $1.60 as of mid 2003. There are weekly and 
monthly versions of such tickets that allow unlimited use over the respective periods. The 
weekly pass costs $16.50. A rider who uses transit five days a week saves $1 (or 5%) 
over the daily pass rate. At $64.00, the regular monthly pass offers the four-week-a­
month user an additional $2 savings (or 3%) over the weekly pass and a total of $6 (or 
8.5%) over the daily pass. Beside the regular urban area transit services, similar discounts
exist for Express and Commuter services. The common term for these unlimited-use, 
periodic tickets is the “pass” from the fact that they allow the user to pass a conductor or
turnstile on entry into most transit vehicles without per-use fee or fare. 
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The deep discount “group pass” is similar to the monthly pass with the following 
modifications: 
•	 The period of permitted, unlimited use typically is longer than one month. 
•	 The pass is often provided to all members of a group rather than individuals, hence 
the term “group”. 
•	 The cost of the pass per user is very low relative to per-ride fares and daily or
monthly passes, hence the expression, “deep discount”. 
2.2 TYPES OF DEEP DISCOUNT PASS PROGRAMS 
There are various versions of deep discount pass programs. They may be categorized into 
four broad groups as follows: 
1.University campus-based programs ~ These always include students and 
sometimes also include faculty and staff. The pioneers and most widely 
documented examples include the U-PASS at the University of Washington, 
Seattle and the UPASS at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. The ClassPass 
program at U.C. Berkeley and BruinGO at U.C. Los Angeles were recently 
introduced in California. 
2.  Employment-based programs ~ These exist in more than a dozen metropolitan 
areas. One of the oldest and most widely documented is the ECO Pass program in 
Denver, Colorado. In California, the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 
(VTA) offers this type of program to Silicon Valley commuters and AC Transit 
offers it to employees of the City of Berkeley. 
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3.  Residential-based programs ~ These are offshoots of the employment-based 
programs. One of the oldest is the Neighborhood ECO Pass program in Denver, 
Colorado. In California, the VTA offers this type of program to residents of Santa
Clara County. 
4.	 Student pass programs ~ These are variants of the campus-based programs. They 
typically cover middle and high school students. They are offered in Denver, 
Colorado as the TeenPass and to eligible students in New York City as the 
Student Metrocard. 
2.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is well known that transit patronage declined dramatically in the United States over the
last 5 decades. At its peak in the 1940s, transit registered an annual ridership of 24 billion
passengers. Currently transit use has fallen to an annual ridership of fewer than 9 billion 
passengers. Transit ridership is therefore relatively low, catering predominantly to either 
those captive of it or such selected trips as work trips during the peak in highly congested 
urban corridors. Thus demand for transit tends to be inelastic. Most transit use occurs in 
urbanized areas where it is most feasible to provide the service. Its use is highest in the
densest, most urbanized areas where the services are most readily available. 
With declining ridership, transit service became highly subsidized. In 1974, operating 
subsidies were added to the various federal assistance programs for transit with a 50% 
matching ratio from the combination of farebox, state and local sources (Wachs, 1989). 
Total subsidy at the national level ranged nominally from $1.4 billion in 1975 to a peak 
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of $10 billion in 1992 (APTA, 2000). In constant 1983 dollars, the range is from $2.6 
billion in 1975 to almost a three-fold peak of $7.1 billion in 1992. In order to stem the 
tide of escalating subsidies, federal assistance has been restrained over the years resulting 
in its contribution to operating assistance declining nominally from a peak of $1 billion in
the early 1980s to approximately $ 0.7 billion by 1998. In constant 1983 dollars, the 
decline is from a peak of $1.2 billion in the early 1980s to nearly a third of approximately
$ 0.43 billion by 1998. Since 1992, the federal share of operating assistance has been 
10% or less with the remainder from state and local sources including farebox recovery.  
At the national level, fare revenue accounted for 36% (1983) to 53% (1975) of total 
operating costs. Historically, fare increases have typically led to declines in ridership in
favor of the private automobile. Sometimes a vicious cycle ensues when fare increases 
lead to declines in patronage that lead to service cutbacks that lead to further declines in
patronage that necessitate further fare increases or service cutbacks. 
Community Issues ~ In recent years, the focus of community planning has been changing. 
Issues of key importance include concerns about environmental pollution, livability and 
sustainability. Such concerns lead to proposals for increased use of shared transportation 
and lessening dependence on the automobile. 
Transit dependency ~ There are people who cannot drive and for whom some form of 
public transportation must be provided. These include the very young, the very old, and 
the disabled. There is also a significant segment of the populace classified as “poor” who 
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cannot afford personal means of transportation, but whose mobility needs have to be met. 
In California, for instance, the 2000 Census reveals that one out of three households that 
earn an annual income of $10,000 or less did not have a vehicle available for work travel. 
Similarly, one out of five households that earn an annual income of $25,000 or less did 
not have a vehicle available. By comparison, less than one out of twenty households that 
earn an annual income greater than $25,000 did not have a vehicle available.1 Public
transit is often the only choice for many in this category. 
Circumstances ~ There are many circumstances when the need exists for high capacity 
transportation. These include travel along congested urban corridors and travel into the 
CBD especially at periods of peak travel demand. Public transit is the right option to 
serve these types of needs. 
These reasons include why governments have tried to maintain transit service with 
subsidies. However subsidies have escalated and may not be sustainable. In Boston, for
instance, the shortfall between passenger revenue and transit agency costs increased
nominally from $21 million in 1965 to $575 million in 1991.2 In constant 1983 dollars, 
the increase is from $67 million in 1965 to $422 million in 1991, that is, 6 times in 26 
years. In his 1996 study of the phenomenon, Gomez-Ibanez noted “there has been little 
political will or incentive to date to adopt measures that might help to control the deficit 
without greatly reducing ridership”. He concluded that without deficit control measures 
“cities like Boston may soon find they cannot afford to maintain transit ridership”. This is 
why it becomes necessary to find innovative ways to finance transit operations. 
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The successes of various deep discount pass programs are extolled in reports and articles. 
However there is substantial skepticism on the part of the management of transit agencies 
toward their adoption and wide-scale deployment. Discussions with operators revealed 
the following: 
•	 Management is not generally convinced of the efficacy of the program. Rather it is 
considered a “special treatment” or “favor” to a segment of the population. They 
fear the perception of special treatment could raise questions about equity. An 
operator would make such an argument by comparing the $5 a month charge per 
person per month for the City of Berkeley ECO Pass with the regular monthly pass
rate of $50 each. By such comparison, AC Transit offers the ECO Pass to the City 
of Berkeley at 10% of the regular rate or 90% discount. Similarly, Santa Clara VTA
offers the pass at 20% of the regular monthly rate to Silicon Valley commuters. 
Comparisons with regular fares are interpreted as discounts that are easily 
misconstrued as special treatments because the argument fails to see the 
fundamental difference in the fare structure of the “group pass” from individual 
ticket purchases. The group pass covers a large number of people and is paid for the 
whole year in advance whether the service is going to be used or not. In this regard 
it operates similar to an insurance scheme, which can charge a relatively low 
premium as membership in the pool grows large and yet be profitable. Take the 
City of Berkeley case for example. Surveys revealed that 6.2% of all employees
commuted to work by AC Transit before the ECO Pass program; (6.2% of 1938 
employees is approximately 120 people). As detailed later in Chapter 9, if
12
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
infrequent riders purchased an average number of rides while regular riders 
purchased the monthly pass, the estimated lost revenue would be approximately 
$2,410 a month. In comparison, the City pays the equivalent of (1330 * $5) or
$6,650 per month for all months of the year. This would translate to net revenue of 
$4,240 a month, approximately 175% increase over previous fare revenue. For 
offering the program therefore, AC Transit would realize a net annual increase in 
revenue of approximately $50,880 from that market. This illustrates the potential of 
the program to increase operating revenue for transit agencies. If the programs
necessitate additional operating costs, these added costs would need to be 
considered in setting the prices for the passes. 
• Discussions also revealed that the methods of determining the prices of passes are 
not very systematic. Prices are determined by combinations of the following: 
o Watching what others have done under similar settings 
o Considering the level of transit service available at the destination location  
o Recognizing the cost components of implementing the programs, which 
include operation, maintenance, marketing and administration. 
It appears the key ingredients of determining the appropriate price are recognized. 
However the literature and discussions reveal that no formal methodology is established 
for price determination. That is why this study has sought to establish a methodology for
determining the prices for deep discount group passes that would safeguard against net
loss in revenue to transit agencies. 
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2.4 THE CONCEPT OF EQUITY 
With deep concern by transit management about issues of equity, it is appropriate to do a
brief review of the concept of equity in relation to deep discount programs. Equity is 
defined as “fairness in the distribution of goods and services (among the people in an 
economy)”. 3 In the context of transit fares, equity may be defined as how just pricing is 
among various constituents of riders. There are three common criteria for judging equity 
as follows: 
1.The benefit criterion asserts that people should pay for services in proportion to the 
benefits they receive from them. Going strictly by this, transit riders would pay 
for individual rides according to a benefit such as time savings enjoyed relative to 
the next best alternative means of travel available to the riders. This is virtually
impossible to measure for individual riders. 
2.The cost criterion asserts that people should be charged for the use of the transit 
services in proportion to the cost they impose on the transit system. This is 
complex to determine for individual riders, but may be captured through time of 
day and location-based pricing. If a deep discount pass reflects costs implied in its 
implementation, then it satisfies this equity concept of “cost imposed”. 
3.The ability to pay criterion asserts that people are charged for the use of transit in
proportion to their wealth. While this may be partially achieved by charging lower 
fares to such groups as the youth, the elderly and the handicapped, there is no 
guarantee that the actual rider in the group is economically disadvantaged. 
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Equity is sometimes viewed from the perspectives of (a) the equality of outcome; and (b) 
the equality of opportunity. The deep discount pass has the potential to provide equality 
of opportunity either because it is available to all members of a target group or it is
available to many groups via the work place or residential location. If the program is
offered, it is then left to potential participants to organize and take advantage of the
opportunity it offers. Wide scale deployment of deep discount programs in a transit 
service area can therefore provide equality of opportunity. 
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3. HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSIT IN THE USA 
3.1 TRANSIT PRODUCTIVITY AND AGENCY RESPONSES 
A very low level of productivity characterizes transit service in the USA. For instance 
Brown, Hess and Shoup calculated at the gross national level that passengers occupied no 
more than 27% of available seats on urban transit buses in 1998.4 On average therefore,
there are approximately 11 passengers on board the average 40-seater bus for every 
revenue mile of bus service. Thus there is excess capacity to be utilized. This fact alone 
would largely explain why at the national level transit operating ratios fell below 50% 
and has hovered around 40% since 1980.5 
Historically, transit agencies have resorted to two types of responses when faced with 
loss of ridership: 
1.Service improvement – this is typically an attempt to make transit more attractive, but 
has proven to be expensive without yielding commensurate returns. For instance, to 
improve service, some transit agencies constructed new rail systems that operate on 
exclusive rights-of-way. However Don Pickrell’s comparison of actual and forecasted 
figures for eight urban rail transit projects in the USA revealed that seven cost much 
more than expected by 17% to 150% and seven achieved less than half the forecasted
ridership. 6 
2.Fare reduction – this is also intended to make transit more attractive per popular 
economic theory. As explained in the next section, it is typically inexpensive to 
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implement and has proven to be popular with riders. There is, however, the concern 
that fare reductions can lead to lower revenues and higher subsidies 
As outlined in the next section on case overviews, studies have shown that the latter of
the two responses might be the better policy to pursue. It is worth noting, however, that 
goals differ from project to project so that what is considered “better” may depend on 
more specific goals. 
3.2 CASE OVERVIEWS OF AGENCY RESPONSES 
Studies of transit operations in major cities in the USA reveal the following: 
Boston ~ Gomez-Ibanez (1996) studied the experience with transit agency responses in 
Boston and concluded “fare reductions are a significantly less costly method of retaining 
ridership than service expansions”.7  He modeled alternative deficit and ridership 
projections for 2010 using a “more complex version” of formulas first developed by Don 
H. Pickrell (1985) in his study of why industry-wide transit operating deficits increased 
during the 1970s. Termed the deficit accounting model, it was estimated with 1970-1990 
data and used to project ridership and deficits for 2010 under a variety of policy 
scenarios. Results for scenarios related to fare reduction and service expansion are 
compared in Table 3-1.  
The following are noteworthy: 
17
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
    
   
 
   
 
 
•	 Fare reduction would result in slightly more ridership (170 million trips) in 2010
than service expansion (166 million). 
•	 Fare reduction resulted in $313 million lower nominal deficit than service 
expansion. 
•	 In 1990 dollars, fare reductions would add 9% to the deficit while service 
expansions would add 41%. 
•	 In 1990 dollars, fare reductions would add $2.60 per ride retained to the deficit 
while service expansions would add $10.68 per ride retained. 
Thus his conclusions that fare reductions are a significantly less costly method of 
retaining ridership than service expansions. He noted, however, that both fare reduction 
and service expansion are less likely to be effective in retaining ridership in the future
than they were in the past.
Table 3-1: Comparative 2010 Projections of Transit Agency Responses: Case Study 
of The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Boston 
Ridership Nominal Deficit Real (1990) Deficit 
Millions 
Change 
from 
1990 
Millions 
($ 2010) 
Change 
from 
1990 
Millions 
($ 1990)
Change 
from 
1990
Increase 
per ride 
retained 
Base 1990 177 -­ 440 -­ 440 -- -­
Fare 
reduction 
@ -2.7% per 
year 
170 -4% 1,047 +138% 478 +9% $2.60 
Service 
expansion 
@ +1.6% per 
year 
166 -6% 1,360 +209% 621 +41% $10.68 
Source: Gomez-Ibanez (1996), Table 7, p45 
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Chicago ~ Savage and Schupp posited in a study of transit service in Chicago “it is more 
advantageous to use subsidy monies to reduce fares than improve service levels”.8 
Similar to Boston, the financial performance of the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) 
deteriorated nominally from an $84 million operating surplus in 1948 to a $458 million
operating deficit in 1997 (Savage, 2002). In constant 1983 dollars, the deterioration is 
from a $349 million operating surplus in 1948 to a $285 million operating deficit in 1997. 
Savage and Schupp agreed with the widely held economic notion that the advent of 
subsidies gave transit agencies the latitude to choose between many combinations of 
prices and levels of service in satisfying their budgets. The preferred combination could 
aim at maximizing social welfare in terms of the number of passengers carried or the 
amount of service provided. The authors concluded from their empirical analysis of half a 
century of transit operations in Chicago that the agency opted to maximize level of 
service as opposed to the number of passengers carried. They asserted from their 
economic analysis therefore “the public would be better off if service levels are reduced 
and the money saved channeled into lower fares”.  
New York City ~ It is reported that New York City lowered transit fares in the late 1990s, 
which led to a surge in ridership (Hirsch, Jordan, Hickey and Cravo, 1999). Besides half-
priced elderly and handicapped fares, New York City was a relatively recent entrant to
the practice of discount pricing of transit services, having maintained flat fares with 
limited transfer opportunities for almost a century. Between mid 1997 and the beginning 
of 1999, New York’s transit operators successively adopted fare incentives that produced 
“greater-than-expected ridership increases”. Operators are New York City Transit 
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(NYCT) of subway and bus and seven franchised carriers of the New York City 
Department of Transportation (NYCDOT), which provide additional bus services. 
Following a 3-year period of installing automated fare collection technology system-
wide, the following fare incentives were introduced within a period of one year: 
a)	 Free intermodal transfers offered varied levels of attractiveness. A typical 
commuter from outside Manhattan, for instance, who paid two flat fares one-way to 
work downtown, now enjoys a 50% discount on the same trip by paying one fare. 
b) The MetroCard bonus program offered a 10% discount on fare cards of $15 or
more, the equivalent of one free trip for ten trips purchased. 
c) Express Bus fare reduction by 25% from $4 to $3 
d)	 Unlimited-ride regular MetroCards for $4 per day, $17 for 7 days (at 13 trips to 
break-even) and $63 for 30 days (at 47 trips to break-even) as well as 30-day 
Express Bus pass for $120 (at 40 trips to break-even). 
e)	 Student MetroCards that allow 3 trips and 3 transfers per day replaced the flash 
cards previously used by eligible students. 
Comparing the first half of 1997 (the “before” situation) with the first half of 1999 (the
“after” situation), the following are noteworthy: 
•	 Weekly non-student ridership rose by 12% on the subway and 40% on buses during 
a period when New York City employment grew by 5%. Table 3-2 summarizes the
annual rates of change in ridership with the introduction of various fare discounts. 
The convenience of the MetroCard, a “pass”, over exact fare payment contributes to 
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the initial rates of increase of 8% on weekdays and 9% on weekends, but the series 
of discounts offered through the fare incentives constitute most of the large 
ridership increases of 20% on weekdays and 24% on weekends. 
Table 3-2: Annual Rates of Change in New York City Non-Student Transit 
Ridership 
Period of 
Comparison 
Fare Incentive Percent Change 
From To 
Employment Weekday 
Ridership 
Weekend 
Ridership 
Mar 
1996 
Jun 
1997 
1.8% 0.9% 1.8% 
Jul 
1996 
Dec 
1997 
2.5% 7.8% 9.0% 
Jan 
1997 
Jun 
1998 
Free transfer with 
bonus 
2.6% 10.2% 10.6% 
Jul 
1997 
Dec 
1998 
Unlimited ride and 
bonus 
2.2% 9.3% 13.8% 
Jan 
1998 
Jun 
1999 
Unlimited ride 2.2% 9.2% 12.1% 
Jan 
1997 
Jun 
1999 
All fare incentives 4.9% 20.3% 24.0% 
Source: Hirsch et al, 1999, Table 1, p151
•	 Customers using unlimited-ride MetroCards increased their trip-making 
disproportionately on weekends. This makes a good case for discounted travel 
during off-peak when there may be excess capacity. 
•	 The 7-day MetroCard was more popular than the 30-day card by a ratio of 3 to 1 
despite the lower unit cost of the latter. Surveys revealed that many customers 
either consider the lower fare card a less risky investment in case of theft or loss or
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did not have the cash outlay for the other. Due to the convenience of the “pass”, 
MetroCard share of fare media in June 1997 was 23%. With the addition of fare
discounts, the total share of all types of MetroCards rose to 75% in June 1999. See
Table 3-3. 
Table 3-3: Market Shares of Fare Media 
Fare Media June 1997 June 1999 
Single ride fare 77% 25% 
Regular MetroCard 23% 14% 
Bonus MetroCard -- 30% 
30-day Pass -- 7% 
7-day Pass -- 22% 
1-day Pass -- 2% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Hirsch et al, 1999, Figure 11, p156
These successes occurred at a cost to the transit operators. In order to accommodate the 
increases in ridership, annual subway seat-miles increased by 10% from the 1996 level of 
293 million with a $300 million capital investment. Annual bus vehicle-miles increased 
by 11% above the 1996 level of 88 million with the addition of 631 peak buses to the 
1996 base of 3,078. 
It is interesting to note that the average adult fare decreased 21% from $1.35 in June 1997 
to $1.08 in June 1999 with the discounts while ridership increased by 20% on weekdays
and 24% on weekends. It is arguable that by their actions transit operators in New York 
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attempted to maximize social welfare in terms of the number of passengers carried. The
average weekday ridership exceeded 4 million unlinked subway trips, 2 million bus trips
and half a million student trips for an estimated total of 5 million linked weekday trips.
Los Angeles ~ Thomas Rubin reported that there was a period when bus fares were 
lowered in Los Angeles. The reduced fares led to increased ridership and higher total 
revenue.9 Table 3-4 summarizes trends in bus fares and ridership in Los Angeles County, 
California in slightly over a decade. In the mid 1970s, the cash fare for a bus ride was 
lowered from $0.30 to $0.25. During the ensuing period of two years, ridership increased 
sufficiently to make up for the lower fare charged per passenger so that total revenue 
increased (Rubin, 2000). The fare reduction is analogous to discounting, which resulted 
in increased total revenue. 
Table 3-4: Trends in Bus Fares vs. Ridership in Los Angeles County 
Fiscal 
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Fare ($) 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.85 0.50 0.50 0.5 
Bus 
Ridership 
(millions) 218 310 282 316 345 366 397 389 354 416 466 497 
Change 
from
previous 
year -- 92 -28 34 29 21 31 -8 -35 62 50 31 
% 
Change -- 42% -9% 12% 9% 6% 8% -2% -9% 18% 12% 7% 
Fare 
Impact1 ++ ++ * * * * ↓ ↓ # # # 
1Notes -- The Impact of Fares on Revenues and Ridership: 
++ ~ Additional revenues from increased ridership more than compensated for lower unit fares 
* ~ Ridership continued to increase even as fares were steadily increased 
↓ ~ Decline in ridership following further fare increases 
# ~ Dramatic increase in ridership following the introduction of deep discount fares 
Source: Thomas Rubin, 2000; pp 7-15 & Figure 9 
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As buses became overcrowded, service was expanded with attendant increase in 
operating costs. In the late 1970s, a series of upward adjustments were made annually to 
the fares. Ridership continued to increase despite the fare increases because Los Angeles
County was experiencing a major shift in its demographic composition with rapid
increases in the population of minorities who tended to patronize transit service. However 
ridership began to decrease in the early 1980s as fare increases continued. These fare 
increases may be viewed as deviations away from discounting and they eventually led to 
decline in ridership. 
Yet another period of discounting, large enough to be considered a deep discount, was 
introduced in conjunction with the passage of ‘Proposition A’, which gained 54% of 
voter approval in the November 1980 elections. The Los Angeles County Transportation 
Commission Ordinance 16 (Proposition A) imposed a ½ cent sales tax in the county to be
dedicated to transit. The proposition included the provision that bus fares would be 
reduced and held at $0.50 per ride and at $20 for the monthly pass during the first three 
years of sales tax collection. Up to 35% of the tax receipts were to be used to fund the
discount fare program. By the end of the third year following the deep discount fares 
(1985), ridership that was previously declining had increased by 40% or 143 million
annual boardings. This was termed the “greatest increase in transit utilization over a 
comparable, non-wartime period in the United States” (Rubin, 2000). The increase in bus 
ridership was the equivalence of the fifth largest bus operations or the tenth largest transit 
system in the United States in 1985. Funding of the deep discount program required 
slightly less than 20% of the ‘Proposition A’ sales tax receipts. 
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When the three-year period elapsed and fares were increased, ridership began to decline. 
The Los Angeles experience with the cycle of fare discounts and fare increases with 
attendant changes in ridership partially illustrates the fact that fare discounts can attract 
ridership without increasing subsidy. It also supports the case for a careful administration 
of a deep discount program. 
3.3 ELASTICITIES AND IMPACTS 
In 1980 the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (now Federal Transit 
Administration) conducted a comprehensive study of transit fare and service elasticities.10 
The report noted that there are “significant differences in fare elasticities . . . for different 
periods of the day or week or type of service, service locations, trip lengths, trip purposes 
and ages of the transit riding population”. Table 3-5 compares a sample of the fare
elasticities reported in the study. As shown, average off-peak fare elasticity is 
approximately twice average peak fare elasticity. Similarly, fare elasticities for school 
and shopping trips are at least twice the fare elasticity for work trips. 
The report posited that fare policies that take into account these differences could be 
designed to increase transit revenue with minimum disruption to patronage. The report 
suggested that fares could be increased during peak hours but reduced during the midday 
to result in a net revenue increase at no loss in total ridership. This would occur because 
the higher fares charged during peak periods would result in loss of fewer passengers 
than would be gained by proportionally lower fares charged in the off-peak.  
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Table 3-5: Comparison of Selected Fare Elasticities 
Type of Fare 
Elasticity  
Components Average 
Elasticity 
Standard 
Deviation 
Time of Day 
Peak Period -0.17 ± 0.09 
Off-Peak Period -0.40 ± 0.26 
Trip Purpose 
Work -0.10 ± 0.04
School -0.19 ± 0.44
Shopping -0.23 ± 0.06
Source: Mayworm et al (1980), p xi
In his review and synthesis of transit pricing a decade later, Cervero (1990) made the
following observations, among others: 
•	 “Prepayment schemes have met with success in the U.S. and Europe”. It is worth 
noting that a deep discount pass is a form of “prepayment” scheme. 
•	 Some of the more noteworthy fare policy successes in North America have been 
discount programs. These include the following:  
1.	 In Connecticut, Bridgeport’s combined pass-fare program (1981) – The “Fare-
Cutter Pass” was introduced to reduce the revenue losses associated with unlimited 
use passes at the time. The $15 a month pass was valid at all times along with a
$0.25 extra fare. Officials estimated that the program reduced pass-related revenue 
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losses by 50% during the first year (Oram, 1983). Overall the program increased 
revenue yields while maintaining bargain rates for frequent users. 
2.	 In Pennsylvania, Allentown’s deep discounts -- Pre-paid, 10-ride strip tickets and
tokens were offered for $5 a pack at a 50 percent discount over the adult cash fare 
of $0.75 each ($7.50 for ten). After six months, the transit agency recorded a 10% 
increase in farebox revenues, a 5% increase in ridership and a 14% decrease in 
deficit per rider compared to the same month a year earlier. (Oram, 1989). Prepaid 
rides rose from 37% to 67% of all trips with the largest ridership gains among 
infrequent users. 
3.	 In Canada, Ottawa’s major fare reduction and differentiation – Up to 1987, transit 
fares were indexed to the rate of inflation and increased commensurately once or
twice a year in order to meet a 75% cost recovery target. In 1987 officials lowered 
the adult cash fare by 37.5% from $1.20 to $0.75 ($ Canadian), but introduced peak 
period surcharges and zonal fares and raised downtown parking rates. Within a 
year, revenue receipts increased by 5%, ridership remained steady while the share
of off-peak trips by transit rose from 52% to 62% compared to the same period a 
year earlier. (Bonsall, 1988) 
4.	 In Ohio, Columbus’s substantial midday discount – In 1981 Off-peak (9:30 a.m. to
3:00 p.m.) and weekend fares were lowered by almost 60% from $0.60 to $0.25 
while services within 2 square miles of downtown were fare-free. Within the first 
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month, ridership to downtown increased by 200% while midday ridership more
than doubled. (Cervero, 1985). From 1981 to 1985, system-wide ridership rose 14% 
while midday ridership increased from 36% to 48% of total daily patronage. 
Although passenger revenues fell, officials asserted that this was more than offset 
by the increase in sales tax revenues dedicated to transit. The transit system’s cost 
recovery ratio increased by 7% within the first four years of the program. 
Essentially therefore, experience suggests that fare reduction is certainly a way to boost 
ridership. However, if not selectively implemented, it can also reduce revenue and 
necessitate increase in subsidy. The challenge lies with implementing fare reductions
without reducing revenue. That is what a well-crafted deep discount program is 
hypothesized to achieve. 
3.4 SELECTED DEEP DISCOUNT GROUP PASS PROGRAMS 
The literature includes quite a few publications dated from the 1980s on the subject of 
deep discount passes. The attraction of these various forms of discounted fare instruments 
is that no public subsidy is required to cover the additional rides if they use existing
capacity. The added fare revenue instead would help reduce the need for public subsidy.11 
However, if additional capacity is needed, the program will induce both additional
investment in capital and associated increase in operating costs. This is why a well-
crafted program has to be directed at appropriate target groups. Such groups include those 
whose travel needs occur most often outside periods of peak travel demand. The studies 
are overviewed in the following sections. 
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3.4.1 General Deep Discount Fares 
Richard Oram conducted some of the earliest studies in which he specifically discussed 
“Deep Discount fares” that referred to reduced fares for single-rides, token packs and 
monthly passes. Oram (1988) discusses deep discount fare strategies that relate to the 
purchase of multi-ride tickets or tokens. Oram (1994) includes a review of experience in 
17 US cities that are again reduced fares but not the modern trend of unlimited ride group 
passes. From these studies, Oram was able to identify the long list of “Benefits of Deep 
Discount Fares” shown in Table 3-6 (Oram, 1988, 1990). Many of these benefits are 
echoed today for the newer group-pass programs. 
Oram (1994) concluded from his series of studies: “deep discounting has shown that it is 
possible to raise transit ridership and revenues simultaneously with a combination of 
higher cash fares and deeply discounted tickets or tokens.” 
Daniel Fleishman’s (ca. 1993) “Recent Experience with Deep Discounting” draws on 
previous work by Oram. It also looks at the traditional discounting of fares rather than 
group passes. He traced historical trends from the early 1980s to the early 1990s in 
ridership versus revenues for four major transit systems: the CTA in Chicago, SEPTA in 
Pennsylvania, RTD in Denver and Metro in Madison.  He concluded that deep 
discounting of fares “resulted in positive ridership and revenue impacts indicating that it 
offers potential to meet revenue targets while avoiding the ridership loss that invariably
accompanies a general fare increase”. 
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Table 3-6: Summary of Benefits of Deep Discount Fares 
Transit Operators •can enable a prepayment program to be 
revenue neutral• provides a comprehensive/strategic 
framework for marketing-driven •can have the largest impacts on off-peak 
improvements ridership 
• increases transit productivity •creates favorable public and press 
relations •offers escape from "higher fares-
less riding" cycle •can increase private sector support of 
transit promotion •can raise revenues without 
ridership loss • develops a membership/identity 
mentality among riders• builds ridership 
• improves transit's overall image•can boost per capita trip rates 
•encourages more usage by low-
frequency market Transit Users 
•results in reduced fares for those 

reduces turnover and builds rider 

• increases rider commitment, 
choosing to prepay 

retention 
 •raises revenues without raising fares for 
those sensitive to them
 
market research 

•stimulates increased attention on 
•with revenues maximized, the average 
fare can be less 

impacts 

•builds appreciation of marketing's 
•with revenues maximized, fare increases 
are less frequent 

expanded marketing efforts 

•provides resources to finance 
•facilitates an enhanced consumer focus 
overall 

marketing methods 

•promotes use of the most effective 
•makes payment of fares more convenient 
•can be used as a target marketing •can allow fare structures to be simplified 
incentive 
•provides a consumer-based pricing General Public 
strategy •can reduce general subsidy requirements•can enable less emphasis on cost- of transit 
based pricing •improves transit productivity •can be integrated with peak/off­ •expands transit use (reduces congestion, peak fare differentials to improve 
pollution, etc.)their operational and political 
acceptability and expand their •can increase private sector support of 

impact 
 transit promotion 
• eases fare collection 
•can reduce fare evasion 
Source: Oram, 1988, 1990•can allow a reduced reliance on 
monthly transit passes 
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3.4.2 Campus-Based Programs 
Of the three categories of deep discount programs, the campus-based programs appear 
from the literature to be the most widely “evaluated”. Two references are national in 
outlook and are identified as follows: 
Brown, Hess and Shoup (1999) present a survey of “Unlimited Access” programs in 31 
Universities around the nation. The authors assert: a majority of the truly “deep discount
programs” operate in partnership with universities around the country. By the year 2000, 
there were approximately 45 and by 2002 more than 60 such programs in universities 
around the nation. They found from their survey that during the first year of 
implementation, increases in student transit ridership ranged between 70% and 200%
while the average cost to the universities was $32 per student per year.12 Table 3-7 is a 
summary of growth in transit ridership at selected universities due to the deep discount 
program. Additional details about the 31 universities surveyed are summarized in
Appendix 3-1. 
The effects of the programs on the financial performance of transit agencies varied from 
one location to another, but are not dramatic one way or the other. In most cases, the
annual rate of increase in operating cost per ride decreased after inception of the program. 
This resulted in a general reduction in operating subsidy per ride. Details are included in 
Appendix 3-2. 
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Table 3-7: Increases in Transit Ridership in First Year of Deep Discount Programs 
Year 
Began
Annual Student Transit Ridership Fare 
ElasticityUniversity Before After Change 
Cal State Univ., Sacramento 1992 315,000 537,700 + 71% -0.26 
Univ. California, Davis 1990 587,000 1,054,000 +79% -0.28 
Univ. Wisconsin, Madison 1996 812,000 1,653,000 +104% -0.34 
Univ. Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign 
1989 1,058,000 3,102,000 +193% -0.49 
Univ. Colorado, Boulder 1990 300,000 900,000 +200% -0.50 
Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup, 1999, Table 3
Under the emerging programs, a university negotiates with the local transit agency to pay
an annual lump sum based on the frequency of “expected” ridership by program
participants. Participants always include students and in some programs also include 
faculty and staff. Participants use their university identification cards as passes to board 
the transit vehicles. Most often all members of a participating body are included. In some
cases, as at the University of Washington, Seattle, members could opt out of the program. 
Table 3-8 summarizes the types of coverage options in existence. 
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Table 3-8: Deep Discount Program Options at Universities 
Partial Coverage Universal Coverage 
Opt In Opt Out Cannot Opt Out 
Example University of University of University of Colorado, 
Institution California, Irvine Washington, Seattle Boulder 
How program The university buys Students, faculty, and Students are 
works bus passes from the staff are automatically automatically enrolled 
Orange County enrolled but can opt out and cannot opt out.
Transit Authority for and not pay the fee.  Students pay a 
$33.50 per month and Students pay $28 per mandatory transit fee of 
sells the passes to quarter and faculty and $19.52 per semester. 
Percent who 1% of students 74% of students, 100% of students 
participate faculty staff 
University's $246 per year $130 per year $41 per year 
cost per 
Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup, 1999, Table 5
TCRP Synthesis Report #39 (2001) by James Miller is a synthesis of transit practice 
entitled “Transportation on College and University Campuses”. The synthesis discusses 
the range of transit services provided including unlimited access programs and identifies
sources of revenue. The synthesis has determined that typically “all systems start with 
students as the first group of eligible riders”. This is mainly because student travel times 
are predominantly in the off-peak and student demand is not anticipated to overwhelm 
the existing transit service. After the transit system has made operational and financial 
adjustments to increases in ridership, other groups such as faculty and staff are added to 
the program. In certain cases, where increases in student ridership are feared to 
overwhelm the transit system, as at Penn State University and Indiana University, the 
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unlimited access program is initially restricted to designated routes. The study concludes: 
“unlimited access systems appear to be the greatest success for campus transit systems”. 
The literature reveals evaluations of three individual university programs. These three 
studies report similar success stories and may be viewed as representative of the success 
that could be expected when a campus-based deep discount program is well administered. 
The individual studies are outlined as follows: 
Williams and Petrait (1993) discussed the U-PASS program at the University of 
Washington, Seattle in the report, “A Model Transportation Management Program That
Works”. The U-PASS program has been in existence since 1991 and is considered a 
model of success (Williams and Petrait). Its impacts are well documented from biennial 
telephone surveys that have been administered since 1992 to ask a sample of faculty, staff 
and students about their travel behaviors and attitudes. The program allows these three 
groups of affiliates of the university (faculty, staff and students) to ride on “Metro” and
“County” buses at a fraction of the cost of a regular bus pass. Students pay $20 per 
quarter while faculty and staff pay $27. Studies revealed the following: 
•	 It enabled the reduction of parking facilities. The 12,000 current campus parking 
spaces are fewer than existed in 1983 despite the addition of 8,000 more people to 
the campus community since then. 
•	 It helped to avoid building 3,600 new parking spaces that saved $100 million in 
construction costs. 
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•	 It caused a significant shift in mode choice from drive-alone to transit and 
vanpools. The increase in transit patronage is expectedly higher among students 
than faculty and staff. Table 3-9 summarizes the shifts observed in mode choice. 
•	 In response to ridership gains, Metro added 60,000 annual hours of new bus
service, the equivalent of 10 more buses operating for approximately 18 hours a
day. 
Table 3-9: Change in Mode Choice One Year after Initiation of U-PASS Program 
Students Faculty & Staff 
Before After Before After 
Auto Drive Alone 25% 14% 49% 40% 
Transit 21% 35% 21% 28% 
All Others (carpool/vanpool, bicycle, 
walk, “other”) 
54% 51% 30% 32% 
Source: Williams and Petrait
Meyer and Beimborn (1996) and also in TRR 1618 (1990) prepared “An Evaluation of 
an Innovative Transit Pass Program: The UPASS” at the University of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee (UWM). The study examined the effects of the program on transit ridership, 
traffic congestion, parking and other transportation related issues and also assessed its 
transferability to other areas. The program was initiated in 1994 for students and is 
judged to be highly successful. The highlights of the evaluation are the following: 
1. 	 The UPASS program influenced modal shifts as follows: 
	 The share of students who drove to UWM declined from 54% prior to UPASS to 
a rate between 38% and 41% after the implementation of UPASS.  
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	 The share of students who rode Milwaukee County Transit System (MCTS) 
doubled from 12% prior to UPASS to a rate between 25% and 26% after the 
implementation of UPASS.  
 Transit mode share for work trips by survey respondents showed nearly a 

doubling over pre-UPASS semesters from a rate of 8% to approximately 15%.  

 Surveys indicate a 17% to 18% increase in transit ridership for other trip purposes 

compared to pre-UPASS ridership. 
2. The UPASS program reduced vehicle trips to the university, which resulted in 
reductions in emissions and fuel consumption and translated to dollar savings to 
students during the 1994-95 academic year as follows: 
 221,055 fewer vehicle trips 
 5,084,265 fewer VMT for trips to UWM  
 242,108 gallons of fuel savings 
 $295,372 savings in fuel costs 
 20% reduction in emissions for trips to UWM and approximately 0.1% for the 
entire Southeastern Wisconsin region. 
3. Students perceived improvements in the parking situation at the university since 
the implementation of the UPASS program as follows: 
 19% of students indicated parking on-campus was easier 
 16% indicated parking off-campus was easier   
 24% of students who drove prior to the implementation of UPASS and who 
continued to drive indicated they found it easier to locate parking near campus. 
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Brown, Hess and Shoup (2002) present an evaluation of the BruinGO Program at 
UCLA. The study examined: (a) the effects of the program on commuting by faculty, 
staff and students; (b) fare elasticities; (c) parking demand; (d) non-commute trips; and 
(e) costs and benefits. The program, begun in Fall 2000, is reported by the authors to 
incur a cost of about $1.27 per eligible rider per month and a benefit-cost ratio of 4 to 1. 
By Fall 2002, the program resulted in the following13: 
• 56% increase in bus ridership for commuting to campus; 
• 20% decrease in drive-alone commuting; 
• Over 1000 solo drivers gave up their parking spaces 
3.4.3 Employment-Based Programs 
The literature reveals few evaluations of the employment-based programs. Several transit 
agencies have extended the deep discount program to groups outside the university under 
the term “ECO Pass”. Examples include the Denver Regional Transportation District in 
Colorado, Metro in Seattle, Washington and the Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Authority (VTA) in California. Similar programs were in existence in more than a dozen 
metropolitan areas around the country by the late 1990s and are listed in Appendix 3-4. 
Denver – Since inception of the ECO Pass program in 1991, both ridership and revenues 
of the RTD have increased steadily. Chapter 7 presents a detailed case of the Denver 
ECO Pass program. In the six-county Denver metropolitan area, the level of participation 
in 1998 included 1,123 companies and a total of 44,536 employees. Fay Lewis reports 
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estimates in TransAct that the average employee who used the ECO Pass in 1996 would 
have eliminated the following14: 
• 300 single occupancy vehicle trips 
• 5,000 miles of driving 
• 200 gallons of gasoline 
• 200 pounds of pollutants. 
Seattle -- From the success of the U-PASS program, Metro extended the idea of “putting
a transit pass in everyone’s hands at a greatly reduced price” to employers. Today the 
FLEXPASS program serves 130 employers and 74,000 commuters in addition to 
participants of the U-PASS program. The widespread distribution of the program 
encourages both occasional and regular transit riders to the mode.15 
Santa Clara County – Replicating the key feature of the Denver ECO Pass program, 
employers in Santa Clara County, California are required to purchase the pass for all 
employees whether they use the service or not. Thus the VTA is able to offer discounted 
monthly group passes at less than 20% of the price for the conventional monthly pass. 
Even though only 40% of employees for whom passes are purchased actually use them, 
the rate of discount per actual user is approximately 50% of the price for the conventional 
monthly pass. A survey of commuters to the Silicon Valley indicates that the program 
resulted in the following16: 
• Reduction in the drive-alone share from 76% to 60%,  
• Increase in transit mode share from 11% to 27% and  
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• Reduction in parking demand by approximately 19%. 
City of Berkeley -- The City has approximately 1940 employees, of whom 1330 are 
qualified and covered by the program even if they do not use transit. Full time employees 
of the City of Berkeley are issued unlimited ride AC Transit passes in exchange for a 
contractual payment per employee per year by the city government. The large volume
allows the passes to be sold at the relatively low unit cost of $60 a year or $5 per month. 
Thus the ECO pass is offered at approximately 10% of a basic adult monthly pass. 
Chapter 9 contains the case write-up on the City of Berkeley ECO Pass program. 
3.4.4 Residential Location -Based Deep Discount Programs 
Success of the campus and employment based programs led to the introduction of the 
residential ECO Pass programs. The literature search does not reveal evaluations of the 
residential-based programs. The Denver RTD and Santa Clara VTA offer the most 
notable of the programs.17 
Denver RTD – The Neighborhood ECO Pass is a deep discount annual transit pass 
purchased by a neighborhood organization for all members of participating households. 
RTD charges an annual fee per housing unit. The price reflects the number of eligible 
housing units, amount of transit availability and usage. The minimum amount required to 
initiate a Neighborhood ECO Pass contract is the greater of the computed cost for 100 
residential units or $5,000. The Neighborhood Eco Pass program offers substantial 
39
 
  
  
 
 
savings when compared to the per person price of a monthly pass. Chapter 7 presents a 
detailed case of the programs including the Neighborhood ECO Pass program. 
Santa Clara County VTA -- The VTA offers the Residential ECO Pass to residential 
communities of 25 units or more that are defined geographically as apartment or 
condominium complexes, or by neighborhood or community associations. All members 
of the community of age 5 or above must participate. Participants have unlimited access 
to light rail, bus and paratransit services in addition to free “emergency ride home” via 
taxi.18 
The assortment of ECO Pass programs offered by the Denver RTD and the Santa Clara 
VTA exemplifies the general concept of a wide scale deployment of the deep discount 
program that is the motivation for this study. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
Review of the historical dynamics of fares, revenues and ridership confirms that price 
discounts have been able to both increase total revenue receipts and attract ridership. 
Cases reviewed include major transit operations in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and 
Boston. Studies of these systems produce results that point to the conclusion that it is 
preferable to maximize social welfare through the number of persons carried with 
reduced fares than to maximize the level of transit service provided.  
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The literature review differentiated between general discount fare programs and true deep 
discount group pass programs. The group pass is the subject of this dissertation. There are
various versions of deep discount pass programs that may be categorized into four broad 
groups as follows: 
1.  University campus-based programs, which always include students and sometimes
also include faculty and staff. The pioneers and most widely documented 
examples include the U-PASS at the University of Washington, Seattle (1991) 
and the UPASS at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (1994). The ClassPass 
program at U.C. Berkeley (1999) and BruinGO at U.C. Los Angeles (2000) were 
introduced in California relatively recently. Chapter 8 presents a detailed case 
study of the U.C. Berkeley program. 
2.  Employment-based programs exist in more than a dozen metropolitan areas. One
of the oldest and most widely documented is the ECO Pass program in Denver, 
Colorado (1991). In California, the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 
(VTA) offers this type of program to Silicon Valley commuters and AC Transit 
offers it to employees of the City of Berkeley (2002). Chapter 7 presents a 
detailed case study of the Denver programs while Chapter 9 presents a detailed 
case study of the City of Berkeley program. 
3.	 Residential-based programs are offshoots of the employment-based programs. 
One of the oldest is the Neighborhood ECO Pass program in Denver, Colorado 
(1995). In California, the VTA offers this type of program to residents of Santa 
Clara County. 
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4.	 Student pass programs, which are variants of the campus-based programs, 
typically cover middle and high school students. They are offered in Denver and 
New York City. 
The next three chapters are extensions of the literature review. They cover the intellectual 
and theoretical analyses of pricing and the effects of deep discount group pass programs
relative to revenues and ridership. 
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4. TRANSIT AND PRICING 
4.1 THE CASE FOR MARGINAL COST PRICING 
Economists would argue that transit, like other economic goods, should be priced at 
marginal cost if subsidies are to be reduced or eliminated. However, transit is not simply 
an economic good.  It is also a social good stemming from the reasons society has for 
maintaining it in spite of its poor financial performance. The following discussion
explains the economist’s concept of marginal cost pricing and its applicability to public 
transit. 
4.1.1 Definition 
Marginal cost is defined as “the increase in total cost that occurs from producing one 
more unit of output or service”. (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999).19 Charging transit riders the 
marginal cost ensures that they will demand an extra unit of service only when the value 
to them is at least as great as the cost of providing it. An efficient allocation method 
should seek to maximize net “social” benefit (NSB). And NSB may be defined as the 
difference between riders’ willingness to pay for services and the costs of providing the 
services. 
4.1.2 Formulation
Gomez-Ibanez formulated the concept of net social benefit and marginal cost analytically 
as follows: 
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Let 
NSB = net social benefit 
P(X) = inverse demand curve of transit riders  
Q = quantity of unit service demanded 
UC = average cost to a rider of using a unit of transit service 
CC = average amortized cost of providing a unit of system capacity 
L = the number of units of capacity 
Then net social benefit is: 
 NSB = ∫[0,Q] P(X) dX – Q*UC(Q/L) – L*CC(L) (4-1) 
Taking the first derivative of Equation 4-1 with respect to Q, quantity of unit service
demanded, and setting it equal to zero derives the optimal price under first-order 
conditions. (Second order conditions for optimality require that the second derivative is 
negative.) The result provides marginal cost that has the two components of (a) average 
user cost and (b) the change in average cost of serving an additional service demand as
follows: 
P = UC + Q*(∂UC/∂Q) ÎMC (4-2) 
Similarly, taking the first derivative of Equation 4-1 with respect to L, the number of 
units of capacity, and setting it equal to zero derives the optimal level of investment as 
follows: 
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CC + L*(dCC/dL) = - Q*(∂UC/∂L) (4-3) 
Equation 4-3 translates to the following: 
a. On the left-hand side, the marginal cost of adding an additional unit of capacity; 
b. On the right-hand side, the saving in user costs from the additional unit.  
This suggests that a transit agency should expand capacity to the point where the 
marginal cost of providing extra capacity equals the marginal savings it brings to the 
users of its services. 
However, whether pricing transit service at marginal cost is financially efficient or not 
depends on whether its operations exhibit economies or diseconomies of scale. If average 
costs of transit services are not affected by volume of demand, then the “change-in­
average-cost” component of Equation 4-2 is zero and marginal cost equals average cost. 
If operations exhibit economies of scale due to large fixed costs, then marginal cost is
lower than average cost (and the “change-in-average-cost” component is negative). Thus 
pricing at marginal cost will not generate sufficient revenue for the transit agency to be 
financially self-sufficient. In the unlikely event that the agency exhibits diseconomies of 
scale, then the “change-in-average-cost” component is positive and the agency will 
generate surpluses from an allocation procedure based on marginal cost. 
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4.1.3 Limitations of Marginal Cost Pricing 
The discussion so far has indicated some limitations to a blanket advocacy of marginal 
cost pricing. Certain peculiar characteristics of transportation systems make the
application of marginal cost pricing a complex endeavor. (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999)20 These 
are outlined as follows: 
•	 Joint use in which not only a commuter train operator, but intercity passenger and 
freight carriers might share the same track. While joint use enables the spreading of 
cost over a wide clientele, it makes the allocation of costs among the different types 
of users difficult. 
•	 A transit agency is the type of organization whose operations require high levels of 
capital investment and tend to exhibit economies of scale. As discussed, marginal 
costs are thus less than average costs and marginal cost pricing will produce less 
than adequate revenue. 
It is worth noting that with a wide range of users, there may be groups that would try to 
justify low fees and cross-subsidies in their own self-interest by overstating the
complexity in allocating costs based on marginal costs. This could lead to the adoption of 
non-marginal cost pricing schemes. However, alternatives to pure marginal cost pricing 
revealed the following: 
•	 Attempts to apply level payment schemes that deviate from marginal cost pricing 
sometimes lead to a system of cross-subsidies whereby some users pay more than 
marginal cost while others pay less thereby raising issues of equity. 
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•	 Others involve complex pricing schemes that are designed to raise more revenue 
than marginal cost pricing can while seeking to leave usage levels the same. Key 
among such schemes is Ramsey pricing, which is for practical purposes modified
marginal cost pricing. Ramsey pricing is therefore examined next for its
applicability to transit. 
4.2 THE CASE FOR RAMSEY PRICING 
4.2.1 Antecedents 
In their 1970 survey of inverse elasticity pricing methods, Baumol and Bradford 
proposed: “generally, prices which deviate in a systematic manner from marginal costs 
will be required for an optimal allocation of resources, even in the absence of
externalities”.21 They posited that “social welfare will be served most effectively not by 
setting prices equal or even proportionate to marginal costs, but by causing unequal 
deviations in which items with elastic demands are priced at levels close to their marginal 
costs” while “prices of items whose demands are inelastic diverge from their marginal 
costs by relatively wider margins”.22 They concluded, “the percentage deviation of price 
of any taxed commodity from marginal cost should be inversely proportional to its own 
price elasticity of demand”.23 These statements are essentially the tenets of Ramsey
Pricing. 
Baumol and Bradford summed up that “it follows for the economy as a whole that unless
marginal cost pricing happens to provide returns sufficient to meet the social revenue 
requirement, a quasi-optimal allocation calls for systematic deviations of prices from
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marginal costs”. They conclude: “in a world in which marginal cost pricing without 
excise or income taxes is not feasible, the systematic deviations between prices and 
marginal costs may truly be optimal because they constitute the best we can do within the
limitations imposed by normal economic circumstances”.24 With these, they affirmatively
supported the idea of Ramsey pricing that was formally laid down much earlier in 1927.25 
4.2.2 The Idea of Ramsey Pricing 
The idea of Ramsey Pricing is to charge the largest markups over marginal cost to those 
consumers who are least sensitive to price, that is, those who have the least price elastic 
demand. The objective is to minimize the reduction in consumption that would result 
from charging higher prices. This type of pricing is termed “inverse elasticity pricing”. 
This idea of pricing is conceptually very appealing and is often attempted in 
transportation. In public transit, however, those who have the least price elastic demand 
are very likely to include the transit dependent, many of who may be the poor. Charging 
them the largest markups over marginal cost could raise equity issues. 
4.2.3 Formulation 
There are two formulations for Ramsey Pricing. If there are no cross-elasticities of 
demand between the various transit services, Ramsey’s formula to minimize distortions is
the following: 
(Pi – MCi) / Pi = k / Ei        (4-4)  
where 
Pi = price charged for service i 
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MCi = marginal cost of producing service i 
k 	= a constant determined by the amount to be raised to meet a budget target 
Ei = price elasticity of demand for service i. 
In Equation 4-4, the left-hand term shows that the percentage of markup over marginal 
cost for each user is inversely proportional to the user’s demand elasticity, Ei as
conceptually explained. 
If there are cross-elasticities of demand between various transit services, the formula
becomes: 
(Pi – MCi) / Pi = (k / Ei) - Σ(j not i) {[(Pj – MCj) / Pj ]* Eij *[(Pi Qi) / (Pj Qj)]} (4-5) 
where 
Eij = cross-elasticity of demand for j with respect to the price charged service user i 
Equation 4-5 requires not only information about own-price elasticities but also estimates 
of cross-price elasticities.
4.2.4 Limitations of Ramsey Pricing 
The application of Ramsey Pricing to transit services will carry with it its widely 
acknowledged limitations that include the following: 
•	 It is often difficult to estimate the elasticities of demand for different groups of 
users 
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•	 The scheme often sows the seeds of its own demise as it gives those charged high 
mark-ups the incentive to find alternative services or sources. If those who are 
transit dependent are charged high markups, they are likely to find it worthwhile to 
own and travel by the private automobile. Thus this method of pricing can trigger 
some curtailment of patronage in the long run even among the transit dependent. 
•	 Changes in the demand elasticities of users resulting from the above would 
necessitate the calculation of a new set of Ramsey prices. 
•	 As the number of users with inelastic demand declines, it will make it harder to 
charge much above the marginal cost without reducing demand. 
A case application to the U.S. post Office illustrates the limitations of Ramsey Pricing.
William Tye (1983) found in this case that the Ramsey pricing formula was “very
sensitive to the direct- and cross-price elasticities assumed and that these elasticities were 
seldom known with great precision”. When estimated, “the standard errors of the 
estimated elasticities were often very high, so that very different mark-ups over marginal 
cost among mail classes were based on statistically insignificant differences in the 
estimated elasticities”.26 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that using Ramsey pricing is by and large 
using marginal cost pricing, but with markups. The issue therefore is not the choice 
between marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. It is a question of whether marginal 
cost pricing and its variants, Ramsey pricing and other inverse elasticity pricing methods, 
are appropriate applications in public transit. 
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4.3 COST RECOVERY IN TRANSIT 
4.3.1 Marginal Cost Pricing versus Price Discrimination27 
Marginal cost pricing and its variants imply two principal methods of economic pricing. 
The discussion so far does not support either method for use in transit. Prest (1969) 
makes a brief comparison of the two methods for clarity. 
A system of marginal cost pricing equates benefits with costs at the margin. It is implied
that if price, defined as marginal benefit, exceeds marginal cost, there will be an incentive
to expand output until any difference is eliminated. 
A system of price discrimination approximates in the limit to one of charging according 
to total benefit. It is implied that total revenue is equal to the whole area under the 
demand curve and consumers are deprived of all consumers’ surpluses. Under price 
discrimination, it may be sensible to price transit usage below marginal cost if a higher 
fare means a reduction in usage and hence a smaller incremental return to the operation.
4.3.2 The Problem with Marginal Cost Pricing in Transit 
A problem arises when marginal cost (MC) pricing is used in transit because the prices
do not generate sufficient revenue to cover costs. This occurs when average total cost is
greater than marginal cost because of any of the following: 
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1.	 Decreasing costs and economies of scale ~ MC pricing implies that fares are fixed
on the basis of marginal operating costs and that fixed costs are ignored. 
2.	 Discontinuities in variable costs ~ an extra passenger may be responsible for zero 
additional cost, if he could find an empty seat on the transit vehicle, or for the 
provision of an extra vehicle or an extra run. Thus strict adherence to the principle 
can lead to tremendous volatility in prices with sudden changes in demand or major 
discontinuities in variable costs. 
3.	 Consistency across sectors ~ the proposition holds for a sector if all other sectors of 
the economy operate on similar principles. It is well known and argued, for
instance, that use of the automobile, the primary competition to transit, is excessive 
because it is not priced at marginal cost. Using marginal cost pricing in transit will 
thus not be consistent even within the transportation sector. 
4.	 Externalities ~ MC pricing also assumes that the externalities and the consequences 
of resorting to general government revenues to finance deficits can be ignored. 
4.3.3 Why Transit Runs at A Loss 
As previously discussed, society has reasons to maintain transit service. In addition to
these reasons, there has been the consistent tendency to over-estimate demand and over­
invest in transit capacity. There is also the peak demand that must be catered for. Both of 
these latter factors result in the procurement of larger capital equipment, design of larger 
operations and employment of more personnel than needed. Thus society is forced to fall 
back on government subsidies to keep operations running. 
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4.3.4 Subsidies in Transit 
Subsidies are generally introduced for several reasons. Dalrymple (1975) identified those 
outlined as follows:28 
•	 To stimulate development or consumption of some desired activity or service 
•	 To stimulate development of a particular area 
•	 To redress deficiencies in income distribution 
•	 To reduce risks of speculative activity such as research and development 
•	 To encourage activity that yields external economies. The transit sector, for
instance, is purported to help in the revival of urban centers and to generate 
economic spin off on local economies. 
However criticisms and concerns have been expressed that subsidies result in the 
following: 
•	 Lead to unanticipated distortions elsewhere in the economy 
•	 Require counter-subsidies to offset distortions created 
•	 Become burdensome administratively 
•	 Inhibit incentives to efficiency 
•	 Give unwarranted market protection 
•	 Become difficult to terminate. 
Thus it is argued as undesirable to fall on government subsidy as a financial solution to 
the shortfall in transit revenue because of the following: 
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1.	 Subsidy from public funds can only come from the generation of more public 
revenue, more borrowing or less spending elsewhere so that the consequences of 
any of these courses of action may be substantially worse than the loss of benefits 
to consumers through paying fares higher than marginal variable cost.
2.	 On the grounds of income distribution, there is a stronger case for meeting the
deficit out of pockets of transit consumers rather than from those who would pay 
the higher taxes or receive less from government spending.
3.	 Once started, subsidies breed expectations of further subsidies and so become
conducive to inefficiency in management. Organized labor pitches demands for
wage increases at much higher levels if it thinks the public purse can provide more.
4.3.5 Traditional Methods of Cost Recovery in Transit 
For these reasons, therefore, it is argued as preferable to make the consumers of the 
service pay for the deficits. Three methods are traditionally employed to make consumers
absorb deficits as follows: 
1.	 Discriminatory pricing ~ this is traditionally used in railway ratemaking and in the 
pricing of airfares. It is in many ways similar in concept to such modified marginal 
cost pricing schemes as Ramsey pricing. 
2.	 Two-part tariff ~ whereby each consumer pays a fixed or quasi-fixed sum as well as 
according to the amount consumed. For instances many transit agencies charge
zone fares that vary by length of trip over and above a basic fare. This method has
the drawback that it is likely to keep out some consumers and so reduce
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consumption below what it would be if based purely on marginal cost. It will thus 
in turn reduce the usage of capacity below the optimum level. 
3.	 Long range marginal cost pricing ~ will ensure that capital as well as variable costs 
are considered, but deficits may not necessarily be eliminated while it can result in 
reduction in usage below the optimum level. 
While all these methods are invariably applied in transit fare pricing, there are no unique 
principles for choosing between them. Besides, all these methods may be weak 
instruments when benefits are not concentrated on a discernible body of consumers. Thus 
there is no clear or easy answer to the dilemma posed by the need to maintain service
versus the desire to reduce or eliminate subsidies. One answer is to devise ways of 
increasing revenue without driving away patronage. This is what a well-crafted deep 
discount program would attempt to accomplish.  
This research proposes that transit services are offered in multiple product configurations 
in the attempt both to appeal to users and to elicit the most revenues. Product 
configurations are to include the following: 
•	 Single-fare rides for the occasional and convenience user as widely in existence 
•	 Periodic pass (daily, weekly, monthly) rides for habitual, yet individual users as 
already in existence 
•	 Deep discount group passes for easily targeted groups akin to group health 
insurance plans. This is also in existence, but not widely deployed despite the 
potential it offers as a relatively “profitable” source of revenue. 
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The analogy of the deep discount group pass to a group insurance plan is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
4.4 OPPORTUNITY COST AND DEEP DISCOUNT PROGRAMS 
The decisions of travelers to drive or to take an alternative mode and to seek parking or
not to be bothered with parking all imply alternative allocations of the resources available 
to them. The concept of cost is fundamental to the comparison of alternatives. The
concept of costs could refer to those incurred by society or by individuals or agencies.
Thus three different definitions may arise in the evaluation of costs and benefits 
(Friedman, 2002) of deep discount programs as follows: 
Social opportunity cost is defined as the value forgone in using resources in one activity 
by not using them in the next best alternative activity. The concept treats a whole
community as if it were one large family so that all things forgone are counted as part of
the social cost. The concept is most relevant in efficiency considerations. 
Private opportunity cost is defined as the payment necessary to keep a resource in its
current use. It is similar to social cost, but may be different if the prices of resources do 
not reflect their full social costs. It represents the value in its next best alternative use 
from the point of view of the individual who employs the resource. The concept is 
important because individual decision makers are thought to act on their perceptions of 
costs, that is, their private opportunity costs. 
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Accounting cost is the bookkeeper’s view and reflects what is recorded on financial 
statements and budgets of agencies. For instance the cost to construct one parking space 
is an accounting cost. The social opportunity cost may be larger and represents 
alternatives forgone such as use of the space for buildings, environmental pollution 
associated with use of the space, etc.
The concept of opportunity cost may be illustrated in the context of the deep discount 
analysis as follows. Suppose an agency, such as a University, has the choice to allocate 
resources (say a transportation budget) to the provision of either transit passes or parking 
for its employees. The opportunity cost of providing parking, for instance, is the transit
pass forgone. More realistically the concern would lie with the minimum number of 
parking spaces that could be forgone if use of transit passes were to increase by one unit. 
This is even better stated as how many parking spaces the university might not need to 
spend construction funds on because of the availability of transit passes to its affiliates. 
Consistent with the compensation principle in economics, “a change in allocation is 
relatively efficient if its social benefits exceed its social costs”29. Thus if the provision of 
passes results in higher societal benefits than the parking forgone, then the decision to 
provide passes is an efficient one. 
As individuals choose between travel-with-transit-pass and drive-to-park in order to 
maximize their individual utilities, the composite of choices would maximize social 
benefits less social costs or equivalently net social benefits. This is so because individual 
decisions on choice to travel or not to travel with the deep discount pass may be viewed 
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as consumption decisions that maximize consumer surplus. Likewise transit agency
decisions on the terms of deep discount programs may be viewed as production decisions
to maximize producer surplus. The sum of the consumer and producer surpluses is the net
social benefit. The concept of a “surplus” thus equates to net benefit because it represents
the difference between benefits and costs. 
In the assessment of cost impacts, two distinctions are necessary. One is the assessment
whether society is made relatively more efficient by the pass program. The other is the
assessment of the program’s effects from the perspectives of such constituencies as 
participants in the deep discount program, university administrations, other governing 
bodies and service providers. The latter assessment can help determine potential support 
for the program by these constituents or in evaluating the equity of the deep discount 
program. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
Review of the intellectual literature on pricing reveals that both marginal cost pricing and 
modified marginal cost pricing schemes like Ramsey Pricing are conceptually appealing
in general, but have limitations when applied to public transit. The foremost reason for 
the mismatch is the fact that transit operations fall among the types of organizations that 
require high levels of capital investment and tend to exhibit economies of scale. Such 
organizations typically have marginal costs that are less than average cost so that 
marginal cost pricing produces less than adequate revenue. Traditional pricing methods
such as price discrimination, two-part tariffs and long range marginal cost pricing may be 
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weak instruments for pricing when benefits are not concentrated on a discernible body of 
consumers. Thus there is no clear or easy answer to the dilemma posed by the need to
maintain service while reducing or eliminating subsidies. The deep discount group pass
program may be a device for increasing revenue without driving away patronage. How 
the group pass can achieve this is the crux of the discussion in the next two chapters. 
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5. ANALOGIES TO INSURANCE AND RISK SPREADING30 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research proposes that deep discount group passes are offered to easily targeted 
groups similar to the way group health insurance or property insurance plans are 
administered. This analogy explains the paradox of how offering deep discounts can 
result in net increases in total revenue. The analogy is outlined in the form of comparative 
tables first in terms of risk spreading and then in terms of insurance.
5.2 RISK SPREADING 
5.2.1 The Concept of Risk Spreading 
Risk spreading occurs when different individuals share the returns from one risky 
situation.31 In transit, the risk may be viewed as the indebtedness associated with
provision of services and the returns may be viewed as the available transit services.32 
The analogy of deep discount programs in transit operations to risk spreading is sketched 
in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Comparison in Terms of Risk Spreading 
A Firm A Transit Agency 
A firm diversifies ownership 
through the stock market by issuing 
common stock. 
A transit agency diversifies responsibility for 
generating fare revenue by selling the 
responsibility in the form of passes. 
By this move, a single firm can 
allow many individuals to bear only 
a small portion of the total risk of 
operating the firm. 
The transit agency thus allows many individuals 
to bear only a small portion of the 
responsibility. 
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5.2.2 Illustration of Risk Spreading 
The advantage of risk spreading is that the sum of the costs of risk faced by each
individual is significantly lower than if there were a single risk-taker. This is so because 
the risk cost is approximately proportional to the variance. And risk spreading reduces the 
variance more than proportionately and thus reduces the risk cost. For example, 1/10th 
reduction in expected value results in 1/100th of the original variance. This is illustrated
by Friedman (2002) as follows: 
Let us suppose one large investment owned by one person were divided into ten equal, 
smaller investments among ten individual investors. The expected value of the 
investment would remain the same whether it is a single or ten smaller investments. 
However the variance that each investor would experience will change significantly as
follows: 
Let, 
Xi represent the ith outcome of the one large investment; πi its probability; and 
Xi/10 represents how much each of the ten investors would receive in state i.
Then, 

Var(X/10) = Σπi[E(Xi/10) - Xi/10]2
 
And factoring out 1/10 

= (1/10)2 Σπi[E(Xi) - Xi]2
 = (1/100) Var(X) 
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The illustration reveals that when the risk is spread, each individual investor receives 
1/10 of the expected value, but only 1/100 of the original variance, which is far less than 
the proportionate reduction of 1/10. A lower variance implies a lower level of uncertainty 
or risk. Because the cost of risk is approximately proportional to the variance, the cost of 
risk of each smaller investment is substantially less than 1/10 that of the original one-
owner investment.  
5.2.3 Risk Spreading and Diminishing Marginal Utility 
The risk spreading may also be viewed in terms of diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
The concept states that as an individual acquires more units of wealth, the total utility
received increases, but the extra or marginal utility decreases. Viewed the opposite way 
in terms of risk, a larger gamble represents not only a larger total but also a larger 
marginal risk cost. Just as the expected utility gain from a second winning is less than 
that from the first, so also is the expected utility lost from a second unit of loss exceeds 
that of the first unit of loss. The marginal risk cost increases therefore as the stakes 
increase. Thus when two or more similar individuals share the risk from one risky event, 
each has a lower risk cost than one individual facing the risk alone. This is one of the 
basic rationales behind insurance programs, stock shares and futures contracts. 
5.3 INSURANCE 
5.3.1 The Concept of Insurance 
Pooling is the concept behind insurance. Risk pooling occurs when a group of 
individuals, each facing a risk that is independent of the risks faced by the others, agree to 
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share any losses (or gains) among themselves.33 Insurance therefore represents a large 
pool of people who agree to divide any losses among themselves. The analogy of deep 
discount programs in transit operations to insurance is outlined in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2: Comparison in Terms of Insurance 
Insurance Company Transit Agency 
An insurance company that insures 
properties against theft does not care 
whose property is stolen. Its concern is 
that the total premiums it collects will 
(at least) cover the total cost of
replacing the property that is stolen.34 
It does not matter to the transit agency 
which members of a group use the service it 
provides. It is concerned that the total group 
revenue covers the “total cost” of providing 
the service. 
An insurance company is an 
intermediary, which organizes the pools 
and incurs transaction costs. 
Transit agency is a facilitator, which 
promotes the pool through deep discount 
pass programs and incurs transaction costs. 
As the number of people in the pool 
gets larger, the risk cost and often the 
transaction costs become smaller and
the premium approaches the fair level. 
As the number of participants increases, the 
unit service and transaction costs become
smaller and the price per participant (or per 
pass) reduces. 
5.3.2 Hypothetical Example 
This illustration of the basics of insurance is adapted from Friedman (2002) as follows: 
Let us assume the following: 
$5,000 = Value of property to be insured per household 
0.2 = the probability that any household’s property will be stolen 
63
 
  
   
   
  
  
 
 
 
To provide full coverage insurance at the fair entry price, the premium must equal
the expected loss. 
Let: 
E(V) = ΣN Πi Xi  (5-1) 
Where 
E(V) = expected loss 
Πi =  probability of occurrence 
Xi = payoff or value of property 
N = possible states (‘i = 1: stolen’ or ‘i = 2: not stolen’) 
And Equation 5-1 interprets as: 

“The sum of (probability a property is stolen times the value of property stolen) +

(probability a property is not stolen times the value of the un-stolen property).” 

This calculates as: 
E(V) = 0.2(5000) + 0.8(0) 
= 1000 
The expected loss fair premium from the hypothetical example therefore is $1,000 per 
household. By the law of large numbers, it is virtually certain that the insurance company 
will total claims from 20% of the insured households, which equals the premium 
collected. 
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By shifting the risk to the insurance company where it is pooled, the risk cost is reduced 
for all insured. Without the insurance, each household would have to set aside $5,000 to
replace the property if stolen. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
The analogy to insurance and risk pooling explains how deep discount programs can 
increase revenues to transit operators. By selling group passes, the transit agency
diversifies the responsibility for generating fare revenues with participating groups. As 
the number of participants in the pool increases, the unit service and transaction costs
become smaller and the price per pass reduces. Lower pass prices translate to higher 
levels of discount relative to regular pass prices. The next chapter explores how the deep 
discount group pass affects ridership. 
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6. A GENERALIZED FRAMEWORK FOR FARE DISCOUNTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the analogy of deep discount group pass programs to insurance and risk-pooling 
schemes, an important policy question that may arise is how the participation of groups in 
the programs might affect the demand for transit. Like an insurance scheme, because 
deep discount programs lower the out-of-pocket costs to participants, some increase in 
demand is to be expected. A follow-up question is how large the increase would be. The
degree of change would depend on the fare elasticity of demand for transit. The elasticity 
of demand with respect to out-of-pocket cost therefore explains how offering deep 
discount programs can result in increased transit ridership. 
6.2 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND 
6.2.1 Definition35 
Economists define the elasticity of demand with respect to price as the relative 
responsiveness in the quantity of a commodity purchased per unit of time to a change in 
its price. In public transit, fare elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness in the quantity 
of rides purchased to a change in the fare. In mathematical terms, eX,Y, the elasticity of 
one variable, X (say ridership), with respect to another variable, Y (say fare), is the
percentage change that occurs in X in response to a 1 percent change in Y. It is expressed 
in terms of macro change and termed “arc elasticity” as: 
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eX,Y, = 	 ∆X/X = ∆X . Y (6-1) 
∆Y/Y ∆Y X 
And in terms of partial derivatives and termed “point elasticity” as follows: 
eX,Y, = 	 ∂X/X = ∂X . Y (6-2) 
∂Y/Y ∂Y X 
6.2.2 The Components of Response to Fare Reduction 
The response to a change in fare or out-of-pocket cost is decomposable into two parts: an
income effect and a substitution effect. The response is illustrated in Figure 6-1, which 
assumes that a traveler chooses between two modes of transportation, transit and auto. 
Initially, the traveler maximizes utility at point A where his indifference curve, Uo, meets
his budget constraint, Io, by consuming Xo quantity of transit. When the deep discount
pass program causes his out-of-pocket cost to fall, the individual’s indifference curve will 
shift outward to become UI, while the budget constraint rotates outward to form the new
budget constraint denoted II. Now the traveler maximizes utility at point C where his new 
indifference curve, UI, meets his new budget constraint, II, by consuming XI quantity of 
transit. This is, however, a two-step adjustment process as follows: 
1.	 First, consumption will expand from Xo to Xs in response to the new price 
assuming the individual was compelled to remain on the initial indifference curve. 
Termed the substitution effect, or pure price effect or compensated price effect, it is 
determined by finding the budget constraint, Is, with the same slope as II reflecting 
the reduced price. The difference in the two new budget constraints, (II – Is) is the
compensation required to keep utility at the initial level. 
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Figure 6-1: Income and Substitution Effects of Out-of-pocket Cost Reduction for 

Transit Travel Due to Deep Discount Pass Programs 

Adapted from Friedman (2002), Figure 4-4, p89. 
2.	 Second, the income e ffect occurs whereby the change in the quantity of rides
caused exclusively by the change in budget brings the individual from the initial to 
the new utility level while holding fare constant. Consumption will expand from Xs 
to XI maxim izing utility at point C where the new indifference curve, UI, is tangent 
to the new budget constraint, II. 
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6.2.3 Analytics of Income and Substitution Effects 
The utility-maximizing choice of an individual depends on the prices of goods (Pi) or 
transport mode including X, the transit m ode, and the budget level (I). In response to
changes in any of the parameters, say fare or income, the individual will change demand 
for the good, say transit rides. The responses are reflected in a demand function that may 
be generalized as follows: 
X = D (P , P , . . . ., P , . . . ., P , I) 1 x n (6-3)x 2 
Income Elasticity 
Taking the partial derivative of the demand equation with respect to income will provide 
a measure of the response to a unit increase in income. The income elasticity is defined
therefore as: 
eX,I, = ∂X/X = ∂X . I (6-4) 
∂I/I ∂I X 
Where eX,Y, denotes the elasticity of one variable, X (say ridership), with respect to 
another variable, I (say Inc ome ), 
Price Elastici ty 
Simil arly, taking the partial derivative of the demand equation with respect to price
(expressed as ∂X/∂Px) will provide a m easure of the response to a unit increase in price.
The price elasticity is defined therefore as:  
eX,Px, = ∂X/X = ∂X . Px (6-5) 
∂Px/Px ∂ Px  X 
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Total Effect and the Slutsky Equation36 
The Slutsky equation describes the decomposition of the total effect of a price change to
its component income and substitution effects as follows: 
∂X = ∂X ⏐ -X ∂X (6-6) 
∂Px ∂Px ⏐U=U0 ∂I 
Where 
(a) The first term on the right is the substitution effect in which utility level is held
constant at its initial level of U . o 
(b) The second term on the right is the income effect which is proportional in size to 
the individual’s initial consumption level of good X, transit. 
The Slutsky equation may be rewritten in terms of price and income elasticities by
multiplying both sides by Px/X and the last term by I/I as follows: 
∂X . Px  = ∂X ⏐ Px -X ∂X Px  I (6-7) 
∂ Px  X ∂Px ⏐U=U0  X ∂I X I 
(a) The left side term is now the same as the price elasticity, eX,Px, (Equation 6-5); 
s(b) The first term on the right side is the substitution elasticity, e X,Px 
(c ) Rearranging the second term on the right side produces the income elasticity, 
eX,I, (Equation 6-4) and the proportion of income spent on good X, -( Px X) / I. 
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 Equation 6-7 may be written more concisely therefore in terms of price and income
elasticities as: 
se	 , = e  -( P  X) / I e (6-8)  X,Px X,Px x X,I 
6.3 EMPIRICAL ELASTICITIES IN TRANSIT 
Table 6-1 presents some empirical estimates of the fare elasticities of demand for transit 
in general and for selected deep discount group pass programs. The following are 
noteworthy: 
•	 In general, all elasticities are larger than -1 and range between -0.26 and -0.6 
indicating that the demand for transit service is quite inelastic. However, the figures 
suggest that the demand may expand as a result of reduction in the effective fares 
whether directly in per ride fares or indirectly in out-of-pocket cost through deep 
discount programs. 
These observations carry certain policy implications. The elasticities do not justify
the concern that implementation of deep discount programs could overwhelm 
existing operations. This is especially so vis-à-vis the fact that approximately 27% 
of existing transit capacity is used overall in urban areas (Brown, Hess and Shoup, 
1999). 
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Table 6-1: Comparative Fare Elasticities1 
Transit in General 
By Time of Day2 Peak -0.17 
Off-Peak -0.40 
By Trip Purpose2 Work -0.10 
School -0.19 
Shopping -0.23 
By Mode3 Rail -0.26 
Bus -0.46 
College Campus-Based Student Deep Discount Programs4 
California State University, Sacramento -0.26 
University of California, Davis -0.28 
University of Wisconsin, Madison -0.34 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign -0.49 
University of Colorado, Boulder -0.50 
University of California, Berkeley5 -0.60 
Employment-Based Deep Discount Programs5 
City of Berkeley Employees – AC transit -0.33 
Silicon Valley Employees – Santa Clara VTA -0.60 
College Campus-Based Mixed-Affiliate Deep Discount Programs5 
University of Washington, Seattle – Students  -0.28 
University of Washington, Seattle – Faculty and Staff -0.17 
1 Mid-point arc elasticities 
2 Mayworm et al, 1980, p xi37 
3 Savage, 2002, Table 138 
4 Shoup et al, 1999, Table 339 
5 Author’s estimate40 
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•	 The responsiveness to fare changes may differ significantly by time of day, trip 
purpose, transit mode, and type of fare instrument. The largest responses are likely 
to occur during off-peak periods (when excess capacity is most likely to be 
available) and for the bus travel mode, which is more ubiquitous than the rail 
modes. 
This implies that groups need to be carefully selected to maximize benefits from the 
use of existing transit capacity. Participants who need to travel more during the off-
peak than peak periods are therefore prime candidates for deep discount programs. 
•	 In general, deep discount programs exhibit higher fare elasticities than the industry 
as a whole. This implies that it may be more beneficial to direct efforts at 
promoting deep discount programs than general fare reductions. 
6.4 GENERALIZED IMPLICATIONS OF ELASTICITIES 
6.4.1 Geometric Interpretations of Responses to Fare Changes 
Figure 6-2 depicts hypothetical plots of demand elasticities with respect to deep discount 
fares. The following are noteworthy: 
•	 If elasticity is zero as in “Curve A”, change in ridership due to the institution of the
deep discount pass program is also zero. This means there is no benefit to the 
agency nor employer (or payer) except for the existing transit riders within the 
group who would enjoy lower fares. 
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• If elasticity is very low as in “Curve B”, a large reduction in out-of-pocket cost due 
to the deep discount pass will trigger a less than proportionate increase in riders. 
The payer (employer or group) may end up paying more per ride than the transit 
agency previously recovered from that market segment. The operator will therefore
make a net gain in revenue. 
• If elasticity is high as in “Curve C”, then a reduction in out-of-pocket cost due to 
the deep discount pass program will trigger a larger than proportionate increase in
riders. In this case, the payer (employer or group) is likely to pay less per ride than 
the transit agency previously recovered. The operator could therefore incur a net 
revenue loss per ride. However, the agency could still make a gain in total net 
revenue if the product of pass price and quantity of participants is higher than the 
revenue generated from previous transit riders in the group. This situation thus still 
remains advantageous to the transit agency where there is existing capacity to be
filled by the new riders. 
• If, as is quite possible, the elasticity curve is non-linear as in “Curve D” of Figure 
6-3, then either of the last two situations discussed could result depending on the 
origin and destination points of the changes in price. As shown, results related to
either elastic or inelastic conditions could occur. For this reason, it is necessary to 
know the shape of the elasticity curve and the loci of prices and quantities if a
reliable projection is to be made. 
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Figure 6-2: Hypothetical Demand Curves of Different Elasticities  
Figure 6-3: Hypothetical Non-Linear Demand Curve 
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6.4.2 Analytics of Price vs. Patronage Implications 
Let us define variables as follows: 
Pg = equivalent monthly unit price of the deep discount pass sold to a group 
Ps = standard monthly pass price 
Ng = number of persons passes are purchased for in a group 
Rb = number of transit riders from the group before implementation of the pass 
program
Ra = number of transit riders in the group following implementation of the pass 
program
Io, Ic = revenue from passes sold to the group before and after pass implementation 
respectively
Then current revenue from pass holders is the cost of pass to purchasers represented as: 
Ic = Pg * Ng = ΣNg Pg (6-9)  
And previous transit revenue is now lost revenue under the pass program represented as: 
Io = Ps * Rb = ΣRb Ps (6-10)  
Implications
If Ic > Ra * Ps ceteris paribus, then the payer (employer, group, or association) loses 
If Ic < Ra * Ps ceteris paribus, then the transit agency loses 
If Ic = Ra * Ps ceteris paribus, then no party makes a gain from the program. 
Estimation 
It may be necessary to make future projections during planning and negotiations leading 
to the institution of a deep discount group pass program. Empirical elasticities may be
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used under ceteris paribus assumptions if the projected conditions are similar to those 
under which the empirical estimates were derived. 
1.	 Future Riders (Ra) 
Ra = ƒ(eX,Px, Rb) = Rb (1 + ⏐eX,Px ⏐) for 0.26 ≤ ⏐eX,Px ⏐≤ 0.60 (6-11) 
2.	 Unused Passes (Ng - Ra) 
(1- ⏐eX,Px ⏐max) ≤ (Ng - Ra) ≤ (1- ⏐eX,Px ⏐min) (6-12) 
(1- 0.60) ≤ (Ng - Ra) ≤ (1- 0.26) 
6.5 ATTRACTIVENESS OF DEEP DISCOUNT PRICING 
6.5.1 General Attractiveness 
The attractiveness of deep discount pricing is the fact that pass prices tend to be very 
close in magnitude even if the base or regular fares were wide apart to begin with. Figure 
6-4 illustrates this point. For a variety of regular periodic passes that are priced from $50 
to $100 each, a deep discount price of $10 across the board will translate to deep discount 
levels of 80% to 90%. Viewed from a different perspective, a 90% discount across the 
board will result in deep discount fares that range between $5 and $10, all of which are
extremely low relative to the regular fares. This fact could minimize contentions from 
stakeholder groups about the equity of prices among various deep discount programs. 
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Figure 6-4: Discount Level by Unit Pass Price by Regular Pass Fare 
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6.5.2 Hypothetical Examples 
Figures 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7 illustrate, for hypothetical cases, the minimum required number
of passes that need to be sold in order to achieve desired revenue margins over existing 
receipts at various levels of deep discount prices. The charts illustrate that deep discount 
pricing is most attractive when populations of target groups are large. Minimal pass 
prices can yield significant margins on revenue if the target groups are sufficiently large. 
They also illustrate that the required minimum number of passes for a given group 
increases in proportion to the number of existing riders for given pass prices. This is also 
demonstrable analytically with the equation for calculating the required number of passes 
(Ng) as a function of the standard monthly pass price (Ps), the deep discount pass price 
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(Pg), the desired margin over existing revenue (Tm) and the number of existing transit 
users (Rb) within the group. 
Ng = (Ps / Pg) * (1 + Tm) * Rb (6-13) 
Figure 6-5: Deep Discount Price by Required Number of Passes (Case I) 
Minimum Required Passes by Discount Price by Desired Revenue Margin
 
For $50 Regular Monthly Pass & 90 Existing Riders
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The charts illustrate that a transit agency could offer very high discounts (at say 90% of 
standard pass prices) to target groups with large memberships and still make net gains on 
revenue. For example, supposing an employer purchased 1,330 passes for employees at
the equivalent rate of $5 per month and previously, 90 employees used transit at the
regular pass price of $50 per month. Figure 6-5 shows that the transit agency can earn 
more than a 50% margin over previous revenue for offering the program to the group .
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The same example with 90 existing riders requires that 900 deep discount passes are sold 
to earn a 100% margin on existing revenue with a deep discount pass price of $10 (Figure 
6-5). Comparatively, if there were 880 existing riders, 8,800 passes would have to be sold 
to earn a 100% margin on existing revenue with a deep discount pass price of $10 (Figure 
6-6). However if the standard pass fare were double at $100, the example with 90 
existing riders requires that twice as many or 1,800 deep discount passes are sold to earn 
a 100% margin on existing revenue with a deep discount pass price of $10 (Figure 6-7). 
Figure 6-6: Deep Discount Price by Required Number of Passes (Case II) 
Minimum Required Passes by Discount Price by Desired Revenue Margin
 
For $50 Regular Monthly Pass & 880 Existing Riders
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Figure 6-7: Deep Discount Price by Required Number of Passes (Case III) 
Minimum Required Passes by Discount Price by Desired Revenue Margin
 
For $100 Regular Monthly Pass & 90 Existing Riders
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6.6 SUMMARY 
With deep discount passes, program participants respond to the resultant reduction in out-
of-pocket cost of riding transit by increasing the number of rides taken. This is consistent 
with the utility-maximizing choice behavior of individuals. This consumer response is 
decomposable into two parts: an income effect and a substitution effect. This 
decomposition of the total effect of the change in out-of-pocket cost (the surrogate for 
price) is explained by the Slutsky Equation in terms of price elasticity, income elasticity,
and substitution elasticity. 
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Comparisons of empirical elasticities reveal that deep discount programs exhibit 
generally higher fare elasticities than those in the transit industry as a whole. This imp lies 
that it may be more beneficial to direct efforts at promoting deep discount programs than 
general fare reductions. The responsiveness to fare changes may differ significantly by 
time of day, trip purpose, transit mode, and type of fare instrument. This implies that 
groups need to be carefully selected to maximize benefits from the use of existing transit 
capacity. Participants who need to travel more during the off-peak than peak periods are 
therefore prime candidates for deep discount programs. 
The attractiveness of deep discount pricing lies in the fact that pass prices tend to be very 
close in magnitude even if the base or regular fares were wide apart to begin with. For 
instance, 90% discounts on $50 and $100 fares produce $5 and $10 respectively, which 
are quite similar in magnitude. This fact could contribute to minimizing contentions from 
stakeholder groups about the equity of prices among various deep discount programs. 
The next three chapters present detailed case study examples of the various types of deep 
discount group pass programs. The case studies provide first-hand information on how 
the programs work, changes in travel behavior of program participants in response to 
changes in out-of-pocket costs, and the effects on transit agency operations in terms of 
ridership and revenues. 
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7. THE DENVER RTD ECO PASS PROGRAMS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Regional Transportation District (RTD) of Denver has instituted one of the oldest, 
employment-based, deep discount transit pass programs in the country. The design of the
program provides a model that other transit providers seem to emulate. The term, ECO is 
originally an acronym for “employee commute options”. As the program is extended 
from employment-based to residential-based passes, the term tends more and more to 
connote both “economical” and “ecological”. 
7.2 TYPES OF PROGRAMS 
RTD offers four types of deep discount programs in addition to regular periodic passes. 
The first is the employment-based ECO Pass. Its success led to the institution of the
residential-based deep discount pass termed, the Neighborhood ECO Pass. Another is the 
campus-based College Pass program. A variant of the latter is the TeenPass that is sold 
through middle and high schools. RTD offers three other types of “discounted” passes 
that are not considered true deep discount fare instruments according to the definition in
this document and are therefore not included in the analysis. They include the
following:41 
•	 ValuPass: The ValuPass is available for any monthly pass category. A rider who 
pays for ten months in advance can get two months free. 
•	 Just For Youth: This pass is available for the youth age 18 and under. It sells for 
$10.00 per month, but is only available for the months of June, July and August. 
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•	 GradPass: Each year, RTD offers the GradPass, a free summer bus/train pass, to all 
graduating 8th graders. 
The City of Boulder located approximately 20 miles to the northwest of Denver offers all 
these programs and many other experimental programs. The Boulder program is
overviewed in Appendix 7-1. 
7.3 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The primary goal of the ECO Pass was to increase transit ridership. Its secondary goals 
aimed at improving the quality of life in the region through reductions in traffic 
congestion, air pollution, vehicle miles traveled and the impact of the automobile on the 
environment.  
The objective of the program was to promote transit as an alternative to driving alone
through the provision of a low-cost fringe benefit to workers. Its targeted subjects are 
expanded to include neighborhood residents and students. 
7.4 HOW THE PROGRAMS WORK 
7.4.1 The Employment-based ECO Pass42 
Universality ~ The Eco Pass is an annual transit pass. A participating employer purchases 
the transit pass for all full time employees in the organization.
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Unlimited Ride ~ The pass is in the form of a photo ID card that permits pass holders to 
make an unlimited number of rides on all RTD services (excluding special services) 7
days a week for an entire year. Holders can ride: 
• Local, Express or Regional buses 
• SkyRide bus service to Denver International Airport  
• Light Rail 
• Call-n-Ride 
Guaranteed Ride Home ~ All Eco Pass cardholders are eligible to use the Guaranteed 
Ride Home Program from RideArrangers. This peace-of-mind program gives pass
holders a FREE taxi ride home in the event of an emergency, illness or unexpected 
schedule change that requires them to work late. They may use the Guaranteed Ride
Home Program on any day they ride the bus or use another form of alternative 
transportation to get to work.  
Innovative Financing ~ The program adopts an insurance concept for financing the ECO 
Pass. That is why an employer purchases passes for all employees, regardless of the level 
of individual use or whether every employee would use the program or not. The large 
volumes allow the passes to be sold at relatively low unit costs. Thus the pass is issued at 
deep discounts when compared to the regular monthly pass.  
Pricing ~ However, not all passes are priced equally because the pricing is designed to
cover costs of providing service that include operational, maintenance and administrative 
expenses of the transit agency and program marketing as well as administrative assistance 
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to participating employers. The price of the ECO Pass per employee is therefore based on 
employment location as follows: 
•	 Availability of bus service at that location – the need for service extensions would 
result in a higher unit price 
•	 Number of employees at the location – the fewer the number of employees the 
higher the unit price 
•	 The level of peak-hour service trips near the location -- the higher the level of peak-
period travel in the locality (such as a CBD), the higher the unit price. 
As an example, the price of an ECO Pass per employee is considerably higher in
downtown Denver, where there is a concentration of services and peak period travel and 
where parking is expensive, than in the suburbs, where there are fewer services and peak 
period travel and plenty of free parking. The RTD attempts to capture these factors in the 
rate chart presented in Table 7-1. 
Participation ~ Table 7-2 shows an upward trend in the purchase of the ECO Pass over 
its existence. The number of participating companies was 47 at program inception, but 
grew twenty-four-fold within 5 years peaking at 1,178 and appeared to have tapered off 
thereafter. The number of eligible employees grew over the entire decade from 3,900 in 
1991 to 77,500 in 2001 after which there are indications to suggest a tapering off. 
Additional details are included in Appendix 7-2. 
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Table 7-1: Denver RTD Pricing Chart (Effective 01/01/2003) 
RTD 2003 Eco Pass Pricing 
SLA 
Contract Minimum 
Per Year 
Per Employee/Per Year 
Employees Amount 1-24 25-249 250-999 1,000-1,999 2,000+ 
A 
1-10 
11-20 
21+ 
$420 
$840 
$1,260 
$44 $39 $34 $29 $27 
B 
1-10 
11-20 
21+ 
$900 
$1,800 
$2,700  
$95 $85 $78 $73 $69 
C 
1-10 
11-20 
21+ 
$1,260 
$2,520 
$3,780 
$242 $225 $213 $208 $197 
D 
1-10 
11-20 
21+ 
$1,260 
$2,520 
$3,780 
$247 $236 $219 $213 $202 
Table Notes:
1.	 Source: http://www.rtd-denver.com/FaresAndPasses/Passes/Eco_Pass/pricing.html 
2.	 The contract amount is either the number of employees times the cost per employee or the 
contract minimum, whichever is greater. 
3.	 The Service Level Area (SLA) designation helps determine the price of the Eco Pass. The
SLA is determined by the amount of bus service available to the office location and other 
factors. There are four SLA categories: 
A.	 Outer suburban and major employment centers outside CBD*  
B.	 Downtown Boulder CBD* and fringe Denver CBD*  
C.	 Downtown Denver CBD* 
D.	 Denver International Airport (DIA) and home businesses  
*CBD = Central Business District
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Table 7-2: Trends in ECO Pass Participation 
Participating 
Companies 
Employee Pass 
Holders 
1991 – Program Inception 47 3,912 
1996 – Half a Decade Later 1,178 32,976 
2002 – Recent 1,059 76,577 
The trends in participation are explained by the fact that large firms added to or replaced 
small firms over the years as additional firms adopted the ECO Pass as a “benefit” to 
employees. In 2002, for instance, Table 7-3 shows that firms that have 100 or more 
employees constituted 11% of participating companies but accounted for 73% of 
employee participants. At the other end of the spectrum, firms that have less than 25
employees constituted 63% of participating companies but accounted for 8% of employee 
participants.
Table 7-3: Distribution of Company Size by Eligible Employees (2002) 
Company Size
Companies 
Enrolled 
% of 
Companies 
Enrolled 
Eligible 
Employees 
% of 
Eligible 
Employees 
100 + 120 11% 56,260 73% 
< 100 940 89% 20,320 27% 
< 25 670 63% 6,430 8% 
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The perception and acceptance of the ECO Pass as an “employee benefit” is reflected in 
the fact that 74% of all participating companies provide some level of subsidy. Among 
firms that subsidize the Pass, 88% cover the full cost while only 12% cover a portion. 
Table 7-4 and Appendix 7-2 contain additional details. 
Table 7-4: Degree of Subsidization of the Employee ECO Pass (2002) 
All Companies Enrolled Companies Providing Subsidy 
Subsidy Level % of All 
Companies 
Enrolled 
Subsidy Level % of Companies 
Providing 
Subsidy
All Levels 74% Full 88% 
None 26% Partial 12% 
Total 100% Total 100% 
7.4.2 The Neighborhood ECO Pass43 
Description ~ This is a deep discount annual transit pass purchased by a neighborhood 
organization for all members of participating households. Once a community 
organization concludes their Neighborhood Eco Pass agreement with RTD, eligible 
residents are issued individual photo ID passes that entitle residents to one year of
unlimited travel on all RTD Local, Express, Regional, call-n-Ride, and Light Rail routes, 
plus unlimited skyRide service to Denver International Airport. When residents ride the 
bus, they simply show their Neighborhood Eco Pass ID to the driver and take a seat. 
The Neighborhood Eco Pass is touted as an “environmental alternative to single 
occupancy vehicles, a cost-saving convenience for residents and a great way to enhance
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community relations”. Similar to the employment-based program, the Neighborhood Pass 
exudes the features of universal coverage of members of an identified group, unlimited 
ride, and innovative financing with deep discount pricing. 
Requirements ~ The standardized requirements to qualify for the program include the 
following: 
1.	 Only neighborhoods located within the RTD District are eligible. 
2.	 The neighborhood is required to be represented by a registered neighborhood 
organization or association, or by a city or county government entity for the 
purpose of entering into an agreement with RTD. 
3.	 All housing units within a participating residential neighborhood are included in 
the total price of the program.
4.	 The neighborhood organization appoints someone to act as liaison between 
RTD and the neighborhood residents. This individual is responsible for: (a) 
providing RTD with the requested household information; and, (b) collecting 
the funds to meet the terms of the agreement. 
5.	 The neighborhood organization provides a map outlining the neighborhood's 
boundaries, plus other neighborhood information requested by RTD.  
Pricing ~ RTD charges an annual fee per housing unit. The price reflects the number of 
eligible housing units, amount of transit availability and usage. The minimum amount
required to initiate a Neighborhood Eco Pass contract is the greater of the computed 
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cost for 100 residential units or $5,000. The Neighborhood Eco Pass program offers 
substantial savings when compared to the per person price of a regular monthly pass. 
7.4.3 The Colorado University (CU) College Pass44 
As early as 1991, the University of Colorado (CU) students voted to adopt a bus pass 
program that has been a resounding success and still exists today. In 1998, the Faculty 
and Staff ECO Pass began initially as a pilot program. The following indicate its
effectiveness:  
•	 In six years, the number of students riding the bus jumped fivefold from 300,000 
trips to 1,500,000 trips annually. 
•	 A modal choice survey revealed that 42% of these trips would have been by car.  
•	 The biannual travel behavior survey released in January 1999 indicates that student 
bus ridership to campus has risen by a factor of about 550% from 1990 to 1998. 
•	 The Student Bus Pass program won the EPA's “Way-to-GO” award for its 
achievements in reducing pollution by encouraging alternative transportation and
providing economical options for greater student mobility. EPA estimates that the 
bus program reduces driving by 3.2 to 6.5 million miles per year consequently 
preventing 1,700 to 3,000 metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions from entering 
the atmosphere. 45 
91
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tremendous student ridership increase encouraged the implementation of two new 
transit services, which have proven to be great assets to the city of Boulder and the goals 
of its Transportation Master Plan. 
•	 The HOP is a smaller shuttle type bus that runs on high frequencies connecting the
downtown, the university and the major commercial shopping areas in a circular 
route. It was initially funded by federal grant money but more recently with support 
from the student bus pass fee.  
•	 The SKIP is an express bus that travels the north/south span of the city, running by 
the university at high frequencies. 
CU students demonstrated their overwhelming support of the bus pass program in 1997 
by approving a referendum by an extraordinary 16 to 1 margin that raised their student 
fees by $5 a semester to $19.42 in order to extend transit benefits and services as follows: 
•	 In addition to free local bus service, students consequently gained free unlimited 
access on regional trips that cost $3.25 for metro area cities and up to $8 for the
DIA airport. 
•	 They also enjoy heavily discounted weekend bus service to major Colorado ski 
areas. 
•	 Finally, the extra fee helps pay for the HOP and the SKIP bus routes. 
The cooperative relationship forged between students, the administration, employees, the 
city and the RTD demonstrates that everyone can win if they can come together on 
common goals. 
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7.5 RIDERSHIP TRENDS
7.5.1 Historical Trends 
The investigation of the effect of the ECO Pass on ridership began with a review of 
historical annual boarding data over approximately two decades: a decade before and a 
decade after the inception of the ECO Pass program. Table 7-5 is a summary comparison 
of system-wide boardings with those by three major deep discount groups. They include: 
(a) the top seven employment-based participating companies, (b) Colorado University,
Boulder and (c) Auraria Higher Education Center. Appendix 7-3 shows additional details.
The data reveal the following: 
•	 Annual system-wide boardings more than doubled from 25 million (1981) to more 
than 56 million (1991) over the decade preceding the introduction of the ECO Pass. 
However, the change from year to year fluctuated quite noticeably including
negative growth in three of the years.
•	 In the decade following the inception of the ECO Pass program, system-wide
boardings grew consistently from year to year and peaked at 82 million (2001) with
much less fluctuation in the annual rates than the previous decade. 
•	 Over the second half of the decade following inception of the ECO Pass program, 
system-wide boardings increased by 17% while ECO Pass boardings grew three 
times as fast by 52%. Within this period, the increase in ECO Pass boardings of the 
three major participating groups accounted for a third of the annual system-wide
increase. In those years, the contribution of the ECO Pass to ridership growth is 
unquestionable. 
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Table 7-5: Trends in System-wide vs. ECO Pass Ridership 
System-wide 
Boardings 
“Three Majors1” 
ECO Pass 
Boardings 
% of System-wide 
Boardings 
1991 – Program Inception 56,687,001 83,652 0.15% 
1996 – Half a Decade Later 70,217,783 6,452,209 9.19% 
2002 – Recent 81,322,365 9,826,303 12.08% 
1 The three major deep discount programs of the RTD include the following: 
(a) Top seven employment-based participating companies 
(b) Colorado University (CU), Boulder 
(c) Auraria Higher Education Center (CU-Denver, Metro State and Community College of 
Denver 
It is worth noting that there are a few other ECO Pass participating groups not accounted 
for in the data. These include the remainder of the employment-based and all of the 
residential-based and non-college student-based groups. With the addition of these other 
groups, even more of the annual increase in system-wide boardings would be attributed to 
the deep discount group pass programs. Regardless of the actual level of contribution of 
the ECO Pass to ridership, the historical comparison of boardings supports the hypothesis 
that deep discount group passes may be instruments for increasing transit ridership. 
7.5.2 Pre & Post Ridership Surveys 
A number of “before and after” surveys could shed light on how many ECO Pass 
participants were previous regular fare riders. This information is necessary to make the
determination whether the net revenues that accrue to the transit agency due to the deep
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discount programs are positive or negative. Results of the surveys related to the various 
programs are outlined in the following sections. 
Business Eco Pass ~ In 1997, the RTD conducted a survey of Eco Pass participating 
companies in Downtown Denver with the following findings: 
•	 Before the Eco Pass, these companies posted 37% RTD ridership overall. 
According to the responses, 37% rode at least once a week to commute to work. 
•	 After the Eco Pass, they posted a 58% ridership overall. 
•	 These translate to more than half as much increase overall in the number of 
employee transit riders following introduction of the employee ECO Pass
programs.  
The RTD is currently conducting pre- and post surveys with all new Eco Pass companies, 
but has not conducted enough surveys to have valid data on business ECO Passes outside 
of downtown. The results presented here are therefore valid only for Downtown Denver
and may be different for other areas in the RTD District. Even in the downtown area, 
ridership levels varied by company size with a tendency for larger changes to occur with 
smaller companies. This is shown in Table 7-6. 
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Table 7-6: Percent Employee Ridership Before and After Inception of Business Eco 

Pass 

Company Size Changes 
(employees) Pre-Ridership Post-Ridership % Point % of Pre
1-24 48% 74% 26% 54% 
25-249 27% 53% 26% 96% 
250+ 42% 58% 16% 38% 
Overall 37% 58% 21% 57% 
CU Boulder College Pass ~ In 1991, a survey was conducted to determine ridership prior 
to the start of this College Pass program with the following results: 
•	 6% of students living off-campus said they rode RTD to school on the day of the
survey 
• 46% rode RTD at least once the previous semester.  
In 2000, CU conducted an after survey with the following results: 
•	 67% of students said they rode RTD at least once during the past four weeks.  
•	 59% said they ride RTD at least once during a typical week. 
While the “before and after” results are not directly comparable, one can infer that there 
was no less than the increase from 46% (within a semester “before”) to 67% (within four 
weeks “after”). At most, the increase would be from 6% (on the survey day “before”) to 
67% (in four weeks “after”). 
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Auraria Campus College Pass ~ In 1993, a survey was conducted to determine ridership 
prior to the start of this College Pass program with the following result: 
• 21% of the students said they rode RTD to school at least once a week.  
In 2000, the RTD conducted an after survey with the following result: 
•	 49% of the students said they rode RTD to school at least once a week.  
While the “before and after” results are directly comparable, the response rate for this
survey was very poor. The results therefore have a large margin of error. 
TeenPass ~ When the TeenPass first started, it was a pilot program at just a few Denver 
city high schools. 
•	 33% of students at participating high schools said they typically used RTD to get to 
school at least once a week the year before the TeenPass program started.  
•	 29% said they used RTD at least once a week to get to school after the TeenPass 
program started. 
While the “before and after” results are directly comparable, the base populations of the 
surveys are not the same. The results are therefore inconclusive.  
GradPass ~ In 2000, the first year the GradPass was offered, the RTD did a pre and post 
ridership survey with the following results: 
•	 Before they received their GradPass, 53% of GradPass applicants said they had not 
ridden RTD. The before ridership of various frequencies therefore stood at 47%. 
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•	 After the end of the summer, 96% of GradPass holders said they had used their 
GradPass at least once during the three months it was valid.  
•	 54% said they typically used it three days a week or more. 
It may be inferred that the composite of varying levels of ridership approximately 
doubled from 47% to 96% following issuance of the GradPass. 
Neighborhood Eco Pass ~ The RTD does not have any survey data on the Neighborhood 
Eco Pass at this time. 
7.5.3 Peak vs. Off-Peak Ridership 
A major limitation with the RTD ridership data on the ECO Pass is that it is not recorded 
by time of day. The RTD expects to rectify this deficiency in the future when program 
participants are issued with Smart Cards. Due to this limitation, the following are not 
determined: 
•	 The percentage of ECO Pass boardings that are in peak and off-peak periods. 
•	 Whether the increases in ridership cause more peak crowding than existed before 
introduction of the various programs. 
7.5.4 Ridership Effect on Supply of Service 
Boarding by the three major ECO Pass groups accounted for 12% or less of annual 
system-wide ridership. The data therefore does not support the notion that the program 
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could overwhelm the existing supply of services necessitating capital expansion. One of 
the areas of potential concern is CBD travel. A 1997 survey of ECO Pass participants in 
downtown Denver revealed the following:46 
•	 58% of employee Pass holders who worked downtown used it; 
• It is estimated that ECO Pass riders accounted for 13% of all downtown employees. 
Similarly, it is estimated from a 2001 survey that 44% of employee Pass holders who 
worked at the airport used it.47 These levels of Pass use are consistent with survey
findings about Silicon Valley commuters in California among whom 40% of pass holders 
actually use it.48 
7.6 REVENUE TRENDS 
Revenue trend data are available for 7 continuous years out of ten in the 1990s. The data 
are compiled from the following two sources: 
1.	 System-wide fare revenue data come from the National Transit Database (NTD) of
the Federal Transit Administration. 
2.	 ECO Pass revenue data come from the RTD and are available for the key seven 

employment-based participating groups and the other deep discount programs. 

7.6.1 Total Annual Revenue 
Table 7-7 is a summary comparison of system-wide revenues with those from the deep 
discount programs. Appendices 7-4a and 7-4b show additional details in current and
constant dollars respectively. The data reveal the following:  
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•	 System-wide fare revenue increased consistently in both nominal and constant 
(1983) dollars each year between 1993 and 2000. During this period, the ECO Pass
program has not merely been in existence, it has been expanded. And revenue from 
the ECO Pass program also increased consistently from year to year in both 
nominal and constant (1983) dollars. 
•	 From 1995 onwards, annual ECO Pass sales began to account for more than all the 
annual growth in system-wide fare revenues in either current or constant dollars. 
•	 For the years that data are available, the annual sales revenue from the deep
discount programs accounted for between 10% and 90% of the year-to-year 
increase in system-wide revenues.  
Table 7-7: Trends in System-wide vs. ECO Pass Revenue (in Nominal Dollars) 
System-wide Deep Discount Programs 
Revenue Revenue Per 
Boarding 
Sales Revenue Revenue Per 
Boarding1 
1994 $26,508,526 $0.43 $3,009,235 $1.092 
1997 $36,746,800 $0.51 $5,611,869 $0.77 
2000 $45,474,675 $0.58 $8,872,327 $1.07 
1 Revenue per boarding for combined three major programs
2 Data for 1993  
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7.6.2 Average Revenue per Boarding
Data reveal that every deep discount program offered by the RTD yields more revenue 
per boarding than the system-wide average. Additional details are included in Appendix 
7-4c. The following are noteworthy: 
•	 Together, the three major ECO Pass programs yielded almost two times as much as
the system-wide average by the year 2002. Generally, the employment-based 
program appears to yield the highest revenue per boarding among the various deep 
discount programs. 
•	 In constant 1983 dollars, revenue per boarding increased generally in the 1990s 
both system-wide and across various deep discount programs. 
7.6.3 Administrative Cost 
The administrative cost associated with implementing the employment-based ECO Pass 
program ranged between 1% and 7% of total sales receipts each year. Details are 
included in Appendix 7-3b. By comparison, the proportion of total operating expenditure 
on materials and supplies at the national level hovered around 9% and 10% each year 
within the 1990s. During the same period, the proportion of expenditure on general
administration ranged between 14% and 22%. The cost of administering the ECO Pass,
therefore, did not appear to be excessive and indeed appeared to be less than what was
typical with comparative objects of expenditure.  
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The data analyzed are indicative that a carefully selected combination of deep discount 
programs (employment-based, neighborhood-based, and student-based) has the potential 
to contribute significantly to a transit operator’s total revenue. The historical data 
suggests that the employment-based deep ECO pass could serve as the backbone of the 
deep discount programs offered by a transit agency. 
7.7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RTD OPERATIONAL DATA 
7.7.1 Objectives 
A fundamental issue to be determined in analyzing the historical data on the RTD is 
whether changes in any operating variable do cause changes in others or whether changes
in individual variables are endogenously determined. Ultimately, two determinations are 
to be made with reference to deep discount programs. They are the following: 
(a) The effect of deep discount programs on revenue. 
(b) The effect of deep discount programs on ridership. 
There are five operational variables whose effects on each other are therefore of primary 
concern. They are identified in Table 7-8. 
Table 7-8: Operational Variables and Units of Measurement 
Operational Variable Unit of Measurement 
1. System-wide Ridership Annual boardings 
2. Service Supply Annual revenue vehicle miles 
3. System-wide Revenue Constant 1983 Dollars per annum
4. Eco Pass Ridership Annual boardings 
5. Eco Pass Revenue Constant 1983 Dollars per annum
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7.7.2 The Granger Causality Test49 
The approach to testing for causality is based on the procedure by Granger and Sims.50 
The test is based on the idea that if X causes Y, then changes in X should precede 
changes in Y. To satisfy this premise, the following two conditions should be met: 
(a) In a regression, the independent variable, X, should contribute significantly to 
the explanatory power of the model predicting Y.
(b) Y should not help predict X. If the latter occurs, then it is likely that one or 
more other variables are indeed causing the observed changes in both X and Y. 
To test for the presence of each of these two conditions, a hypothesis test is performed for
a pair of variables stating that: “one does not help to predict the other”. First one variable 
is assumed to be dependent and the other independent. Next, the roles of the variables are
switched and the test repeated. 
Each of the tests within the pair involves two regressions as follows: 
(a) The dependent variable, Y, is regressed only against lagged values of Y. Thus
Yt = ƒ(Yt-1). This lagged endogenous model may be termed the “reduced model” 
that may be presented structurally as: 
m 
Yt = Σ  αi Yt-1 + εi  (7-1) 
  i=1  
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(b) The dependent variable, Y, is regressed against both its lagged values and the 
lagged values of X. Thus Yt = ƒ(Yt-1, Xt-1). This lagged endogenous and exogenous 
model may be termed the “full model” that may be presented structurally as: 
m m 
Yt = Σ  αi Yt-1 + Σ  βi Xt-1 + εi  (7-2) 
i=1  i=1 
Where 

Y = the dependent variable 

X = the independent variable 

α, β = parameters to be estimated 

εi = a random error term
 
m = the number of lags 

Finally, the sums of squared residuals from both regressions are used to calculate an F-
statistic to test whether the group of coefficients, β1, β2, . . . . , βm, are significantly 
different from zero. If they are, the hypothesis is rejected. Commensurate with the two 
conditions tested for, two results are essential to conclude that “X causes Y”. They are: 
(a) The initial hypothesis, “X does not cause Y” must be rejected. 
(b) The reversed hypothesis, “Y does not cause X” must be accepted. 
Permutations of the five variables of primary interest created seven pairs of causality 
tests, three for all system-wide and four for Eco Pass vs. system-wide relationships. The 
pairs of variables tested are presented in Table 7-9. 
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Table 7-9: Pairs of Variables Tested 
Initial Hypothesis1 Reversed Hypothesis1 
1. supply → system-wide rides 1R. system-wide rides → supply 
2. system rides → system revenue 2R. system  revenue → system rides 
3. supply → system revenue 3R. system revenue → supply 
4. Eco Pass rides → system rides 4R. system rides → Eco Pass rides 
5. Eco Pass revenue → system revenue 5R. system revenue → Eco Pass revenue 
6. Eco Pass rides → system revenue 6R. system revenue → Eco Pass rides 
7. Eco Pass revenue → system rides 7R. system rides → Eco Pass revenue 
1 The null hypothesis of these causal statements is tested as: “X does not cause Y”. 
7.7.3 Autocorrelation Tests 
Autocorrelation tends to occur with time series data such as used in this analysis. Also
called serial correlation, it refers to the correlations of error terms for different 
observations over time. It violates the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumption of 
independent error terms and leads to inefficient parameter estimates. When serial 
correlation is present, then 
Cov(εt, εt-1) < > 0. 
Let51 
εt = ρεt-1 + γt 
So that 
γt = εt - ρεt-1 
Where 
ρ is the first-order serial correlation coefficient  
γt is a random disturbance term that is independent and identically distributed  
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ε is the error term associated with individual observations 
For a count of T time periods of data with t = 1, 2, . . . . ., T, the first-order serial 
correlation coefficient is calculated for a time lag of one period as follows: 
T T 
ρ = {Cov(εt, εt-1)}/{Var(εt)}= {Σ (εt * εt-1)}/{Σ (εt)2 } (7-3)
 t=2 t=1 
And similarly for a time lag of two periods as follows: 
T  T
 
ρ = {Σ (εt * εt-2)}/{Σ (εt)2 }, . . . . . , and so on.

 t=3 t=1 

The higher the absolute value of the coefficient, the more dominant is that lag period in 
the time series analysis. A plot illustrates the dominance of the coefficients of the various 
lag periods. 
Before application of the Granger Causality Tests therefore the appropriate lag period 
was determined with plots of autocorrelations for residuals over lags of different numbers 
of years. To produce the residuals, OLS regressions were performed for the pairs of
variables to be tested for causality. 
The autocorrelation plots revealed overwhelmingly that a one-year lag is the most 
dominant. Details of the plots and OLS regressions are presented in Appendix 7-5. 
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7.7.4 Causality Test Results 
Table 7-10 lists the various hypothesis statements tested and their results. Details of the 
Granger Causality Tests are included in Appendix 7-6. The following are noteworthy: 
• All models tested produced certain consistent results that include the following: 
o	 Both reduced and full models were significant with large F-statistics and 
high R-squares. 
o	 The lagged endogenous variables were significant whereas the lagged 
exogenous variables were not. 
These results suggest in general that the pairs of variables tested did not 
significantly influence each other. Instead, changes in individual variables are 
endogenously determined, that is, ongoing trends tend to perpetuate themselves
over time. In addition, other undetermined factors contribute to observed changes 
in the variables over time. 
Human, political and other not-so-measurable factors may have contributed to the 
changes in supply and patronage of service and in fares and consequent revenues. 
This implies that program success should not be judged in terms of quantifiable 
performance measures only, but also in terms of intangible factors. 
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Table 7-10: Summary of Causality Test Results 
INITIAL HYPOTHESIS REVERSED HYPOTHESIS 
Statement 
Test 
Result Fcalc Fcrit Fcalc 
Test 
Result Statement
1. System: supply 
changes do not cause 
ridership changes 
Accept 2.98 4.41 3.03 Accept 1R. System: ridership 
changes do not cause 
supply changes 
2. System: ridership 
changes do not cause 
revenue changes 
Accept 0.08 4.41 3.01 Accept 2R. System: revenue 
changes do not cause 
ridership changes 
3. System: supply 
changes do not cause 
revenue changes 
Accept 3.38 4.41 2.55 Accept 3R. System: revenue 
changes do not cause 
supply changes 
4. Eco Pass ride 
changes do not cause 
system ride changes 
Accept 0.37 5.32 6.16 Reject 4R. System ride 
changes do not cause 
Eco Pass ride changes 
5. Eco Pass revenue 
changes do not cause 
system revenue 
changes 
Accept 0.66 5.32 0.35 Accept 5R. System revenue 
changes do not cause 
Eco Pass revenue 
changes 
6. Eco Pass ride 
changes do not cause 
system revenue 
changes 
Accept 3.95 5.32 3.30 Accept 6R. System revenue 
changes do not cause 
Eco Pass ride changes 
7. Eco Pass revenue 
changes do not cause 
system ride changes  
Reject 9.47 5.32 0.79 Accept 7R. System ride 
changes do not cause 
Eco Pass revenue 
changes 
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•	 For the three system-wide tests, results are not conclusive. Thus the statistical tests
are unable to establish causality one way or the other between pairs of such 
operational variables as service supply, ridership and revenue. This means other
variables are causing the observed changes. 
The RTD embarked on a program of transit service expansion over the last few 
decades in an attempt to increase the use of shared transport in order to slow the 
deterioration in air quality. Thus it is not so surprising that the analyses showed that 
ridership did not significantly contribute to service expansion. In similar vein, 
ridership changes did not significantly contribute to revenue changes (in constant 
dollars) since fares were not typically adjusted regularly for inflation. Finally, on 
account of the above reasons, changes in supply have not significantly affected 
changes in revenue. 
•	 The test for causality between Eco Pass and system-wide ridership suggests that 
system-wide ridership changes do cause changes in Eco Pass ridership, but not the 
other way around. These results are explainable by the fact that as a relatively small 
proportion of the whole, Eco pass rides stabilized at between 9% and 12% of 
system-wide boardings for more than half a decade.  
This implies that major swings in transit patronage such as occurred previously in
times of either crises or economic boom will undoubtedly affect Eco Pass ridership.
Transit operators need to be cognizant of this and decisively make adjustments in 
service supply whenever necessary to accommodate demand. Another policy 
implication is that more groups need to be identified for deep discount program 
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expansion subject to capacity and cost limitations. Indeed the RTD embarked on 
such expansion in recent years to the neighborhood and teen Eco Pass programs for
which ridership data are not available. Such data should become available when the 
RTD adopts the magnetic dip fare card in the future. 
•	 The test for causality between Eco Pass and system-wide revenues is not conclusive 
as the test is unable to establish causality one way or the other. Although the lagged 
exogenous variables are not significant in the models, examination of standardized 
beta weights confirms that Eco Pass revenues yield nearly two times as much
influence on increases in system-wide revenues as the latter yields on the former. 
This implies that expansion of Eco Pass programs is recommended for as long as 
they continue to demonstrate higher marginal revenues than the existing fare 
instruments.
•	 The tests failed to reject the hypothesis that “changes in Eco Pass rides do not cause 
system revenue changes”. While unit revenues per boarding from deep discount 
programs are significantly higher than the system-wide average, the programs 
constitute a relatively small share of the entire operation and thus are unable to
register a significant effect on system-wide revenues.  
•	 The tests rejected the null hypothesis enabling the inference that Eco Pass revenue 
changes account for system-wide ridership changes although all variables are 
individually insignificant suggesting the lack of other explanatory variables. Beta 
weights reveal that Eco Pass revenue increases, which are themselves caused by
expansion in the program, exert more than proportionate increase on system-wide 
ridership while the latter endogenously exerts a slight negative influence on itself. 
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This implies that while the Eco Pass program might draw from the existing transit 
riding population, it yields more than proportionate increase in revenue resulting in 
a net gain in fare revenue. This finding is consistent with the basic hypothesis of 
this study that deep discount group pass programs may be instruments for 
increasing transit revenue and ridership. 
7.8 SUMMARY 
The Denver RTD Eco Pass case study is the most extensive and one of the oldest deep 
discount programs in the nation, spanning more than two decades. The assortment of 
programs offered provides an example of the concept for wide deployment of deep 
discount programs that originally motivated this research. Granger Causality Tests of
time series data on RTD operations did not produce conclusive results on the extent of 
causality between pairs of such operational variables as service supply, ridership and 
revenues. This is explained by the fact that the RTD embarked on a program of transit 
expansion to slow the deterioration in air quality and not because of the interaction of 
prices and ridership. Neither did the tests confirm causal relationships between Eco Pass 
and system-wide revenues or ridership. This is explained by the fact that Eco Pass 
programs constitute a relatively small proportion (between 9% and 12%) of the agency’s
entire operations which stood at approximately 81 million boardings in 2002. 
It is interesting to note, however, that every deep discount program offered by the RTD 
yields more revenue than and up to two times as much per boarding as the system-wide 
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average. The data also reveal that employment-based programs yield the highest revenue 
per boarding among the various deep discount offerings. 
The next chapter explores university campus-based programs. These are the most rapidly 
expanding type of deep discount programs around the country. 
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8.	 CAMPUS-BASED PROGRAM: U.C. BERKELEY STUDENT 
CLASS PASS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The majority of students at the University of California, Berkeley voted to assess 
themselves a fee to be applied toward the deep discount group pass program referred to 
as the “ClassPass”. The program was consequently initiated in the fall semester of 1999. 
The data presented in this overview come from two random surveys. Both surveys were 
weighted to the student population with weights created to reflect undergraduate versus 
graduate status, gender and ethnicity. 
1.	 The paper survey “before” program initiation took place in the fall semester of 
1997. There were 3,357 responses representing 11% of the student population. The 
margin of error is 1.69% with a 95% confidence interval.  
2.	 The web-based survey “after” program initiation took place in the fall semester of 
2000. There were 3,008 responses representing 9.6% of the student population and 
51% of the sample. The margin of error is 1.79% with a 95% confidence interval. 
8.2 THE PROGRAM 
A key feature of the ClassPass program is its universal coverage of all students enrolled
during each semester. Another feature is that it allows participants unlimited use of all 
services provided by AC Transit at no out-of-pocket charge. For a fare medium, a 
113
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
validation sticker is affixed each semester to the official picture identification cards of all 
students who choose to avail themselves of the services. Currently, approximately 26,000 
stickers are picked up a semester out of the student population of about 32,000. To ride 
an AC Transit bus, a student simply flashes the validated ID card to the operator on entry. 
Beginning in 2003, the fall semester sticker is valid through the winter break while the 
spring semester sticker is valid through the summer break. Effectively therefore, the two 
stickers now cover twelve calendar months. 
Each student was initially assessed $34.20 per semester as part of student fees billed 
through the student’s university account to cover the ClassPass and campus perimeter
shuttle services. According to the terms of agreement, the assessment is distributed as
shown in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1: Distribution of ClassPass Assessment per Semester 
Year of Program 
1st and 2nd 3rd and 4th 
Payment to AC Transit 20.00 22.00 
Allocation to Student Aid Fund (@ 33.3% of assessment) 11.40 12.40 
Campus Parking and Transportation Department (for 
perimeter shuttle services) 
2.80 2.80 
Total Assessment 34.20 37.20 
By way of cost sharing, AC Transit supplies the validation stickers based on enrolment 
while the university distributes the stickers. In order to keep costs low, AC Transit did 
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not commit from the outset to satisfy any service improvements that the ClassPass 
program would necessitate. However, the agency agreed to provide the Transit Guide to
students, to install route map and schedule information at key stops on the perimeter of 
the campus, and to hold a student forum periodically to inform and receive comments on
the status of transit service affecting the campus area. 
8.3 CHANGES IN CHOICE OF MODE 
The surveys reveal that the choice of AC Transit as the primary mode of travel to campus 
jumped from 5.6% to 8.7% in the first year of ClassPass implementation; it more than 
doubled to 14% in the second year of the program. The data suggests that the ClassPass 
program may have helped reverse a downward trend in the choice of BART as the 
primary mode of travel. Although a significantly small share, the choice of “other transit" 
also increased with the introduction of the ClassPass program from 0.2% to 1.3%. 
Apparently, the pass and AC Transit service provide convenient access to and from 
BART and other transit services at no additional out-of-pocket cost to the students. This 
could explain the increase in use of all forms of transit. Results are summarized in Table 
8-2. Additional details are included in Appendix 8-1. 
Overall, the survey results reveal the following: 
•	 Before the ClassPass, just as many students took public transportation (12.2%) as 
those who drove (12.5%) and both combined were half as many as those who 
walked (53.5%). 
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Table 8-2: Choice of Travel Mode Before and After Introduction of the ClassPass 

Program 

Before ClassPass 
Program 
With ClassPass 
Program 
Statistically 
Significant 
Difference1 
1996 1997 1999 2000 1997 - 2000 
Walk 42.9% 53.5% 42.3% 51.6% N 
Auto Drive Alone 8.5% 12.5% 9.1% 11.5% N 
All Transit 9.0% 12.2% 15.4% 21.7% Y 
All Other Modes 39.6% 21.8% 33.2% 15.2% --
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% --
Transit 
AC Transit 3.9% 5.6% 8.7% 14.1% Y 
BART 4.9% 6.3% 5.6% 6.3% N 
Other Transit 0.2% 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% Y 
1 Null hypothesis: %1997 = %2000; alpha level = 5%; Y = significant; N = not significant  
•	 After the ClassPass was introduced, there were twice as many transit riders (21.7%) 
as drivers (11.5%) and both combined increased to nearly two-thirds of those who 
walked (51.6%). 
•	 Most of the shift in mode to transit came from the personal transportation modes
such as walking, drive-alone, and biking. 
•	 Public transit and campus shuttles gained in mode choice because the pass provided 
convenient access to both types of services. 
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Statistical tests of mode choice proportions before and after introduction of the ClassPass
(Appendix 8-8) reveal the following: 
•	 No statistically significant differences in the shares of walk and drive-alone modes. 
Although these two modes are the main losers of shares to the transit modes, the 
losses have not caused significant shifts away from them. 
•	 No statistically significant difference in the share of the BART mode. This may be 
explained by the fact that the ClassPass provides no direct savings in out-of-pocket 
costs to BART users. The 2000 survey shows that 84% of student BART riders 
travel more than 5 miles and 64% travel more than 10 miles to campus. By 
comparison, 12 % of student AC Transit riders travel more than 5 miles and 5% 
travel more than 10 miles. Thus many of the BART riders among the students 
travel over much longer distances than those who travel by AC Transit. Having a 
pass for AC Transit, which serves a relatively smaller geographic area than BART, 
appears to have effected negligible change on the choice of BART for travel among 
the students.
•	 Differences in the mode shares of AC Transit and “other” transit (including campus 
perimeter services) were statistically significant at the 5% level. This fact speaks
for the effectiveness of the deep discount program in increasing bus transit 
ridership. 
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8.4 REASONS FOR MODE CHOICE CHANGES
Before the ClassPass - The survey revealed that 22% of students had changed mode of 
travel in the two consecutive years before the pass was introduced. Details are included in
Appendix 8-2. The top three reasons indicated for changing primary mode of travel to 
campus were the following: 
a.	 Change in residential location (10.8%) 
b.	 “Other” reasons (5.8%)  
c.	 Change in class or work schedule (1.4%) 
AC Transit and BART related issues were minimally selected as reasons for changing 
primary mode as follows: 
a.	 0.7% of respondents selected the pilot AC Transit pass program offered 
voluntarily at $60 per semester. 
b.	 0.2% of respondents also selected change in AC Transit route or service. 
c.	 0.1% of respondents selected discount on BART, Muni and BART-plus tickets. 
After the ClassPass – The survey revealed that 38% of students had changed mode of
travel between the first and second years following the introduction of the program. 
Besides the 11.5% of respondents who were not enrolled in the previous year, the three 
top reasons indicated for changing primary mode of travel to campus were the following: 
a.	 Change in residential location (9.9%) 
b.	 “Other” reasons (7.9%) 
c.	 AC Transit ClassPass (3.6%). 
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These findings are consistent with the increase in transit mode share noted in the previous 
section. While less than 4% of respondents specifically attributed their shift in mode of 
travel to the ClassPass, it could very well contribute to the change in residential location 
and the “other” reasons that together represented nearly half of those who shifted mode. 
8.5 CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL LOCATION 
Travel distances between residence and central campus were analyzed to determine the 
types of “changes” that occurred in residential location subsequent to the introduction of 
the ClassPass. Figure 8-1 shows cumulative plots of reported median distances “before”
and “after” program introduction. The plots lie very close to each other. It is noticeable, 
however, that the plot for fall 2000 lies beneath the 1997 plot for the most part. Before 
the ClassPass, nearly 56% of students lived within 1 mile of campus and 73% lived
within 3 miles. One year following the introduction of the pass, the respective 
percentages changed to about 55% within 1 mile and about 75% within 3 miles. The
overall average travel distance decreased by about 10% from 4.28 miles to 3.88 miles. As 
shown in Table 8-3, the short distances over which most students relocated are consistent 
with the finding that many of the increases in transit mode choice came from walkers. 
Additional details are included in Appendix 8-3. 
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Figure 8-1: Cumulative Distribution of Distances 
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Statistical tests of the proportions of student travel distances before and after introduction 
of the ClassPass (Appendix 8-8) reveal the following: 
•	 The differences in the proportions of students who resided within the short 
distances (up to 1 mile) are statistically significant. 
•	 The differences in the proportions of students who resided over distances greater
than 1 mile are not statistically significant. 
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After just the first year, it was not conclusive, as anticipated, that the pass program 
increased student latitude to seek more affordable or better quality accommodations that 
were further away from campus, but within relatively easy access of AC Transit or to 
other transit modes to which AC Transit service facilitated access. However the real 
estate market was in a state of rapid change in the entire metropolitan area at the time and 
several extraneous reasons could have explained this initial lack of dispersion. 
Table 8-3: Locations of Student Residences from Campus 
Distance from Residence 1997 2000 % Change 
Statistically 
Significant 
Difference1 
1997 - 2000 
Average distance to campus 4.28 miles 3.88 miles -9% --
Within 0.5 mile of campus 39.3% 25.5% -35% Y 
Within 1 mile of campus 56.1% 52.6% -6% Y 
Within 2 miles of campus 67.6% 67.8% +0.3% N 
Within 5 miles of campus 80.0% 80.5% +0.6% N 
1 Null hypothesis: %1997 = %2000; alpha level = 5%; Y = significant; N = not significant  
3-D surface charts were prepared to illustrate the spatial distribution of mode choice 
changes. Figures 8-2 and 8-3 compare the distributions of travel distances between 
student residences and primary modes of travel before and after the introduction of the 
ClassPass. Additional details are included in Appendix 8-4. The following are 
noteworthy: 
•	 As expected, most walkers (65%) lived within half a mile to three miles of central 
campus and their numbers reduced rapidly over the distance. Although the 
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Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (1997)
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number of walkers dropped after the pass was introduced, the pattern of spatial 
distribution of walkers remained the same. 
Figure 8-2: Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (1997) 
W
al
k
A
ut
o 
- d
riv
er
A
ut
o 
pa
ss
en
ge
r
C
ar
po
ol
M
ot
or
cy
cl
e
B
ic
yc
le
A
C
 T
ra
ns
it
B
A
R
T
C
am
pu
s 
S
hu
ttl
e
O
th
er
 tr
an
si
t
< 
0.
5
0.
5 
-0
.9
1.
0 
-1
.9
2.
0 
-2
.9
3.
0 
- 4
.9
5.
0 
-9
.9
10
.0
 -
19
.9
20
.0
 -
29
.9
30
.0
 - 
39
.9
40
.0
 - 
49
.9
50
.0
+ 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
St
ud
en
ts
 
Distance Range (miles) Primary Mode 
0-500 500-1000 1000-1500 1500-2000 
2000-2500 2500-3000 3000-3500 3500-4000 
122
 
  
 
 
 
Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (2000)
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Figure 8-3: Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (2000) 
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•	 Similarly, motorcycle and bicycle riders resided close and mainly up to 5 miles 
from central campus. Most of the shift away from these two modes occurred 
among those who resided within 2 miles of campus. 
•	 Auto drive-alone commuters reside over all distances but predominantly between
2 miles and 40 miles from central campus before the ClassPass. Their spatial 
distribution pattern after the pass remained essentially the same. While the shifts
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away from auto drive-alone occurred over all distances, it was most noticeable
over distances up to 5 miles from central campus. 
•	 AC Transit use was concentrated among students who lived between 1 mile and 5 
miles from campus before the ClassPass. With the pass, its gain in mode shift shot 
up and extended spatially among those who resided over all the distances but 
mainly up to 20 miles from central campus. 
•	 BART riders typically resided between 5 miles and 40 miles of central campus. 
With the pass, choice of the mode was over the same typical distances. 
•	 Another noticeable change was the increase in mode shift in favor of campus 
shuttle and the spatial extension in its patronage from students who resided up to 1 
mile to those who resided up to 2 miles from central campus. 
8.6 EFFECT ON TRAVEL TIMES 
The distribution of average travel times was analyzed to determine the effects of both 
change in residential location and increased transit mode choice. Figure 8-4 suggests that 
the ease of transit use provided by the ClassPass may have contributed to a slight 
reduction in the number of students who traveled up to 15 minutes to central campus.
Expectedly, the proportion of students who traveled more than 15 minutes increased 
slightly since the introduction of the ClassPass. The latter may be explained by a 
combination of factors including increasing traffic congestion for those who drove and 
the generally longer travel times for transit trips that occurred over relatively longer 
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distances. The overall average travel times increased slightly from almost 18.6 minutes in 
1997 to 19 minutes in 2000. Additional details are included in Appendix 8-5. Statistical 
tests of the proportions of student travel times before and after the introduction of the 
ClassPass (Appendix 8-8) reveal that the differences in the proportions are not 
statistically significant. 
Figure 8-4: Comparison of Travel Times 
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3-D surface charts were prepared to illustrate changes in travel times relative to mode 
choice changes. Figures 8-5 and 8-6 compare the distributions of travel times between 
student residences and primary modes of travel before and after the introduction of the 
ClassPass. Findings are consistent with the spatial distributions of travel distances. 
Additional details are included in Appendix 8-6. The following are noteworthy: 
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Figure 8-5: Student Travel Times (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (1997) 
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•	 As expected, most walkers (72%) traveled up to 15 minutes to central campus. The 
slight drop in the number of walkers after the pass was introduced occurred among 
those who traveled more than 15 minutes to campus. . 
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Student Travel Times (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (2000) 
  
 
•	 Similarly, bicycle riders mainly traveled over the shorter commute times up to 30 
minutes to central campus. The shift away from biking therefore occurred among 
students within the 30-minute commute time to campus. 
Figure 8-6: Student Travel Times (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode (2000) 
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• Auto drive-alone students traveled over all the lengths of commute times to central
campus before the ClassPass. Their distribution pattern after the pass remained 
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essentially the same. The shifts away from auto drive-alone occurred over all the 
lengths of commute times. 
•	 Students who chose AC Transit traveled between 15 minutes and 45 minutes to
campus before the ClassPass. With the pass, its gains in mode shift occurred among 
those who traveled over all the lengths of commute times. 
•	 BART riders typically traveled 15 minutes or more to central campus. With the 
pass, choice of the mode was over the same typical lengths of commute times. 
8.7 CHANGES IN PERIODS OF TRAVEL 
The time of day when students traveled to and from campus was examined to see if there 
were any significant changes in pattern that could be attributed to the ClassPass. See
Appendix 8-7 for details. Figure 8-7 shows the comparative distributions of average daily
trips by time of day on weekdays and on weekends before and after the introduction of 
the ClassPass program. The following are noteworthy: 
•	 Student travel times with and without the ClassPass did not exhibit the type of 
severe peaking typically associated with work-related commute travel. Hourly 
distribution of student trips in the day depicted low variability of approximately 
10% to 15% across the midday hours that lie between 8:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. With 
low peaking in the hourly distribution of trips, the danger of growth in ridership 
overwhelming the bus service capacity especially during peak periods is less
pronounced. 
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Figure 8-7: Comparative Distribution of Average Daily Trips by Time of Day 
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•	 The majority of student travel to and from campus occurred in the midday, which 
lies between the morning and afternoon periods of work commute. As summarized 
in Table 8-4, about 50% of student travel to and from campus occurred during 
midday in 1997 while 42% occurred in 2000. The concentration of student travel in 
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the off-peak period points to the increased likelihood of available bus capacity to 
accommodate surges in demand due to the ClassPass. 
Table 8-4: Distribution of Daily Student Trips In & Out of Campus by Time of Day 
1997 2000 
% Change 
in Quantity
Statistically 
Significant 
Difference1 
1997 - 2000 
Weekday Distribution
AM Peak -- Before 8:30 a.m. 14.67% 29.17% 101.67% Y
Midday -- 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 
p.m. 50.59% 42.25% -15.30% 
Y 
PM Peak -- 3:30 p.m. – 7:30 
p.m. 27.59% 22.53% -17.19% 
Y 
Evening -- After 7:30 p.m. 7.15% 6.05% -14.19% N 
Total Daily 100.00% 100.00% 1.42% --
Weekend Distribution
AM -- Before 8:30 a.m. 3.12% 3.77% 155.62% N 
Midday -- 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 
p.m. 51.36% 20.96% -13.80% 
Y
PM -- 3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m. 28.60% 12.04% -11.08% Y 
Evening -- After 7:30 p.m. 16.92% 63.22% 689.16% Y 
Total Daily 100.00% 100.00% 111.21% --
1 Null hypothesis: %1997 = %2000; alpha level = 5%; Y = significant; N = not significant  
•	 With the ClassPass, some student travel shifted to the morning commute period to
levels comparable to what occurred in the midday hours. Despite this shift, the 
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overall distribution of student travel periods in the day depicts the same general 
pattern with the ClassPass as before it. 
•	 The volume of weekend travel to and from campus in 1997 was only about a third 
of typical weekday travel. With the ClassPass, weekend travel doubled. Since 
transit services traditionally operate at low occupancy levels on weekends, the
growth in student travel on weekends should not ordinarily pose a problem with 
availability of seat capacity. 
Statistical tests of proportions of students who traveled during various periods of the day 
before and after the introduction of the ClassPass (Appendix 8-8) reveal the following: 
•	 Despite the generally similar pattern  in the near-hourly distribution of trips by 
time of day shown in Figure 8-7, the differences in the proportions of students 
who traveled during the broad periods of the day summarized in Table 8-4, the 
periods before, during and after midday were statistically significant for 
weekdays. 
•	 The differences in the proportions of students who traveled during late evening 
hours were not statistically significant for weekdays. 
•	 The differences in the proportions of students were statistically significant for all 
periods on weekends except for the early morning hours.  
It is possible to assert from the statistical test results that the introduction of the ClassPass 
caused significant adjustments in the periods many students chose to travel to and from 
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campus. However the distribution of travel throughout the day, especially in terms of 
peaking, followed the same general pattern after the introduction of the ClassPass as 
before it. 
8.8 EFFECT ON AC TRANSIT 
8.8.1 Impact on Revenue  
The 1997 “Before” Survey revealed that 5.6% of U.C. Berkeley (UCB) students used AC 
Transit before implementation of the ClassPass. That is approximately 1690 students. 
Although not all students rode AC Transit daily and thus would not purchase a monthly 
pass, let us assume for simplicity that they all did. The maximum revenue AC Transit 
would have earned from the UCB student-rider market would therefore have been 
$84,500 per month in those months that the university was in session. 
The 2000 “After” Survey revealed that 14.1% of UCB students used AC Transit after 
implementation of the ClassPass. That is approximately 4410 students. However
according to the terms of the program, AC Transit obtained negotiated annual fare 
revenue of $1,251,000 covering the entire enrolled student population. Assuming a 10­
month calendar year, the equivalent monthly revenue to AC Transit was $125,100. 
The net revenue was $40,600 per month ($125,100 - $84,500) or more than $406,000 per 
year. The net increase in revenue therefore was approximately 50% above the pre-
ClassPass level. 
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8.8.2 Impact on Ridership 
Approximately 1690 students rode AC Transit before and 4410 students rode AC Transit 
after the implementation of the ClassPass. The net increase in riders of 2720 (4410 – 
1690) is approximately 160%. Viewed differently, the number of riders jumped to 2.6 
times the pre-ClassPass level.  
FTA Section 15 data for 2000 shows that AC Transit generated 21.3 million vehicle 
revenue miles while service consumption stood at 197.8 million passenger miles. This 
calculates to approximately 9.3 passenger-miles per revenue vehicle-mile. If the average 
vehicle capacity were 40 seats, then occupancy in 2000 would stand at 23%. For an 
average vehicle capacity of 30 seats, occupancy in 2000 would stand at 31%. This
occupancy range straddles the national average for 1998. 
Assume the 1998 average national seat occupancy of 27% held true for the UCB student-
rider market, before the ClassPass. Then the increase in riders to 2.6 times the original 
level would result in 70% average seat occupancy (27% * 2.6). On average therefore, this 
would not necessitate expansion in AC Transit service to accommodate demand. Since 
overcrowding is not known empirically to have plagued the AC Transit services serving
the campus area and pre-existing service frequencies have been largely maintained, it 
could be assumed that the frequency of boardings per person did not change significantly 
after the implementation of the ClassPass. Under the foregoing assumptions, it will take
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approximately a 50% additional increase in boardings per rider to exhaust the available
seating capacity on AC Transit buses in the campus area. 
8.9 SUMMARY 
The deep discount program for students at the University of California, Berkeley is an 
example case study of a college campus-based program, the largest and most rapidly 
expanding group of deep discount programs around the nation. Surveys of student 
behavior before and after the introduction of the program reveal statistically significant 
changes that include the following: 
•	 Changes in the choice of AC Transit and campus perimeter and shuttle service
modes. The pass permits use of both types of services. 
•	 Adjustments in the periods of the day that students travel to and from campus. 
However, the distribution of student travel throughout the day especially in terms 
of peaking followed the same general pattern after the introduction of the
ClassPass as before it. 
Student rides on AC Transit jumped 160% with the ClassPass. The combination of a
generally low seat-occupancy on AC Transit buses and the wide distribution of student 
travel times throughout the day prevented the increase in ridership from overwhelming 
the existing service. While revenue per boarding data on students was not available for
comparison, the program nevertheless increased the total revenues that AC Transit 
134
 
  
 
generated from this student-rider market by more than $40,500 per month or $405,000 a 
year, which was nearly 50% over the pre-ClassPass level. 
The next chapter presents the detailed case study of an employment-based program 
offered by AC Transit, the same agency that offers the ClassPass. Unlike the student 
program, the city of Berkeley employee deep discount program uses the magnetic dip 
fare card, which permits tracking of aspects of the travel behavior of participants. 
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9. THE EMPLOYEE ECO PASS, CITY OF BERKELEY 
9.1 THE PROGRAM 
This program provides employees of the City of Berkeley with unlimited ride AC Transit 
passes in exchange for a contractual payment per employee per year by the city
government. The City has approximately 1600 full-time employees (excluding the Police
Department) of whom 1330 are covered under the program even if they do not use transit. 
The large volume allows the passes to be sold at the relatively low unit cost of $60 a year 
or $5 per month. Thus the ECO pass is offered at approximately 10% of a basic adult 
monthly pass. The negotiations required that AC Transit restructure some of its routes
within Berkeley to include stops at city offices. The restructuring is intended to better 
serve the work destination of pass users.  
9.2 HISTORY 
The idea of a free, that is, employer-paid transit pass was first proposed to the Berkeley 
City Council four years prior to its adoption52. It took two years to convince the Council 
of its efficacy and an additional six months to get it approved. The program was initiated
on January 1, 2002 as a one-year pilot program. During that period, it was voluntary and 
employees had to request for the pass; 703 employees picked up the pass. The second 
year of the program went into effect on January 1, 2003 as a universal program whereby 
1330 eligible full-time City employees were issued the pass. 
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9.3 INITIAL OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
The eventual adoption of the ECO Pass was not without obstacles. The following 
obstacles partially explain why it took two years to get the proposal through City 
Council: 
•	 The then City Manager’s office insisted a free pass was an additional benefit that 
needed to be negotiated with the Unions. The Unions would have to give up some
benefit to get another. Proponents argued that providing the pass free was 
necessary to get the generally auto-dependent workers to assess the convenience 
of using transit and to make the necessary adjustments to their travel routines. 
•	 The then City Manager’s office insisted the City could not afford the free pass.
Proponents admit the economic boom at the time helped overcome this excuse. 
•	 There was a less formidable obstacle in the form of a counter proposal to conduct 
a feasibility study that would include BART and other transit services with AC 
Transit and consider other employers in the city. Proponents of the free pass 
prevailed by suggesting that the pilot program be restricted to City employees and 
AC Transit service after which non-city employees, BART and other service 
providers could be included. Effectively, the funds to be spent to conduct the 
study were instead used for a practical demonstration project that could guide 
future decision. 
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A major obstacle related to the City’s inability to negotiate a deal with BART. City 
officials were convinced it would take a long time, (about half a decade or more) to 
negotiate a similar pass deal with BART for the following reasons: 
•	 BART service area encompasses many of the nine counties in the Bay Area from 
which it is much more difficult to obtain consensus. In comparison, AC Transit 
service area lies in two counties. 
•	 There did not seem to be adequate support from Board members of BART for the 
idea of an ECO Pass at the time. 
•	 BART was still “studying” the region-wide TRANSLINK program that many 
other transit service providers were in favor of implementing. Implementation of 
TRANSLINK would pave the way for seamless travel by transit in the region and
facilitate the issue of a region-wide ECO Pass. In the meantime, City employees
were able to use their Commuter Checks to purchase BART parking or tickets. 
[The City of Berkeley offered $20 a month as a tax-free benefit and City 
employees could request for up to $20 a month as a pre-tax deduction. Internal 
Revenue code 132(f) provides for a maximum of $100 a month per employee in 
combined tax savings to both employers and employees. See Appendix 10-1.] 
9.4 VISION FOR THE PASS 
City officials envisioned a transit pass for both employees and residents of Berkeley. 
Initially the City would like to focus on employers. Before requesting the program from
other employers, the City chose to set an example by covering its employees. Employers 
had databases in place that would enable program implementation at relatively low 
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administrative cost. Large employers were to be initially targeted in order to obtain “the 
best bang for the buck”. Large employers offered the potential to realize economies of 
scale and could provide the critical mass of employees that would make a citywide 
program feasible. Major employers in Berkeley include the University of California, the 
Berkeley Unified School District, the Alta Bates health institution and the U.S. Postal 
Service. The pass price for small employers could be slightly higher than for others 
because of anticipated differences in unit administrative costs to AC Transit. The Denver 
case study (Chapter 7) revealed that the employment-based programs yielded the highest 
net revenues to the RTD. This supports the City of Berkeley’s vision to make employers 
its primary target for the program a good idea. 
The long-term vision for the ECO Pass therefore included the following: 
•	 Expansion of the program to include BART service 
•	 Making the pass available to employees of both the city government and other 
employers in the city. 
•	 Creation of citywide bus passes for Berkeley residents grouped by neighborhood. 
Currently the residential ECO Pass exists in Santa Clara County, California and in 
the service area of the Regional Transportation District at Denver, Colorado. 
The City therefore actively sought to get other employers, the Alameda County 
Congestion Management Agency and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
(MTC) involved in adopting the idea of a widely deployed ECO Pass. The City would 
also like to seek matching funds for the program from regional agency sources. 
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9.5 OPINIONS AND OBSERVATIONS OF CITY OFFICIALS 
Observations and opinions expressed by City officials on the ECO Pass program include 
the following: 
1.	 People argue against the universal pass program because “not everyone is going
to use it”. Not everyone needs to use it for the program to be successful. Programs
elsewhere in the country are known to obtain much more than a 7% shift from
auto use. Even a 7% reduction in auto use can be considered a success. 
2.	 City officials contend that funding from the State and Counties will make the
program successful. For instance, 20% funding from the government can make
the program very popular with employers. 
3.	 Why not make employees pay for the passes? If employees are required to pay, 
one cannot realize universal participation. The auto dependent might not see the 
pass as an opportunity for a convenient alternate means of commuting. Offering it 
free initially could get employees hooked on using transit. 
4.	 Employers in Berkeley looking to expand are required to provide additional 
parking. The city could negotiate with employers to provide cash for pass in lieu 
of constructing expensive new parking. 
5.	 It is observed from the Pilot program that the pass is getting mainly middle class
and upper middle class individuals to use transit. 
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9.6 TERMS OF AGREEMENT FOR THE ECO PASS PROGRAM 
City employees are issued a magnetic dip card with the employee’s picture for
identification and prevention of fraud. The magnetic dip feature enables collection of 
detailed travel data on individual travel patterns. Unlike the basic monthly pass, the 
unlimited-ride ECO Pass permits rides on every AC Transit bus including Transbay 
travel to and from San Francisco. Travel with the pass is therefore only restricted where
AC Transit service does not go, but in most cases it can provide access to other transit 
services in the Bay Area. The following are some specifics of the terms of agreement for 
the Pass: 
•	 The card is valid for a whole calendar year through December 31. 
•	 The full flat fare of $60 per person is charged through June 30th and a lower flat 
fare of $30 per person is charged after June 30th. 
•	 The production of the magnetic strip, picture identification card is charged to the 
City at $7 each. 
•	 The original contract proposal required a bulk purchase of passes for a minimum 
of 1400 and a maximum of 1600 at the quoted unit price. Representatives of the 
City and the transit operator settled on the current enrolment of 1330 employees. 
9.7 THE GUARANTEED RIDE HOME PROGRAM53 
The city participates in a countywide guaranteed ride home program (GRHP) for transit 
riders who would need to leave in a hurry in response to emergencies. The Alameda 
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County Congestion Management Agency administers the countywide GRHP. The terms
of the program are the following: 
•	 The employee must sign up on condition that the employer is signed up for the
program. 
•	 Each employee who signs up is guaranteed no more than one ride per month for a 
maximum of six rides per year.  
•	 The employee could only use the service in such emergencies as (a) severe illness 
or crisis involving the employee or immediate family member, (b) unscheduled 
overtime work, (c) breakdown of rideshare vehicle or either early or late departure
of rideshare driver. 
•	 The employee must have walked, bicycled, carpooled, van-pooled or taken the 
ferry, bus or train on the day of GRHP need 
GRHP is provided through a pre-specified taxi service provider for trip distances less 
than 20 miles. The employee pays the taxi fare with a voucher issued by the program and 
covers only the tip of approximately 10% to 15% out of pocket. For distances longer than 
20 miles, an employee who is 21 years or older and has a valid California driver’s license
may use a rental car from Enterprise.  
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9.8 THE “BEFORE” ECO PASS SURVEY 
9.8.1 Survey Sample 
Before instituting the Eco Pass, an employee transportation survey was conducted in May 
2001. Including both full time and part-time employees at the time, all 1938 city 
employees were surveyed of whom 428 responded. This represented a response rate of 
22%. The margin of error is 4.7% with a 95% confidence interval. The survey data is 
weighted with a census of employees in 18 departments. 
9.8.2 Commute Modes 
Table 9-1 shows survey results of commute modes used by City of Berkeley employees 
prior to the introduction of the Eco Pass. The following are noteworthy: 
•	 Nearly half of the employees drove alone while an additional 12% carpooled. 
•	 Twice as many took BART (12.9%) as those who rode bus transit (6.2%) 
•	 About as many employees walked as those who biked and together the non-
motorized modes were chosen by just under 10% of all employees. 
•	 Nearly 10% of employees are typically off duty on a weekday. 
Table 9-1: Choice of Commute Mode Before Eco Pass 
Motorized Mode Percent Other Mode Percent 
Drive alone 47.4% Bicycle 4.9% 
Carpool 11.9% Walk 4.7% 
BART 12.9% “Other” 2.8% 
Bus 6.2% Off duty 9.1% 
Subtotal Motorized 78.4% Subtotal Other 21.5% 
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9.8.3 Reasons for Choice of Commute Mode 
Table 9-2 lists the top three reasons advanced by city employees for their various choices 
of commute modes. These reasons are consistent with the selection of automobile-based
commute modes by almost three out of every five employees. As indicated, the 
automobile offers more convenience, flexibility, and travel time advantages over public 
transit. 
Table 9-2: Top Three Reasons for Choice of Commute Mode 
Rank Reason % Of Respondents1 
1st Convenience and flexibility 67.5% 
2nd Travel time 65.2% 
3rd Cost 39.7% 
1 Can sum to more than 100% because multiple responses allowed
9.8.4 Reasons Preventing Use of Alternative Modes 
As shown in Table 9-3, the most common reason advanced for not choosing an 
alternative mode is the conviction that alternates increase commute time. Closely 
following is the reason that employees need to work late or irregular hours. Not too far 
behind is the reason that the employee needs a car for work related assignments. 
Table 9-3 Top Three Reasons Preventing Use of Alternatives to Driving Alone 
Rank Reason % Of Respondents1 
1st Alternate increases commute time 38.7% 
2nd Respondent works late or irregular hours 38.3% 
3rd Respondent needs car for work related assignments 25.3% 
1 Can sum to more than 100% because multiple responses allowed
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9.8.5 Incentives to Choose Alternative Modes 
Table 9-4 shows the top three incentives for choosing alternatives to driving alone. The
most preferred incentive is to be offered the opportunity for a flexible work schedule. Not
too far behind is the availability of a guaranteed ride home program. As previously 
indicated, this program is already available to City of Berkeley employees. The next 
choice of incentive is financial subsidy to alternative modes. The employer-provided 
ECO Pass is such a subsidy. 
Table 9-4: Top Three Incentives to Choosing Alternatives to Driving Alone 
Rank Reason % Of Respondents1 
1st Flexible work schedule 30.9% 
2nd Guaranteed ride home in emergency 24.2% 
3rd Financial subsidies to alternative modes 22.3% 
1 Can sum to more than 100% because multiple responses allowed
9.8.6 Potential Commute Options 
Table 9-5 identifies the top three options that drive-alone commuters would consider one 
or more days per week. Bus transit ranked 7th beating only walking. It is apparent from 
both existing choice levels and this stated preference information that BART is the 
favorite choice among the transit modes available to City of Berkeley employees. This 
fact would suggest that a pass program for BART transit be pursued. 
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Table 9-5: Top Three Options that Drive-Alone Commuters Would Consider 
Rank Reason % Of Respondents1 
1st BART 22% 
2nd Telecommuting 17% 
3rd Carpooling 17% 
1 Can sum to more than 100% because multiple responses allowed
9.9 THE “AFTER” ECO PASS SURVEY 
9.9.1 Survey Sample 
After instituting the Eco Pass, a random, online survey of employees was conducted in 
spring 2002. There was a relatively low response of 202 employees.  The margin of error 
is therefore 6.9% with a 95% confidence interval. The survey data is weighted with a 
census of employees. 
9.9.2 Trip Purposes 
As summarized in Table 9-6, the survey revealed, that the ECO Pass was used 
predominantly, but not by any means exclusively, in relation to work travel. Nearly 40% 
of ECO Pass use was for travel either to and from work or in at least one direction to 
work. A good 13% of ECO pass users also used it during the day to conduct travel related 
to work activities. Other trip purposes for which the ECO pass was used include, in 
descending order of importance, errands, recreational, lunch and medical trips. 
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Table 9-6: Trip Purposes of ECO Pass Users 
Trip Purpose Percent of ECO Pass Users1 
To/From Work 24.8% 
One Direction to Work 14.4% 
Errands 21.3% 
Recreational 14.4% 
Lunch 8.9% 
Medical 7.4% 
Work Related 12.9% 
1 Can sum to more than 100% because multiple responses allowed
9.9.3 Factors to Encourage ECO Pass Use 
When asked the single most important factor that would encourage employees to use the 
ECO Pass (Table 9-7), by far the most important factor indicated by 31% of respondents 
was “increased frequency of bus service near the home”. Since the workplace is a 
location that is already served by several bus lines, which also connect with other lines, 
the frequency of service near the work place was not an issue. The rather dispersed home
locations are therefore a source of limitation to the use of the ECO Pass. Accessibility at 
the home end could be enhanced if the ECO Pass program were extended to the many 
transit operations in the metropolitan area. 
Table 9-7: Factors to Encourage ECO Pass Use 
Trip Purpose Percent of ECO Pass Users 
Increased bus frequency near home 31.2% 
Increased bus frequency near work 5.4% 
Bus ride information 2.0% 
ECO Pass incentives 6.4% 
ECO Pass reminders 0.0% 
Night bus near home 5.9% 
Night bus near work 0.0% 
Passenger amenities at stops 2.0% 
Increased safety at stops 5.0% 
Nothing 13.9% 
No Response 28.2% 
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9.9.4 Changes in AC Transit Patronage 
Because of inconsistencies in some of the responses from the survey data, the magnetic 
dip data was used to determine the number of City employees who used AC Transit in the 
first year of the ECO Pass program. Table 9-8 shows the results. Approximately 30% of 
pass holders used the ECO Pass. The estimated number of AC Transit riders among the 
totality of City employees increased by two thirds from 6.2% to 10.7% in the first year of 
the deep discount pass program. 
The difference in the proportions of riders who chose AC Transit before and after 
introduction of the ECO Pass is statistically significant (Appendix 9-3). However this is 
only the initial change due to the program. Additional tracking of use over time is 
necessary to make more definitive judgment about mode choice changes.
Table 9-8: Change in AC Transit Patronage 
Population Percent Riding  
AC Transit 
Number Riding 
AC Transit 
Before ECO Pass (2001)
Total Employees1 1938 6.2% 120 
With ECO Pass (2002)
Participants 7032 29.6% 2083 
Total Employees4 1938 10.7% 208 
1 2001 “Before” Survey
2 The reported number of passes issued in the first-year pilot program
3 2002 Magnetic Dip Data collected and compiled by AC Transit 
4 Based on 2001 Survey and 2002 Magnetic dip Data  
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Figure 9-2 illustrates the fact that not all ECO Pass users are habitual AC Transit riders. 
The magnetic dip data (Appendix 9-1) are tallied weekly by calendar month. Weeks that 
begin or end calendar months often have less than seven days. The data show that on 
average there are 74 riders over a 2-day week, 116 over a 5-day week and 127 over a 7­
day week. Apparently many participants only use the ECO Pass a few times a week 
rather than daily. This result conforms to the survey finding that the ECO Pass is used for 
multiple trip purposes and not for work travel alone. 
Figure 9-1: Number of Riders by Length of Week 
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9.10 RIDERSHIP TRACKING 
9.10.1 Weekday vs. Weekend ECO Pass Use 
Eleven months of magnetic dip data collected and compiled by AC Transit is presented in 
Appendix 9-1 and 9-2. The data summ ary in Table 9-9 shows that an average week day
has nearly three times as many boarding s as a weekend. This fact suggests the dominance 
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of ECO Pass use for work trips, the prim ary motivation for instituting the deep discount 
pass program. However, the relative level of weekend use is by no means trivial. 
Table 9-9: Summary of Average Monthly ECO Pass Boardings and Riders (2002) 
Average total boardings per month 3094 
Average daily boardings on a weekday 125 
Average daily boardings on a weekend 44 
Average number of passes used (Riders) per month  194 
Average of total boardings per pass used 16 
9.10.2 ECO Pass Use by Time of Day 
Conforming to the use of the ECO Pass primarily for work trips is the fact that nearly 
three quarters of all boardings on the m ost frequently patronized routes occur in a nearly 
eve pn s lit between the morning and the afternoon commute periods as shown in Table 9­
10. The sampling of the frequently patronized routes r epresented nearly three of five
boardings by ECO Pass participants. 
The strong showing of midday use at 26 .2% suggests the following: 
•	 Some work trips are made in the off-peak by those who participate in staggered or 
flexible work-hour schedules. 
•	 There is a substantial proportion of either non-work travel or travel related to 
other work activity in the middle of the workday. 
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Table 9-10: Average Monthly Distribution of Boardings by Time of Day 
Period of Day Hours of Day Percent of 
Boardings 
Average Hourly 
Percent 
AM Peak 6:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. 31.5% 7.9% 
Midday 10:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m. 26.2% 5.2% 
PM Peak 3:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m. 33.9% 8.5% 
Evening 7:00 p.m. – 12:01 a.m. 8.4% 1.7% 
Nearly one in ten boardings occurs outside the commute and traditional work hours. This 
and the previous observations confirm that the ECO Pass is used for multi-purpose travel 
needs as reported in the 2002 Survey. 
9.10.3 Frequency of ECO Pass Use 
During the average month, approximately 28% of ECO Pass holders (194 of 703) used 
the pass. This first year of use, is comparable although lower than other employment-
based ECO Pass programs in which 58% of pa ss holders at downtown Denver, 44% at 
Denver Airport, and 40% at Silicon Valley use their passes. Table 9-11 shows that the 
majority (56%) of ECO Pass riders are infrequent users. About 17% each fall in the
categories of occasional and regular users. About 10% of pass riders take maximum 
advantage of the availability of the ECO Pass to them. The facts of this distribu tion 
suggest that there should be little concern about patronage due to the ECO Pass 
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overwhelming existing service. This is especially true in light of the genera lly low seat-
occupancy levels on urban transit buses. 
Table 9-11: Frequency Distribution of Average Monthly Riders 
User
Label 
Range 
of Use 
Frequency 
Riders 
% of Cumu 
% 
lative d 
ve 
Estimate Lost 
Fare Re nue 
per 
Month 
Maximum1 Typical2 
Infrequent 1 – 10 108 55.5% 55.5% $ 835 $ 415 
Occasional 11 – 20 34 17.5% 73.0% $ 525 $ 395 
Regular 21 – 40 33 16.8% 89.8% $ 1,000 $ 1,000 
Heavy > 40 20 10.2% 100% $ 600 $ 600 
All 195 100% -­ $ 2,960 $ 2,410 
Net monthly revenue gain3 $ 3,690 $ 4,240 
Net annual revenue gain $44,280 $50,880 
Percent revenue gain over pre-ECO Pass level 125% 176% 
1 Assumptions for estimate:
 (a) Proportion of riders by category the same before the ECO pass (120 riders) as with it; 
(b) Infrequent riders purchased the maximum number of rides within each range at $1.25 each; 
(c) Regular and heavy riders purchased the monthly pass at $50 each. 
2 Assumptions same as above except for (b): 
(b) Infrequent riders purchased number of rides at midpoint of range at $1.25 each. 
3 Difference from equivalent monthly payment of $6,650 for ECO Pass participants. 
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9.11 PROGRAM EFFECT ON AC TRANSIT 
9.11.1 Revenue 
Figure 9-2 depicts trends in revenue generated per boarding by the ECO Pass program for
AC Transit in 2002. Variations in levels of use over the months ind icate that revenues
ranged between $2.00 and $2.50 per boarding with a tendency to level off close to $2.00 
per boarding. The ECO Pass program appears to yield three times the system-wide unit 
revenue of $0.67 that AC Transit recovered in 2000. The City of Berkeley ECO Pass
program is therefore a deep discount group pass program that generates much higher unit 
revenue to the operator than most other programs. This level of yield is higher than, but
consistent with the yield reported in Chapter 7 for deep discount programs offered by the 
Denver RTD. 
Figure 9-2: Trends in Revenue per Boarding 
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Following from the increase in unit revenue per boarding is the positive net effect on total 
revenue from the City employee market.  The survey data in Table 9-8 indicates that 
approximately 120 employees commuted to work by AC Transit before the ECO Pass 
program. By incrementally relaxing the conservativeness of assumptions, the following
thre se e timates all indicate net revenue gains to AC Transit.  
1. With the findings that most employee riders did not ride AC Transit regularly, not 
all would have purchased regular monthly passes prior to the ECO Pass program. 
However, assuming for simplicity that they all did at $50 per month for a regular 
adult pass, revenue lost is $6,000 per month. In comparison, the City pays the 
equivalent of $6,650 (i.e. 1330 * $5) per month for all months of the year. This 
translates to a net profit of $650 a month, a minimum of 11% increase over 
previous fare revenue that AC Transit collected from the City employee market.  
2.	 More realistically, even if infrequent riders purchased the maximum number of 
rides within the ranges shown in Table 9-11 while regular riders purchased the 
monthly pass, the estimated lost revenue would be approximately $2,960 a month. 
This would translate to net revenue of $3,690 a month, approximately 125% 
increase over previous fare revenue. This estimate is consistent with the revenue 
per boarding data. For offering the program therefore, AC Transit woul d realize a 
net annual increase in revenue of approximately $44,280 from that market. 
3.	 Most realistically, if infrequent riders purchased the average number of rides 
within the ranges shown in Table 9-11 while regular riders purchased the monthly 
pass, the estimated lost revenue would be approximately $2,410 a month. This 
would translate to net revenue of $4,240 a month, approximately 175% increase 
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over previous fare revenue. This estimate is most consistent with the revenue per 
boarding data. For offering the program therefore, AC Transit would realize a net 
annual increase in revenue of approximately $50,880 from that market. 
9.11.2 Ridership 
The data in Table 9-8 indicate that AC Transit riders among City of Berkeley employees 
increased by nearly 75% (from 120 to 208) in the first year of the institution of the ECO 
Pass program. However, the number of riders as a percentage of the total population of 
employees is small relative to other modes; it increased from 6.2% to 10.7%. As 
indicated earlier, this would not necessitate expansion in AC Transit service to
accommodate demand. Indeed no incidence of overcrowding has been known to occur, or
have increases in service levels been warranted on the routes serving downtown Berkeley 
since inception of the ECO Pass program. 
9.12 SUMMARY 
The iC ty of Berkeley Eco Pass is a case study of an employment-based deep discount 
program. Its attractiveness lies with its magnetic dip fare card, the future of deep discount 
fare ac rds. This feature offers opportunities to collect rich travel data on program 
participants. Surveys of employee travel choices before and after introduction of the deep 
discount program reveal a statistically significant difference in the proportions of 
employees who chose AC Transit, the operator that offers the program. The magnetic dip 
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data on employee travel with the Eco Pass during the first year of the program revealed 
the foll owing: 
•	 An average weekday registered nearly three times as many Eco Pass boardings as 
an average day on a weekend. 
•	 Approximately a third each of all Eco Pass boardings occurred during the 
morning and afternoon peak periods of commute travel. An additional quarter of 
all Eco Pass boardings occurred in the midday between the two peak periods. 
•	 These findings confirmed survey results, which indicated that the Eco Pass was 
used for multiple trip purposes although its use for work travel was dominant. 
•	 Approximately 28% of pass holders used it in the first year of its introduction and 
more than 50% of the riders were infrequent users. 
The number of AC Transit riders among City of Berkeley employees increased by nearly 
75% (from 120 to almost 210 riders) in the first year of the program. In spite of this 
increase, and the fact that the deep discount pass was offered at 90% discount, the
program yielded higher than $2.00 in revenue per boarding to AC Transit. This is 
approximately three times the system-wide revenue per boarding. By offering the 
program, AC Transit stood to earn a net annual increase in revenue of almost $51,000. 
In the next chapter, the various findings from program evaluations reported in the 
literature and the detailed case study analyses of this dissertation are synthesized. The
discussion addresses the policy issues identified in the statement of research purpose 
outlined in Chapter 1.
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10. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
10.1 POLICY QUESTIONS 
From the literature review through the analyses of the theoretical bases of the research to 
the case study analyses, this dissertation documented the effects of deep discount pass 
programs in terms of pertinent policy questions on: (1) the terms and conditions of the
programs; (2) opinions, perceptions and equity concerns; (3) effect on mode choice; (4) 
effect on parking; (5) effect on the environment; (6) direct operating and maintenance 
cost implications; (7) net revenue effects;  and (8) benefits to providers and recipients. 
Ultimately, the various policy questions translate into effects on the use of transit and the
automobile. This in turn has implications for parking and for the costs and benefits to 
service providers and recipients. In this chapter, answers to these policy questions are 
distilled and analyzed. 
10.2 HOW THE PROGRAMS WORK 
Deep Discount Transit Pass Programs provide a defined group of people with unlimited 
ride transit passes in exchange for some contractual payment for or on behalf of pass
users by an employer, other governing body or other organizing body. The programs fall 
into four categories: the employment-based ECO Pass, the Neighborhood ECO Pass, the
campus-based College Pass, and the TeenPass that is sold through middle and high 
schools. Deep discount group pass programs exhibit the following general features:  
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(a)	 Universal coverage of members of an identified group – Most often all members
of a participating body are included. In some cases, as at the University of 
Washington, Seattle, members could opt out of the program. In all cases, there are 
criteria for qualifying a distinct body. For instance, qualified participants were 
defined as “benefit-receiving employees” by the City of Berkeley when the City 
opted to pay for the passes as an employee benefit. At U.C. Berkeley where the 
students pay for the program, the body is qualified as “all students enrolled during 
the semester”. In many campus-based programs, participants always include 
students and in some, programs also include faculty and staff. 
(b)	 Unlimited ride – In most programs, participants use validated picture
identification cards as passes to board the transit vehicles. Participants are 
permitted rides on the various types of transit modes offered by the transit provider
typically for a whole calendar year. 
(c)	 Pricing – All programs offer deep discount pricing that covers a relatively large 
number of people as a form of innovative financing. Deep discount prices are as 
low as 6% and as high as 60% of the price of the regular monthly pass. Not all 
passes are priced equally because the pricing is designed to cover costs of providing
service that include operational, maintenance and administrative expenses of the 
transit agency and program marketing as well as administrative assistance to 
participating employers. As an example, the price of an ECO Pass per employee is 
considerably higher in downtown Denver, where there is a concentration of 
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services and peak period travel and where parking is expensive, than in the suburbs, 
where there are fewer services and peak period travel and plenty of free parking. 
Some employment-based and neighborhood-based programs offer guaranteed rides home
either through the transit operator (as by Denver RTD and Santa Clara VTA) or through 
the employer (as by the City of Berkeley in collaboration with the local congestion
management agency). 
10.3 PERCEPTIONS AND EQUITY 
Despite the successes of various deep discount pass programs, there has been substantial 
skepticism on the part of the management of transit agencies toward their adoption and 
wide-scale deployment. Discussions with operators revealed that management is not 
generally convinced of the efficacy of the programs. Rather they are considered “special 
treatments” or “favors” to segments of the population. They fear the perception of special 
treatment could raise questions about equity. An operator would make such an argument
by comparing the $5 a month charge per person per month for the City of Berkeley ECO 
Pass with the regular monthly pass rate of $50 each. By such comparison, AC Transit 
offers the ECO Pass to the City of Berkeley at 10% of the regular rate or at a 90% 
discount. Similarly, Santa Clara VTA offers the pass at 20% of the regular monthly rate 
to Silicon Valley commuters. The Denver RTD offers the passes at 6% to 60% of the 
regular monthly rate depending on the number of participants and geographic location. 
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Comparisons with regular fares are interpreted as discounts that are easily misconstrued 
as special treatments because the argument fails to see the fundamental difference in the 
fare structure of the “group pass” from individual ticket purchases. The group pass covers 
a large number of people and is paid for the whole year in advance whether the service is 
going to be used or not. In this regard it operates similar to an insurance scheme which 
can charge a relatively low premium as membership in the pool grows large and yet be 
profitable. 
In spite of the deep discounts, analyses of the three case studies revealed that all the 
programs produce higher revenues per boarding than the system-wide averages of the 
respective transit agencies. For instance, the City of Berkeley ECO Pass produces $2.00 
per boarding. This is three times the system-wide average of approximately $0.67 per 
boarding over all fare media for AC Transit. This illustrates the potential of the programs
to increase operating revenue for transit agencies. Where the programs necessitate 
additional operating costs, these added costs should be considered in setting the prices for 
the passes as depicted in the proposed pricing methodology in the next chapter.  
When equity is viewed from the perspective of the equality of opportunity, a deep 
discount pass program has the potential to provide equality of opportunity either because
it is available to all members of a target group or it is available to many groups via the 
work place or residential location. Where the program is offered, it is left to potential 
participants to organize and take advantage of the opportunity it offers. Wide scale 
deployment of deep discount programs in a transit service area can, in this regard, 
provide equality of opportunity. 
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10.4 CHANGES IN TRAVEL BEHAVIOR 
10.4.1 Mode Choice Changes 
Table 10-1 summarizes mode choice changes associated with the auto-drive-alone and 
the transit modes following the introduction of selected deep discount programs. The 
following facts are notable: 
•	 The auto-drive-alone mode consistently loses shares to transit, as to be expected. The 
loss is more pronounced among students than faculty, staff or other employees. 
•	 The transit mode consistently gains shares by approximately 5 to 15 percentage 
points. The gain is typically more pronounced among students than faculty, staff or 
other employees. 
These facts emphasize the notion that deep discount programs are more likely to be 
embraced by certain groups than others. In a university community, for instance, students 
are a great clientele because many live relatively close to campus, automobile ownership 
among them is low and many have the flexibility to adjust their travel patterns. Faculty 
may be the least appropriate clientele because they have the least schedule flexibility due 
to commitments to appointments and complex travel patterns to attend to multiple chores. 
The magnitude of increase in transit ridership has varied widely among deep discount 
programs. This fact is illustrated by the following: 
•	 Brown, Hess and Shoup (1999) found from their survey of “Unlimited Access” 
programs in 31 Universities around the nation that during the first year of 
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program implementation, increases in student transit ridership ranged between 
70% and 200%. 
Table 10-1: Change in Mode Choice Following Deep Discount Pass Programs 
Auto Drive Alone Transit
Before After Before After 
Univ. of Washington Students1 25% 14% 21% 35% 
Univ. of Washington Faculty & 
Staff1 
49% 40% 21% 28% 
Univ. Of Wisconsin, Students2 54% 38% 12% 25% 
Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Students3 12.5% 11.5% 12.2% 21.7% 
Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Students4 5.6% 14% 
City of Berkeley Employees5 47.4% 6.2% 10.7% 
Silicon Valley Employees6 76% 60% 11% 27% 
1Source: Williams and Petrait (1993) 

2Source: Meyer and Beimborn (1996); transit rides on MCTS 

3Source: 1997 and 2001 Surveys; Transit refers to all forms 

4Source: 1997 and 2001 Surveys; Transit refers to AC Transit (& Pass Program) 

5Source: 2001 Survey and 2002 Magnetic Dip Data; AC Transit only
 
6Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup (1999)  

•	 Approximately 1690 students rode AC Transit before and 4410 students rode AC 
Transit after the implementation of the U. C. Berkeley ClassPass. The net increase
in riders of 2720 (4410 – 1690) is approximately 160%. Viewed differently, the 
number of riders jumped to 2.6 times the pre-ClassPass level.  
•	 A relatively low increase of 33% occurred among the faculty and staff of the 
University of Washington at Seattle. 
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This fact reinforces the previous assertion that deep discount programs are more likely to 
be embraced by certain groups than others. It can also help in identifying the groups to be 
targeted for deep discount programs.  
10.4.2 Level of Pass Use 
The data revealed that use of the deep discount pass among program participants tended 
to increase over time. In general, about a third to two thirds of participants use the pass
for travel. Among the City of Berkeley employees, approximately 28% of ECO Pass 
holders used the pass in the first year of the program. In the longer established 
employment-based ECO Pass programs, level of participation is higher whereby 58% of 
pass holders at downtown Denver, 44% at Denver Airport, and 40% at Silicon Valley 
travel with their deep discount passes. 
10.4.3  Fare Elasticities 
The levels of mode choice changes relative to price translate into the fare elasticities 
presented in Table 10-2. The following are noteworthy: 
•	 In general, all elasticities are larger than -1 and range between -0.26 and -0.6 
indicating that the demand for transit service is quite inelastic. However, the 
figures suggest that the demand may expand as a result of reduction in the 
effective fares whether directly in per ride fares or indirectly in out-of-pocket cost 
through deep discount programs. 
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Table 10-2: Comparative Fare Elasticities of Deep Discount Programs1 
Transit in General 
By Time of Day2 Peak -0.17 
Off-Peak -0.40 
By Trip Purpose2 Work -0.10 
School -0.19 
Shopping -0.23 
By Mode3 Rail -0.26 
Bus -0.46 
College Campus-Based Student Deep Discount Programs4 
California State University, Sacramento -0.26 
University of California, Davis -0.28 
University of Wisconsin, Madison -0.34 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign -0.49 
University of Colorado, Boulder -0.50 
University of California, Berkeley5 -0.60 
Employment-Based Deep Discount Programs5 
City of Berkeley Employees – AC transit -0.33 
Silicon Valley Employees – Santa Clara VTA -0.60 
College Campus-Based Mixed-Affiliate Deep Discount Programs5 
University of Washington, Seattle – Students  -0.28 
University of Washington, Seattle – Faculty and Staff -0.17 
1 Mid-point arc elasticities 
2 Mayworm et al, 1980, p xi54 
3 Savage, 2002, Table 155 
4 Shoup et al, 1999, Table 356 
5 Author’s estimate57 
• These observations carry the policy implication that implementation of deep 
discount programs would not overwhelm existing operations. This is especially so 
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vis-à-vis the fact that approximately 27% of existing transit capacity is used 
overall in urban areas (Brown, Hess and Shoup, 1999). 
•	 The largest responses are likely to occur during off-peak periods (when excess 
capacity is most likely to be available) and for the bus travel mode, which is more
ubiquitous than the rail modes. This implies that groups need to be carefully 
selected to maximize benefits from the use of existing transit capacity. 
Participants, such as students, who need to travel more during the off-peak than 
peak periods are therefore prime candidates for deep discount programs. 
•	 In general, deep discount programs exhibit higher fare elasticities than the 
industry as a whole. This implies that it may be more beneficial to direct efforts at 
promoting deep discount programs than general fare reductions. 
10.4.4 Time of Travel 
Survey data and statistical test results show that the introduction of the U.C. Berkeley
ClassPass caused significant adjustments in the periods many students chose to travel to 
and from campus. However the distribution of travel throughout the day especially in 
terms of peaking followed the same general pattern after the ClassPass program began as
before it. 
Magnetic swipe data on the City of Berkeley employee pass users revealed that their 
travel times were concentrated in the traditional morning and afternoon commute periods.
The data also revealed that there was a substantial proportion of either non-work travel or 
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travel related to other work activity in the middle of the workday. Nearly one in ten 
boardings occurred outside the commute and traditional work hours. This and the 
previous observations confirm that the ECO Pass was used for multi-purpose travel needs 
and not strictly for work travel. 
The City of Berkeley data also show that an average weekday had nearly three times as 
many boardings as a weekend. While this fact may suggest the dominance of ECO Pass 
use for work trips, the primary motivation for instituting the deep discount pass program, 
the relative level of weekend use was by no means trivial. 
10.5 IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PARKING 
The provision of parking is integral to all major land use activities. In as far as deep 
discount programs trigger mode shift away from the auto-drive-alone mode, they have 
direct cost implications for parking. For instance in Santa Clara County, a survey of 
commuters to the Silicon Valley indicates that the program resulted in a reduction in 
parking demand by approximately 19%58. Traditionally, parking is viewed as a source of 
revenue to university campuses. Parking is also considered a necessary infrastructure that 
supports campus activities. The economics of campus parking vis-à-vis the presence of a
deep discount transit pass program may be illustrated with the UCLA case as follows:59 
Effect on parking demand – With the introduction of the BruinGO program at UCLA, 
1,000 drive-alone commuters living within the Santa Monica Municipal Bus Lines (Blue 
Bus) service area gave up their parking spaces. These spaces did not remain vacant 
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because there was usually a long waiting list (typically of students) for parking permits. 
Table 10-3 summarizes the effect of the pass program on parking at UCLA. 
Similarly at U.C. Berkeley, permits sold represented around 135% of available spaces. If 
the introduction of a transit pass reduces auto drive-alone commuting, the ratio of permits
to spaces is likely to reduce, but the spaces are not likely to remain vacant. In general, a 
deep discount transit pass program that can help reduce the demand for parking may be a 
relief mechanism for situations of acute shortage of parking spaces. 
Table 10-3: Effect of BruinGO on Parking Demand at UCLA 
Introduction of Auto Drivers Students on 
Wait List for 
Parking 
BruinGO Faculty & 
Staff 
Students Total 
Before 3,400  3,000 6,400 3,969 
After 3,100  2,000 5,100 2,637 
Difference - 300 -1,000 1,300 -1,332 
Source: Donald Shoup et al, BruinGO: An Evaluation, 2002, p8, 
Effect on future parking construction – A direct result of the reduction in parking demand 
is the potential reduction in the need to construct new parking spaces. The estimated 
monthly total cost (construction, interest and operation) of a debt-financed space on a
1,500-space parking structure at UCLA was $223 per month in 2002.60 This was four 
times the monthly rate for parking permits at UCLA. Similarly, the estimate for a space 
in a new parking structure at the University of Colorado, Boulder was $227 per month. 
The policy issue of interest is the periodic cost of the deep discount program relative to 
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the cost of financing and maintaining parking for those who shifted away from onsite 
parking. 
Potential for additional short-term parking – The reduction in the demand for parking 
spaces could create opportunities to convert available or less used spaces to daily, short-
term visitor parking, which attracts higher parking rates than long-term, permit rates. At 
UCLA, visitors paid $2 per hour and $7 per day for parking on campus, while faculty, 
staff and students paid approximately $54 per month for permits in 2002. Assuming a 
month had just 20 weekdays, a visitor parking space could generate $140 per month, 
which was more than two and a half times the revenue from a permit. In situations where 
short-term visitor parking is also in short supply as around U.C. Berkeley, a deep 
discount program that could free up parking spaces might help generate increased parking 
revenue. 
10.6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Shifts away from the auto-drive-alone mode to transit carry implications for the
environment through reductions in roadway congestion and environmental pollution as 
follows: 
•	 Reduction in drive-alone travel means a reduction in the number of vehicles that 
could have been on the roads. If demand for roadway use does not shift 
geographically or in time, a reduction in roadway congestion may be realized in a 
subject area.
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•	 Whether reduced demand for roadway space is replaced by latent demand or not,
reduction in vehicle travel could result in the avoidance of emissions from the 
private vehicles of those who shifted away from drive-alone travel. 
While the levels of emissions vary widely by type of vehicle, climate and vehicle 
operating conditions, Table 10-4 shows generalized unit averages of emissions that may 
be avoided when reductions in auto-drive-alone travel occur. It also shows, as proxy for
marginal social cost, unit cost savings based on the average transaction prices for offset 
purchases reported by the California Air Resources Board. These generalized figures
make the point that deep discount programs that reduce auto-drive-alone can contribute to 
reduction in emissions and associated costs to society. 
Table 10-4: Generalized Unit Emissions and Costs1 
Type of Emission 
Unit Emission Unit Cost 
Pounds per 
VMT 
Pounds per 
Gallon of Fuel 
Dollars per 
Pound 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 0.02420 0.593 $3.88 
Nitrogen Oxide (Nox) 0.00251 0.062 $9.68 
Particulates (PM10) 0.00009 0.002 $8.53 
Reactive organic gases (ROG) 0.00242 0.059 $3.28 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 1.25823 30.827 $0.02 
1 Compiled from multiple sources: The California Air Resources Board (2000); U. S. Department 
of Energy (1994); Bernow and Dougherty (1998)  
In concept, emissions reductions should lead to improvements in the personal and 
environmental health of the community. Such improvements may be viewed in terms of 
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reductions in the incidence of illnesses related to the respiratory system, stress and 
damage to structures. The following reported examples of external effects of deep 
discount programs illustrate this: 
UPASS program at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee – Meyer and Beimborn 
(1996) reported reduced vehicle trips to the university, which resulted in reductions in 
emissions and fuel consumption and translated to dollar savings to students during the 
1994-95 academic year as follows: 
•	 221,055 fewer vehicle trips 
•	 5,084,265 fewer VMT for trips to UWM, which implies an average of 23 vehicle 
miles per trip  
•	 242,108 gallons of fuel savings, which checks to 1.1 gallons of fuel per trip at an 
average fuel consumption of 21 miles per galloon.  
•	 $295,372 savings in fuel costs, which calculates to $1.22 per gallon of fuel.  
•	 20% reduction in emissions for trips to UWM and approximately 0.1% for the
entire Southeastern Wisconsin region. 
Denver ECO Pass – Fay Lewis reports estimates in TransAct that the average employee 
who used the ECO Pass in 1996 would have eliminated the following61: 
•	 300 single occupancy vehicle trips 
•	 5,000 miles of driving, which implies an average of 17 vehicle miles per trip 
•	 200 gallons of gasoline, which checks to 0.7 gallons of fuel per trip at an average 
fuel consumption of 25 miles per gallon 
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•	 200 pounds of pollutants, which implies approximately 0.7 pounds per trip or 0.04 
pounds per mile or 1 pound per gallon of fuel used. 
10.7 IMPACTS ON AGENCY OPERATING COSTS 
Under ordinary circumstances, when deep discount programs do not necessitate service 
expansion, the programs exert minimal effect on the operating cost of transit operators. 
The following examples illustrate: 
•	 Denver RTD -- The administrative cost associated with implementing the 
employment-based ECO Pass program ranged between 1% and 7% of total sales 
receipts each year. The cost of administering the ECO Pass, therefore, did not 
appear to be excessive and indeed appeared to be less than what was typical with
comparative objects of expenditure in the transit industry.  
•	 AC Transit -- Unofficial estimates from AC Transit officials place the cost of 
administering their deep discount programs at 3% of receipts from the programs. 
AC Transit riders among City of Berkeley employees increased by nearly 75% 
(from 120 to 208) in the first year of the institution of the ECO Pass program; this 
did not necessitate expansion in AC Transit service to accommodate demand. 
Indeed no incidence of overcrowding has been known to occur and no increase in 
service levels have been warranted on the routes serving downtown Berkeley 
since inception of the ECO Pass program. 
The situation may be drastically different when program expansion occurs. For instance, 
in response to ridership gains after the U-PASS program at the University of Washington, 
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Seattle began, Metro added 60,000 annual hours of new bus service, the equivalent of 10 
more buses operating for approximately 18 hours a day. Program-specific operating cost 
additions that may arise could relate to route extensions, increase in service runs, cost of
tripper operators, cost of guaranteed ride home service, cost of additional administrative
assistance to the participating group and the production cost of the pass instrument. These 
costs can grow rapidly because of the traditionally large unit costs of labor and vehicle 
operation. This is illustrated in an example application of the pricing method developed 
in the next chapter. 
10.8 NET REVENUE EFFECTS 
This dissertation has found consistently that the deep discount group pass programs of the 
case studies generated much higher unit revenues to the transit operators than most other 
programs. The following findings illustrate: 
•	 The tracking of rides by City of Berkeley employees with monthly magnetic 
swipe data revealed that AC Transit earned revenues that ranged between $2.00 
and $2.50 per boarding in 2002. The ECO Pass program appeared to yield three 
times the system-wide unit revenue of $0.67 that AC Transit recovered in 2000. It 
is interesting to note that this rate of revenue yield was obtained from a deep 
discount program that AC transit offered at a 90% discount over the regular adult 
monthly pass. 
•	 Data reveal that every deep discount program offered by the Denver RTD yielded 
more revenue per boarding than the system-wide average. As shown in Table 10­
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5, ECO Pass programs yielded almost two times as much as the system-wide 
average in the year 2002. Generally, the employment-based program appears to 
yield the highest revenue per boarding among the various deep discount 
programs. 
•	 Results of Granger Causality Tests of the RTD data imply that while the Eco Pass 
program might draw from the existing transit riding population, it yielded more
than proportionate increase in revenue resulting in a net gain in fare revenue. This 
finding and the findings on fares per boarding are consistent with the basic 
hypothesis of this study that deep discount group pass programs may be 
instruments for increasing transit revenue. 
•	 When the U.C. Berkeley ClassPass program began, AC Transit earned net 
monthly revenue of approximately $40,600 ($125,100 - $84,500), which 
projected to net annual revenue increase of approximately $406,000. This net 
increase in revenue is nearly 50% over the estimated pre-ClassPass level. 
Table 10-5: Trends in System-wide vs. ECO Pass Revenue – Denver RTD 
System-wide Deep Discount Programs 
Revenue Per Boarding Revenue Per Boarding1 
Nominal 1983 Dollars Nominal 1983 Dollars 
1994 $0.43 $0.29 $1.092 $0.76 
1997 $0.51 $0.32 $0.77 $0.48 
2000 $0.58 $0.34 $1.07 $0.62 
1 Revenue per boarding for combined three major programs
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10.9 PROVIDERS AND RECIPIENTS
Another issue that has wide implications for costs relates to the decision on how to pay 
for the program. The fundamental distinction is between making payments to the operator 
per boarding as at UCLA (with the benefit of magnetic swipe card) or per person as at
U.C. Berkeley and the majority of ECO Pass programs. The following paragraphs review 
related issues. 
Riders – When payment for the deep discount pass is made by a sponsoring organization, 
as at UCLA, there is no cost implication for the riders. However, in the UCLA-specific 
case, there is cross subsidization of transit users by parkers since the cost of the transit 
pass program is fully funded from parking revenues. Where lump sum payments are 
made for all members of the group, as at U.C. Berkeley and the ECO Pass programs,
there is an element of cross-subsidization of riders by non-riders. However where 
individual members of a group can opt out, as at the University of Washington, Seattle, 
cross-subsidization may diminish. 
Operators – Operators could view payment per ride as the fairest method especially if
there are many new riders during periods of excess capacity. If there are several peak 
period rides, capacity expansion and consequent increases in operating cost could result. 
If there are few off-peak riders, the potential to increase revenue becomes limited. 
Payment per participant will ensure a guaranteed amount of revenue and can result in a 
windfall for operators if there are many non-riders or if rides are concentrated in the off­
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peak periods of excess capacity. However if there are several peak period rides, capacity
expansion and consequent increases in operating cost could result. 
Universities – There may be little or no direct cost implications to such recipient agencies 
as universities if participants pay the entire fare as at U.C. Berkeley. On the contrary, 
there is some expense if fares are subsidized as at the University of Washington, Seattle
or are fully covered as at UCLA. However, a university could realize savings from
paying for transit passes instead of constructing more parking spaces. For instance UCLA 
spent approximately $71,000 a month for bus rides by faculty, staff and students that 
resulted in the reduction in parking demand by more than 1,000 spaces.62 At $71 per 
space saved per month, the pass is a bargain compared to the total monthly debt service 
cost of $223 per parking space. In a situation where there is no reduced need to construct 
new parking spaces, the pass might not be a bargain if the institution continued to pay for
both the parking spaces and the bus use. 
10.10 COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Conventionally, the efficacies of programs are judged by their benefits relative to the 
costs incurred in their realization. The incidence of costs and benefits fall differently on 
individuals, agencies, groups, communities and other constituents. Therefore benefit-cost 
analyses should ideally target various constituents of programs. Table 10-6 identifies the 
key elements of costs and benefits attributable to deep discount pass programs as well as 
the constituents of each item. 
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The key cost elements are: (1) payments for passes by payers; (2) additional service 
operating cost, if any, to service providers; (3) loss of parking revenue to parking 
providers; and administrative costs to program administrators. 
The key benefit items include: (1) reduction in fare payments by buyers; (2) reduction to 
parking providers in capital construction and maintenance costs of new parking spaces 
due to reduced demand; (3) additional revenue to parking providers from increased 
availability of short-term parking spaces; (4) increased fare revenue to service providers;
(5) reduced roadway congestion in the community; and (6) reduced environmental 
pollution in the community. It may be argued that other less determinable benefits could 
potentially accrue to society in the wake of deep discount pass programs. They include 
savings from reduced roadway construction; reduced amount of land used for roads; and 
increased safety, which may stem from reduced roadway congestion. 
The evaluation of the UCLA deep discount pass program provides one example of 
benefit-cost analysis of a deep discount pass program. It uses applicable elements of costs
and benefits identified in Table 10-6 to assess the net benefits of the program on various 
constituents of the campus community. Table 10-7 is a summary of the results. 
Additional details are included in Appendix 3-3 of Chapter 3. The evaluation 
parsimoniously considered two elements each of costs and benefits. Included among 
costs are payments for rides and program administration costs. Benefits relate to reduced
fare payments and reduced parking demand. 
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Table 10-6: Key Elements of Costs and Benefits of Deep Discount Pass Programs 
Anticipated Element Constituents 
Potential Costs 
1. Payment for passes The payer: universities, employers, 
participants
2. Additional service operating costs, if
any 
Service provider: transit agency 
3. Parking revenue lost from reduction in 
permits 
Parking provider: university 
4. Administrative costs Program administrators: universities, 
employers, transit agency 
Potential Benefits 
1. Reduction in fare payments The payer: universities, employers, 
participants
2. Reduction in construction cost of 
parking spaces due to reduction in 
demand 
Parking provider: university 
3. Additional revenue from increased 
short-term parking 
Parking provider: university 
4. Increased fare revenue. Service provider: transit agency 
5. Reduced congestion Community 
6. Reduced emissions Community 
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Table 10-7: Estimated Annual Costs and Benefits of BruinGo1 
Constituent Costs Benefits Benefit-Cost 
Ratio 
Students $137,700 $862,000 6.3 
Faculty and Staff $202,500 $807,000 4.0 
University Departments $32,400 $109,000 3.4 
Campus Visitors $437,400 $1,472,000 3.4 
Overall $810,000 $3,250,000 4.0 
1 Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup (2002), Table 3  
Results demonstrate and reveal the following: 
•	 The incidence of costs and benefits fall on various constituents at different levels. 
From stratifying the analysis by constituents, the program may be designed to
achieve specific objectives or to address specific equity concerns. For instance, a 
decision could be made whether payment for the pass should fall on a particular 
constituency or whether they should be shared among them. 
•	 All constituents realized high benefit-to-cost ratios above 3.0. Effectively, the
benefits of the BruinGO deep discount program are more than three times the 
costs incurred in its implementation. Such a finding is indicative of the efficacy
specifically of the UCLA program and generally of deep discount pass programs. 
10.11 SUPPORT POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
This dissertation has highlighted the efficacy of deep discount group pass programs as a 
fare instrument for efficiency in transit operations. This section will address a general 
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policy framework for the success and widespread adoption of the deep-discount transit
pass program. 
National policy and legislation ~ Federal laws (Internal Revenue Code 132(f)), provide
significant tax savings to both employers and employees for the use of public transit.  See 
Appendix 10-1 for an interpretation of the Federal law on employer provided transit 
benefits. These laws offer opportunities for wide scale deployment of the deep discount 
program. Potentially, either employers could pay for deep discount passes as benefits or 
employees could pay through their places of work as pretax deductions. The combination 
of benefits and deductions can sum up to $100 per month. Many employers already take 
advantage of the provisions of this law. The City of Berkeley, for instance, offered $20 a
month as a tax-free benefit while City employees could request for up to $20 a month as
a pre-tax deduction toward “Commuter Checks” for the purchase of transit tickets or
parking at BART stations. The University of California similarly offered subsidies of $6 
to $15 a month for a variety of transit ticket purchases under its “New Directions” 
programs of transit discounts and pre-tax deductions. 
Local legislation and policy ~ Control of transit operations is largely a local affair with
state and federal input. Since local governments are primary stakeholders in the success 
of transit, it is in their interest to find innovative methods of financing including the deep 
discount pass program. Even in the absence of state and federal enabling legislation, local 
policy and legislation can aid in the deployment of the deep discount group pass as 
exemplified by the trend in Denver, Colorado, Santa Clara County, California and King 
County, Washington as previously discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3) and in 
the case study of Chapter 7. 
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Transit agency roles and proactive steps ~ In spite of legislation, how the deep discount 
program is implemented is a major factor in its success. Transit agencies will need to 
market the idea effectively and include appropriately selected discounts that can attract 
ridership without reducing revenue. In addition to the many lessons learned from the 
analyses, transit agencies need to take proactive steps toward the successful 
implementation of deep discount programs. Examples of proactive steps by transit 
agencies are reflected in the variety of deep discount programs offered by the Denver
RTD and, to some extent, by the Santa Clara VTA. 
10.12 IMPLICATIONS OF WIDE SCALE DEPLOYMENT 
Wide scale deployment of deep discount group pass programs implies that in the limit, 
urban public transit is to be viewed much like such community facilities as public schools 
and libraries without General Fund support. Experience with transit systems under public 
ownership in the USA revealed the tendency for inefficiency on the part of transit 
management and unreasonable demands from labor unions whenever there appeared to
be such “deep pocket” sources of funding as the General fund. The pursuit of deep 
discount programs places the burden of raising revenue with the transit agencies. The 
revenue thus collected is therefore specifically dedicated to funding service operations 
thereby maintaining the user fee principle that characterizes transportation finance in the 
USA. It is arguable that adoption of the program constitutes the exchange of one form of 
subsidy for another. However the main difference is the following: 
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•	 The existing form of subsidy comes mainly from tax-payers in general, General 
Fund resources, or special sales tax initiatives. However all must pay to use the 
transit service in spite of making contributions to subsidize operations. 
•	 With group pass programs, cross-subsidization comes from potential riders within 
the service area or with access to the services. And it offers to all contributors to 
the “pool” equal opportunity to use the transit service without additional out-of­
pocket cost. 
This and previous chapters have established the general efficacy of deep discount group 
pass programs. The next chapter presents a method of pricing them. 
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11. PRICING METHOD 
11.1 PRICING FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, a methodology is developed for determining the prices for deep discount 
group passes that would ensure no net loss in revenue to transit agencies. The literature 
reveals two fundamental approaches to setting prices as follows: 
1.	 Pricing based on the concept of elasticity. In microeconomics, price theory explains 
the economic behavior of individual decision-making units in a free-enterprise 
economy. Under this theory, there is an inverse relationship between price and 
quantity demanded. Normally, as one increases, the other decreases. Since the 
product of price and quantity is revenue, the demand responsiveness of users of the
deep discount pass to prices would seem to be an area of interest. These issues were 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. Responsiveness is expressed in terms of 
elasticity, which is defined as “the percentage change in the use of a particular 
transportation service resulting from a 1 percent change in an attribute such as price,
trip time, or frequency of service” (Small and Winston, 1999). 
This framework is not directly applicable to the pricing of deep discount programs 
because individual decision-making affects the quantity demanded, but does not 
directly affect the price of the pass. One of the key features of group passes is that 
they are issued to all members of the group regardless of whether every member is
going to use the transit service or not. 
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2.	 Pricing based on the concept of insurance. Drawing on the analogy of the pass 
program to an insurance program as explained in Chapter 5, its pricing would 
essentially need to determine the cost associated with administering the program and 
then assign the cost to the program group. This framework fits the pricing of deep 
discount programs better than the elasticity-based method. 
11.2 PRICE DETERMINATION TO INCREASE REVENUE AND RIDERSHIP 
All deep discount group passes are not priced equally because the pricing is intended to 
cover the varied costs of providing service. For example, the price of an ECO Pass per 
employee is considerably higher ($200 to $245 per person per year) in downtown Denver 
where there is a concentration of services and peak period travel and where parking is
more expensive than in the suburbs ($30 to $45 per person per year) where there are 
fewer services, much less concentration of peak period travel and plenty of free parking. 
The deep discount is the primary ingredient for increasing ridership; it makes the pass 
relatively more “affordable” and, ceteris paribus, should result in higher demand, where
that demand is downward sloping. Chapter 6 elaborated on this fact. Other factors include 
(a) the convenience of the pass, which eliminates the need to have exact change; and (b) 
universal coverage of a group, which expands the accessibility of the population base to
transit service even for those who would ordinarily not choose transit. The revenue 
increase is the result of the innovative pricing mechanism. Based on the concept of 
pooling, the mechanism enables transaction costs to become smaller as the number of 
people in the pool becomes larger. A description of the analogy to insurance was 
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presented in Chapter 5, the second of three chapters on the “Theoretical Framework” of 
the research.
Conforming to the goal of this research, the objective of the methodology is to safeguard 
at least and preferably increase revenue receipts following implementation of the 
program.  The safeguard is ensuring that the new revenue received from a qualified group 
is higher than the sum of the revenue lost from existing transit riders in the group and the 
additional operating costs associated with program implementation. The method of
determining pass prices would therefore be cognizant of the costs of providing service. 
The cost elements are outlined in Table 11-1. The elements include administrative costs,
service operating costs and coverage costs related to number of participants and location. 
The method bases pricing of the deep discount pass per participant on participant 
location. The price of the pass therefore considers the following: 
•	 Revenue lost from existing riders at prevailing fares 
•	 Level of transit service in the primary location of transit use, that is, the origin or
destination location of the identified “group” 
•	 Additional cost, if any, necessitated by the program 
•	 Attractiveness of program terms to participating groups 
•	 A set target by the transit operator for increasing revenue. 
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Table 11-1: Cost Elements for Deep Discount Pricing 
Administrative 
Costs 
Service Operating 
Costs63 Coverage 
• Administrative 
assistance to
employers 
• Program
marketing 
including 
production 
cost of the 
pass 
instrument 
• Additional 
operating costs 
related to 
service 
extensions 
• Average cost of 
guaranteed ride 
home program, 
where 
applicable. 
• Number of participants 
• Location of participants within the 
service area (place of employment, 
residence or campus respectively) 
• Density of transit service level at 
participant location, which may be 
classified into such location types as 
CBD, central city, urban fringe, 
suburban, rural, etc. 
11.3 COMPONENTS OF THE REVENUE INCREASING METHOD 
The method combines the considerations for pricing into a series of analytic steps. These 
steps are outlined in the following subsections. 
11.3.1 Define Cost Factors 
The primary factors that would affect the cost of administering deep discount programs
relate to the following: 
(a) Availability of applicable transit service at a location – a service extension would 
result in a higher unit price; 
(b) Number of qualified group members at the location – the fewer the number of group 
participants the higher the unit price;
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(c) The level of peak-hour service trips near the location -- the higher the level of peak-
period service trips in the locality (such as a downtown business district), the higher the 
unit price. Additional ridership in the peak hour due to the deep discount program could 
necessitate the provision of additional buses with attendant operators in the form of 
trippers. These service changes could increase operating costs. 
11.3.2 Determine Average System-Wide Operating Costs 
A group of supporting factors relate to the existing elements of unit operating costs 
incurred by the transit agency. Implementation of individual deep discount programs is 
generally anticipated to exert only minor influences on these system-wide costs. 
However, specific programs could exert noticeable influences on costs of affected service 
lines depending on the extent of changes to service operations. The operating factors are: 
•	 Vehicle operation – Its effect may be nil, but a need for additional deadhead or
relief travel costs due to route expansion to accommodate deep discount programs 
could occasion increases in vehicle operating costs. 
•	 Vehicle maintenance – Its effect may be nil, but maintenance costs could increase 
if there is the need to increase service frequency or extend hours of operation due 
to deep discount programs. 
•	 Non-vehicle maintenance – Its effect may also be very small or insignificant. 
•	 General administration – Its effect may be very small and may be especially 
relevant if additional personnel are to be dedicated to the planning, marketing and
overseeing of deep discount programs. 
186
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
The most recent operating expenses are available in the FTA Section 15 dataset of the
National Transit Database. The data are used to calculate the following average system-
wide costs: 
•	 The respective unit cost per revenue vehicle mile (OCum) is derived as the 
quotient of annual operating expenses (OEa) in each of the categories above and 
total annual vehicle revenue miles (vrma). 
OCum = OEa / vrma        (11-1)  
•	 Similarly, the respective unit cost per revenue vehicle hour (OCuh) is derived as 
the quotient of annual operating expenses (OEa) in each of the categories above 
and total annual vehicle revenue hours (vrha). 
OCuh = OEa / vrha        (11-2)  
These unit costs are inputs in the estimation of additional program-specific operating 
costs. The latter are discussed in the next subsection. 
11.3.3 Determine Additional Program-Specific Operating Costs 
This group of factors identifies costs that are directly attributable to individual deep 
discount programs. They may be termed “marginal” operating costs that are the result of 
the following: 
187
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
• Extension of service routes ~ The related additional cost per month (Lr) is the 
product of additional directional miles of service (md), the number of service runs 
affected per month (rm) and the total of the unit operating costs per revenue mile 
(TOCum), which is summed from respective applications of Equation 11-1. 
Lr = md * rm * TOCum  (11-3) 
• Increase in number of service runs either over time or in frequency ~ The related
additional cost per month (Lf) is the product of additional directional runs of 
service (r), the average directional run time  in hours per month (hm) and the total 
of the unit operating costs per revenue hour (TOCuh), which is summed from 
respective applications of Equation 11-2. 
Lf = r * hm * TOCuh  (11-4) 
• Employment of additional operators as “trippers” for peak periods of service ~ 
The two previous additional cost items include operator costs. However, if 
trippers are employed, then additional operator cost incurred per month (Lt) is the
product of additional tripper operators per day (tnd), the average unit tripper cost 
per day (tcd) and the number of tripper service days per month (tm). 
Lt = tnd * tcd * tm       (11-5)  
• Provision of guaranteed rides home (GRH) to participants during emergencies ~ 
The expected cost of guaranteed rides home E(Lg) is a function of the probability
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of a participant using the service a month (Πg) and the cost of GRH service by 
location type (Xg) per month, and the two possible states of GRH (N): 1= use and 
2 = no use 
E(Lg) = ΣN Πg * Xg	       (11-6)  
•	 Administrative assistance to participating groups ~ Operators identified this cost
to run between 1% and 3% of program costs. A multiplier of 1.03 is applied to the 
computed pass price that is based on the other factors. 
•	 Production cost of pass instrument ~ Operators identified this cost to be 
approximately $5 to $7 each for the magnetic dip card with picture identification.
For passes that are typically valid for one year, this cost is approximately $0.50 
per month per participant. 
11.3.4 Identify Decision Variables 
The primary decision is the determination of a pass price that ensures no net loss in
revenue. Other potential decisions may include meeting targeted goals for revenue
increase. For instance, an agency might seek to increase revenue receipts from a group of 
participants by 10% to 200% of receipts currently earned from existing riders. 
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11.4 FORMULATION OF THE PRICING METHOD
11.4.1 The Objective Function 
The objective function is to maximize net revenue (In), which is defined as the difference 
between the revenue earned from the group due to the deep discount program (Ic) and the 
combination of the revenue previously earned by the operator from transit riders in the 
group (Io) and additional operating cost due to the deep discount program (Ca). 
Maximize {In = Ic - Io - Ca} (11-7) 
Whereby revenue from the deep discount program is the product of the number of 
participants in the program and the unit pass price, say per month. 
Ic = Pg * Ng = ΣNg Pg (11-8) 
And similarly, revenue previously earned by the transit agency from transit riders 
in the group is the product of the number of previous riders and the unit price of a
regular transit pass, say per month. If monthly pass prices differ, then the latter is
the weighted average price of monthly passes. 
Io = Ps * Rb = ΣRb Ps (11-9) 
So that combining the last two definitions, Equation 11-7 becomes: 

Maximize {In = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca} (11-10) 
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11.4.2 Constraints 
The objective function is to be maximized subject to the following set of constraints: 
(a) Net revenue is no less than the product of a goal set as a policy by the transit 
agency for increasing revenue (Tm) and the greater of either revenue previously 
earned by the transit agency from existing transit riders in the group (Io) or a
minimum level of revenue set as a policy by the transit agency to warrant the
institution of the program (Im). 
In ≥ (1+Tm) * max (Io, Im) (11-11) 
(b) Whereby the goal set as a policy by the transit agency could be 10% to 100% or 
even 200% to 300% increase over the revenue previously earned by the transit 
agency from transit riders in the group, or over unit revenue collected from a 
specific corridor or over average unit revenue collected system-wide, if the goal is 
to meet a budget shortfall. 
Tm = 0.1 . . . 1.0 . . . . 2.0 . . . . (11-12) 
(c) The revenue to be earned from the group due to the deep discount program is no 
less than the sum of revenue lost due to the deep discount program (Il) and 
additional operating costs attributable to the deep discount program (Ca). 
Ic ≥ Il + Ca        (11-13)  
(d) Whereby lost revenue due to the deep discount program is approximately equal to 
the revenue previously earned by the transit agency from transit riders in the
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group. Along heavily traveled corridors, additional loss of revenue may be 
incurred if riders are lost because of lower levels of service due to delays induced 
by increased deep discount ridership. If data is available to estimate it, then lost 
revenue could be higher than this approximation. 
Il ~ Io 
(e) A set of constraints that the decision variables: pass price (Pg), revenue target 
(Tm), number of participants (Ng) and net revenue (In) are all non-negative. 
(Pg), (Tm), (Ng), (In) ≥ 0 (11-14) 
(f) Additional operating cost due to the deep discount program (Ca) is a function of
two groups of factors: 
(i)	 Unit cost factors that may include vehicle operating cost (Opc), vehicle 
maintenance cost (Mtc), non-vehicle maintenance cost (Nmc), and general 
administration cost (Adc). These are summed to a total unit operating cost.
(ii)	 Program-specific operating cost additions attributed to route extensions
(Lx), increase in service runs (Lf), cost of tripper operators (Lt), cost of
guaranteed ride home service (Lg), cost of additional administrative 
assistance to the participating group (Aac) and the production cost of the 
pass instrument (Pp). 
Ca = ƒ(Opc, Mtc, Nmc, Adc, Lx, Lf, Lt, Lg, Aac, Pp) 	 (11-15) 
Equations 11-3 through 11-6 explain components of this function. 
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(g) Finally, discounted pass prices vary by geographic location according to the level 
of peak-period service trips in the locality. This is measured in terms of the level 
of accessibility of transit service, which is converted to a multiplier (AIm) so that
a locality such as a downtown business district with the highest level of transit 
access justifies a much higher unit pass price than the others.  
(h) The maximum location-based, periodic price of a deep discount pass (PAI) should 
be no more than a percentage (π) of the price of a regular periodic pass. This 
constraint sets maximum price boundaries that ensure “deep discounts”.  
PAI ≤ π Ps        (11-16)  
With sufficient expansion in population of participants, these maxima can eventually 
define feasible boundaries even if not initially. The proposed boundaries are 
constructed to cover equal ranges that are based on variations in deep discount pass 
prices by level of transit service in the Denver Regional Transportation District. They 
are shown in Table 11-2. 
Table 11-2: Deep Discount Levels and Area Multipliers in Denver (2003) 
Location Type1 
Discount Level Multiplier Relative to Area A 
Pass Price as 
% of Regular 
Monthly Fare2 
Proposed Price 
as % (π) of 
Monthly Fare3 
Existing2 Proposed4 
A ~ Suburban 11% 15% 1.0 1.0 
B ~ Urban Fringe 23% 30% 2.6 3.0 
C ~ Urbanized 58% 45% 7.3 5.0 
D ~ Downtown 59% 60% 7.5 7.0 
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Notes to Table 11-2: 
1 Service Level Area with approximate land use definitions. “Downtown” includes major 
employment centers that are highly accessible to transit 
2 Data for Denver Regional Transportation District (2003); regular monthly pass cost = $35 each
3 Constructed to cover equal ranges
4 See the next section for derivation of multipliers
The definitions of variables included in the formulation are summarized as follows: 
Aac = costs related to additional administrative assistance to the group 
Adc = administration cost  
AIm = pass price multiplier related to location accessibility 
Ca = additional operating cost necessitated by the program. 
Im = minimum revenue defined by agency policy to warrant program inception 
Io, Ic = revenue from passes sold to the group before and after pass implementation 
respectively
Lf = additional costs related to increase in service runs 
Lg = additional costs related to guaranteed ride home service 
Lt = additional costs related to tripper operators
Lx = additional costs related to route extensions 
Mtc = vehicle maintenance cost  
Ng = number of persons passes are purchased for in a group 
Nmc = non-vehicle maintenance cost 
π = maximum percentage of the price of a regular periodic pass  
PAI = maximum location-based, periodic price of a deep discount pass 
Pg = unit price of the deep discount pass sold to a group, i.e. equivalent monthly cost 
per rider. 
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Pp = additional costs related to production cost of pass instrument 
Ps = standard monthly pass price or weighted average price of monthly passes 
Ra = number of transit riders in the group following implementation of the pass 
program
Rb = number of transit riders from the group before implementation of the pass 
program
Tm = targeted revenue goal, that is, proportional increase sought by the agency in 
revenue receipts 
11.4.3 Measuring Location Accessibility 
Location accessibility is measured as a gravity-based index of relative accessibility 
between geographic units in a transit agency’s service area. To take advantage of readily 
available data, localities are identified with the travel analysis zones (TAZs) of the 
metropolitan area. The locality of the deep discount program is therefore assumed to be
the same as the TAZ within which the place of employment, neighborhood, college 
campus or other focal point of the participating group resides. 
The gravity-based index of the subject zone (AIiT) is inversely related to the travel time 
between that zone and others (tijT) for travel by the transit mode. 
AIiT = Σj tijT-y         (11-17)  
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Where travel time is the door-to-door time that includes access, wait, transfer, in-
vehicle and egress. The subscripts, i and j, refer to the subject and other zones 
respectively. And y is a calibrated parameter64. 
The idea of travel between a subject zone and others stems from the rationale that 
whether the location is a place of employment, residential neighborhood or college 
campus, program participants can be expected to travel to and from any and all parts of 
the metropolitan area to access employment, housing, recreational, shopping and other 
activities to which the deep discount pass may be used for travel. 
The index value calculated for each zone in the service area (Xi) is expressed in units (Zi) 
of standard deviations (S) from the mean index value of the metropolitan area (X). 
Zi = (Xi - X) / S (11-18) 
The standardized scores are then grouped into equal ranges to correspond approximately 
to location types. Zones with no transit access are identified separately. Table 11-3 shows 
the definitions of the area types. 
Since over 99% of the area under the normal curve is typically within three standard 
deviations on both sides of the mean, all scores below -3 are grouped at the z-value of -4 
as the assumed lowest point on the scale. Also all scores above +3 are grouped at the z-
value of +4 as the assumed highest point on the scale. The abscissa of the normal curve is 
rank-numbered in discrete integer increments from the lowest point below the mean to 
196
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the highest above the mean. Over this converted scale, the midpoint values of the location 
ranges defined above are selected as the multipliers. Figure 11-1 illustrates the standard 
normal curve, the ranking, the ranges and the multiplier. 
Table 11-3: Definitions of the Area Types 
Accessibility Numerical Definition
Most accessible index is more than two standard deviations above mean index value 
Well accessible index is between the mean and one standard deviation above mean 
index value 
Fairly accessible index is between the mean and one standard deviation below mean 
index value 
Least accessible index is more than two standard deviations below mean index value 
Not accessible Zone has not transit service 
Figure 11-1: Standardized Curve with Multiplier Ranges
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11.5 EXAMPLE APPLICATION OF THE PRICING METHOD 
11.5.1 Case Description 
The participating group is a hypothetical collection of 1330 persons located around U.C. 
Berkeley within the service area of AC Transit. Prior to the introduction of the deep 
discount pass program, AC Transit earned average monthly revenue of $2,410 from the 
120 riders in the group. 
The group location is served directly by several lines, but changes are proposed to be 
made to only Line 65. The existing Line 65 has the following characteristics: 
• 30 runs in each direction per weekday for 22 days a month 
• 12 runs in each direction on 4 Saturdays and on 4 Sundays a month 
• 30-minute run time approximately in each direction. 
To enhance accessibility to other transit services, the routing of line 65 is to be extended 
by 0.25 of a directional mile. Weekday hours of operation are also to be expanded by four
runs in each direction from 8:10 pm to 10:10 pm.  
Service enhancements necessitate employment of one tripper operator per weekday. 
Trippers are to be paid for a minimum of 4 hours per day at the rate of $15 per hour. 
Historically, the participants are known to call for 10 guaranteed rides home on average 
per month. The average cost per emergency trip is $30. 
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11.5.2 Average System-Wide Operating Costs 
The latest available unit operating costs for AC Transit calculated from FTA Section 15 
Reports for the year 2000 are presented in Table 11-4. 
Table 11-4: Unit Operating Costs1 – AC Transit 2000 
Vehicle 
Operating 
Vehicle 
Maintenance 
Non-Vehicle 
Maintenance 
General 
Admin. 
Total 
Operating 
Unit cost per revenue 
vehicle mile $4.85 $1.76 $0.18 $1.58 $8.38 
Unit cost per revenue 
vehicle hour $57.37 $20.87 $2.16 $18.71 $99.11 
1 All data for publicly operated transit service excluding privately operated services 
11.5.3 Program-Specific Operating Costs 
Two scenarios are tested. The first involves the hypothetical case, but without program-
specific operation costs. The second involves the proposed service assumptions and 
enhancements outlined under the hypothetical case description. Table 11-5 summarizes 
the program specific operating costs arising from the case scenarios. Additional details 
are included in the Appendix to Chapter 11. It is noteworthy that two cost items are 
recognizable whether there are service improvements or not as follows: 
•	 Administrative assistance to program participants is assumed to be 3% of program 
cost. 
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•	 Production cost of the pass instrument is assumed to be $6 per year or $0.50 per 
month. 
Table 11-5: Program-Specific Operating Costs per Month 
Cost Item 
Scenario 1: 
No Service 
Expansion Unit 
Scenario 2: 
With Proposed 
Service Expansion 
(a) Route extensions Program $3,166 
(b) Increase in service runs Program $396 
(c) Additional “tripper” 
operators 
Program $1,320 
(d) Guaranteed rides home Per Participant $3.00 
(e) Production cost of pass 
instrument 
$0.50 Per Participant $0.50 
(f) Administrative 
assistance 
1.03 Per Participant 1.03 
11.5.4 Pass Price Calculation 
Price determination involved three steps as follows: 
First, the objective function, In = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca, (Equation 11-10) is maximized to 
obtain the base monthly unit pass cost (Pg). However, the program-specific cost (Ca) only 
includes the program-wide costs identified as items (a) through (c) in Table 11-5. 
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Next, the per participant costs identified as items (d) through (f) in Table 11-5 are used 
to adjust the unit cost to a base monthly retail price per participant (Pret). 
Pret = [Pg * (1 + Tm) + Lg + Pp] * Aac	  (11-19) 
Finally, the base retail price is adjusted for the location and accessibility-based pass price 
per participant (PAI). The location multiplier is assumed to be 1. 
PAI = Pret * AIm	        (11-20)  
11.5.5 Linear Program Results 
To test for consistency in the application of the method, four variations of the objective 
function were compared. Three applications added the additional constraint that there is a
finite population of 1330 participants while the fourth minimized the number of 
participants subject to the other constraints. The four objective functions investigated 
therefore are the following: 
1.	 Maximize net revenue (In) with the condition that the number of participants is 
fixed: max {In = Ic - Io - Ca} = max {ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca} 
2.	 Maximize net revenue (In) with the condition that the number of participants is 
fixed for the scenario that includes the set of proposed service improvements
previously outlined. 
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3.	 Minimize the pass price (Pg) with the condition that the number of participants is 
fixed: min {Pg = [Ps * (1 + Tm) * Rb] / Ng} 
4.	 Minimize the number of participants (Ng): min {Ng = (Ps / Pg) * (1 + Tm) * Rb}. 
The solutions to the linear programs are derived with Microsoft Excel’s built-in solver.
Results are summarized in Table 11-6 and indicate the following: 
•	 Without service improvements: (a) the base cost of a pass for 1330 participants to 
match revenue prior to program implementation is $1.82 per month or $21.84 a
year; (b) the base retail price per pass including participant-specific costs 
(administrative assistance and production of pass instrument) is equivalently 
$2.37 per month or $28.44 a year; (c) for an area multiplier of one, the 
accessibility-based pass price is the same as the base retail price.  
•	 Expectedly, the original objective function of maximizing net revenue provides a 
good revenue margin of 274%, but at three times the base retail pass price. The 
solution of the retail price is limited by the maximum ceiling constraint.  
•	 With the inclusion of the proposed service improvements, the pass price is 
virtually the same as under the original objective function since it is also limited 
by the maximum ceiling constraint. However, a huge chunk of the revenue margin 
is wiped out by the additional costs of service expansion to a 71% margin. 
•	 The objective function of minimizing the pass price is most likely from the point 
of view of the employer or other body representing program participants. It is 
expectedly the base retail pass price where the operator breaks even. 
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•	 The least likely objective function of minimizing the number of program 
participants yielded the highest base retail pass price. It is also limited by the 
maximum ceiling constraint. It offers a break-even in revenue with 27% as many 
participants as the original case. 
•	 By way of comparison, the equivalent City of Berkeley pass price of $5 per 
month would yield 140% margin to the transit agency without service 
improvements under this example application. 
Objective Base 
Pass 
Cost 
Retail 
Pass 
Price 
Number of 
Participants  
Revenue 
Margin 
1. Maximize net revenue $1.82 $7.50 1330 274% 
2. Maximize net revenue plus 
service improvements 
$1.97 $7.50 1330 71% 
3. Minimize base pass price $1.82 $3.76 1330 0% 
4. Minimize number of 
participants
$6.78 $7.50 360 1% 
As Implemented by City of 
Berkeley 
$5.00 1330 140% 
In summary, the results demonstrate that for the conditions defined in the example 
application, the equivalent monthly retail price of the deep discount pass should lie 
between, $2.37 where the transit agency would break even and $7.50 where the agency 
could earn 274% margin on existing revenue. In the event that service improvements are
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included, pass prices can increase dramatically sometimes above upper limits that may 
have been set previously as policy. 
11.5.6 Additional Application Comparisons 
Additional application results are compared in Table 11-7 to illustrate changes that would 
occur in revenue margins consequent to changes in various decision variables. Prior case
descriptions and service characteristics are assumed to remain largely the same. And two 
potential groups are compared as follows: 
(a) One group has a membership of 1330 employees (as presented previously in 
Table 11-6) of whom 120 used the transit service prior to implementation of the 
group pass program. 
(b) The other group has a membership of 4000 employees of whom 850 used the 
transit service prior to implementation of the group pass program. An alternative 
proposal is tabled to include just half of the membership in the pass program. 
The variables that changed and the associated results are the following: 
•	 Group size ~ It is shown for the large group with two alternative sizes of
participants that at the maximum ceiling constrained pass price of $7.50 per
person per month, the transit agency would realize hardly any increase (8%) in
revenue margin if half of the group participates, but a healthy 117% if the entire 
group participates. The lowest feasible unit pass price of $7.00 chargeable over 
half the group is nearly two times the $3.75 chargeable over the entire group. 
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Table 11-7: Additional Application Comparisons 
Objective Base 
Pass 
Cost 
Retail 
Pass 
Price 
Number of 
Participants  
Revenue 
Margin 
Comparing Group Sizes
1. Maximize net revenue $6.78 $7.50 2000 8% 
2. Maximize net revenue plus 
service improvements $7.50 2000 -31% 
3. Minimize base pass price $5.57 $6.25 2000 -11% 
4. Minimize number of 
participants $6.78 $7.50 1840 0% 
Break-even $7.00 2000 1% 
1. Maximize net revenue $6.78 $7.50 4000 117% 
2. Maximize net revenue plus 
service improvements $7.50 4000 78% 
3. Minimize base pass price $2.53 $3.13 4000 -19% 
4. Minimize number of 
participants $6.78 $7.50 1840 0% 
Break-even $3.75 4000 0% 
Comparing Pass Prices
Break-even $3.75 4000 0% 
At $4 per pass $4.00 4000 8% 
At $5 per pass $5.00 4000 39% 
At $6 per pass $6.00 4000 70% 
At $7 per pass $7.00 4000 101% 
At $7.50 per pass $7.50 4000 117% 
Comparing Proportions of Riders before Group Pass Program
As % of 
Group 
At $5 per pass
Half of Large Group 43% $5.00 2000 -30% 
All of Large Group 21% $5.00 4000 39% 
The Other Group 9% $5.00 1330 140% 
At $7.50 per pass 
Half of Large Group 43% $7.50 2000 8% 
All of Large Group 21% $7.50 4000 117% 
The Other Group 9% $7.50 1330 274% 
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•	 Pass price ~ When the entirety of the large group participates, a wide variety of 
unit pass prices are feasible from the lowest or break-even price up to the 
maximum ceiling constrained price. Increases in the equivalent monthly unit retail 
price of the pass result in more than proportional increases in net revenue margin. 
This is illustrated in Figure 11-2. 
Figure 11-2: Net Revenue Margin by Pass Price 
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•	 Proportion of existing riders ~ Comparisons demonstrate that at a given unit pass
price, the proportion of riders in the group prior to implementation of the group 
pass program, which largely contributes to setting the lower bound of the unit 
pass price, significantly affects the revenue margin that a transit agency can attain. 
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11.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a methodology for determining the price for deep discount group passes 
was developed. The methodology is designed primarily to ensure no net loss in revenue 
to transit agencies. It is based on the concept of insurance by determining the costs 
associated with implementing the program and then assigning the costs to the program 
group. The procedure is embodied in the following sequence of steps: 
1.	 Cost factors are defined that include the availability and level of transit service in 
the common loca lity of the participating group and the number of qualified group 
members. Variations in these factors affect the unit price. 
2.	 Average system-wide operating costs are determined from FTA Section 15 data to
be used in estimating service expansion costs that program implementation might
induce. The primary figures of interest are: (a) the unit cost per revenue vehicle
mile and (b) the unit cost per revenue vehicle hour. 
3.	 Three other items of program-specific costs are participant-specific. They are 
determined as applicable to include: (a) 3% of program cost for administrative 
assistance (Aac), (b) production cost of the pass instrument (Pp) at approximately 
$6.00 each, and (c) the probable cost per participant of guaranteed ride home
service (Lg).
4.	 The pass price is determined in the following three phases: 
(a) To obtain a base monthly unit pass cost, an objective function is optimized 
subject to a set of constraints: max {In = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca}; (Equation 11-10). If
service expansion costs are involved, they are included in this function, which 
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maximizes net revenue (In) defined as the difference between the new group 
revenue (ΣNg  Pg) and both previous revenue (ΣRb  Ps) and additional program 
operating costs (Ca). 
(b) The base monthly retail price per participant is obtained by adjusting the base 
monthly cost with the basic participant costs as applicable: Pret = [Pg * (1 + Tm) + 
Lg + Pp] * Aac; (Equation 11-19). In addition to the basic participant costs is a
proportional target for revenue increase (Tm) that is established as a policy goal. 
(c) Finally, the base retail price is adjusted with a location multiplier (AIm) to 
become the accessibility-based pass price per participant: PAI = Pret * AIm; 
(Equation 11-20). 
5.	 The calculated pass price is checked for total revenue and compared with the sum
of existing revenue and program cost to ensure that there will be no net loss in 
revenue. 
The methodology permits the investigation of alternative objective functions and thus can 
serve as a common tool for transit agencies, employers and other interest groups. These
different constituents may choose to maximize or minimize either the cost of the pass or 
the number of participants subject to a set of constraints. 
The next and final chapter highlights the major conclusions of this dissertation. It also 
includes ideas for further research. 
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12. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
12.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation highlighted these facts: (a) transit fare increases have largely not had the 
desired effects on revenues; and (b) transit fare reductions can boost ridership but can 
also reduce revenue and increase subsidy. Studies of major transit systems produced 
results, which point to the conclusion that it is preferable to maximize social welfare 
through the number of persons carried with reduced fares than to maximize the level of 
transit service provided. The challenge lies in identifying and adopting such strategies as
deep discount group pass programs that can produce more marginal revenue than cost. 
The deep discount program case studies consistently revealed either higher revenue per 
boarding than the system-wide average or higher total revenues from target markets with 
the program than without it. Of the various types, the employment-based deep discount 
programs appear to yield the highest net revenues to transit agencies. 
Among the various types of deep discount programs, those based on college campuses 
trigger the highest ridership increases notably among student participants. Since student 
travel times are distributed throughout the day, campus-based programs are prime targets 
for deep discount group passes since they offer opportunities for off-peak use when there 
is likely to be excess seat capacity on buses. 
Under wide scale deployment of deep discount group pass programs transit may be 
viewed much like such community facilities as public schools and libraries without 
209
 
  
 
 
 
 
General Fund support. The pursuit of deep discount programs places the burden of raising 
revenue with the transit agencies while the application of revenues to service operations 
maintains the user fee principle that characterizes transportation finance in the USA. 
Under the existing form of subsidy that comes from tax-payers in general via General 
Fund resources or special sales tax initiatives, riders must pay to use the transit service in 
spite of making contributions to subsidize operations. With group pass programs, cross-
subsidization comes from potential riders with access to the services and offers to all 
contributors to the “pool” equal opportunity to use the transit service without additional 
out-of-pocket cost. 
Although transit agencies recognize the factors for price determination, research reveals 
that no systematic methodology exists and pass prices are largely determined by watching 
what others have done. This dissertation has developed a methodology to aid operators in 
determining deeply discounted but favorable pass prices. The methodology considers: 
revenue lost from existing riders at prevailing fares; level of patronage in the primary 
location of transit use; any additional costs necessitated by the program; attractiveness of
program terms to participants; and a policy goal of increasing operating revenue. The 
methodology permits the investigation of alternative objective functions and thus can 
serve as a common tool for transit agencies, employers and other interest groups. These
different constituents may choose to maximize or minimize either the price of the pass or 
the number of participants subject to a set of policy constraints. 
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12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following research efforts can complement the work presented in this dissertation. 
Some of the case study data only reflect short term responses of program participants to 
deep discount programs. Future work should include additional periodic tracking of 
trends to assess the medium and long term impacts of deep discount programs on choice 
of (a) mode, (b) residential location, (c) time of travel, and (d) trip purpose. 
The methodology developed in this dissertation is considered only the beginning of 
formalized methodologies that can aid operators in determining deeply discounted but 
favorable pass prices. A possible extension of the methodology may specifically focus on 
the determination of deep discount fares in areas with no existing transit service. 
Yet a further extension is the development of a similar methodology for determining the 
selection of transit bus routes for upgrade to “express” or “rapid” service. The method
would similarly seek to optimize an objective function subject to a set of policy 
constraints. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Appendix 3-1: A Survey of Unlimited Access Programs (Source: Shoup et al, 1999, Table 1) 
A SURVEY OF UNLIMITED ACCESS PROGRAMS AT THIRTY-ONE UNIVERSITIES 
Number Annual Number Year
Eligible Annual Annual Cost Per of Rides Unlimited 
Who is Eligible 
to Ride 
Free 
Cost 
1997-1998 
Number
of Rides 
Eligible 
Person 
per Eligible 
Person 
Cost 
per Ride 
Access 
Began 
University to Ride Free? (1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)/(1) (5)=(3)/(1) (6)=(2)/(3) (7)
University of California, San Diego students, faculty, staff, 35,200 $177,700 296,600 $5 8 $0.60 1969 
emeritus 
University of Montana students, faculty, staff 14,000 $83,600 190,100 $6 14 $0.44 1991 
Boise State University, ID 
University of Georgia at Athens 
students, faculty, staff 
students 
18,100 
30,000 
$160,000 
$275,000 
175,000 
600,000 
$9 
$9 
10 
20 
$0.91 
$0.46 
1992 
1977 
Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo students, faculty, staff, 17,500 $169,000 531,700 $10 30 $0.32 1985 
emeritus 
University of New Hampshire - Durham students 10,000 $95,000 140,400 $10 14 $0.68 1985 
Cal State University, Sacramento students 27,000 $300,000 597,700 $11 22 $0.50 1992 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington 
students, faculty, staff 
students, faculty, staff 
26,000 
11,000 
$290,000 
$120,000 
476,500 $11 
$11 
18 $0.61 1994 
1997 
University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire students, faculty, staff 11,600 $125,000 195,700 $11 17 $0.64 1997 
George Mason University, VA 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, NY
students, faculty, staff 
students, faculty, staff 
20,000 
10,000 
$300,000 
$148,000 
$15 
$15 
1986 
1997 
Appalachian State University, NC students, faculty, staff 13,200 $251,000 361,800 $19 27 $0.69 1980 
Colorado State University
University of Pittsburgh, PA 
students 
students, faculty, staff 
20,000 
31,200 
$375,400 
$650,000 
462,900 
1,536,900 
$19 
$21 
23 
49 
$0.81 
$0.42 
1975 
1995 
University of California, Santa Barbara students 17,400 $400,200 584,800 $23 34 $0.68 1986 
Santa Barbara City College, CA 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
students 
students, faculty, staff 
12,000 
39,000 
$277,000 
$972,300 
525,500 
807,500 
$23 
$25 
44 
21 
$0.53 
$1.20 
1995 
1969 
Ohio State University students 48,300 $1,400,000 $29 1997 
University of Wisconsin at Madison 
University of Utah
students
students, faculty, staff 
39,000 
25,000 
$1,200,000 
$850,000 
1,653,000 
700,000 
$31 
$34 
42 
28 
$0.73 
$1.21 
1996 
1992 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State students, faculty, staff 32,000 $1,100,000 1,400,000 $34 44 $0.79 1983 
University
Auraria Higher Education Center (UC Denver) students 31,500 $1,204,000 1,965,000 $38 62 $0.61 1994 
University of California, Davis students 18,500 $719,000 2,021,900 $39 109 $0.36 1990 
San Jose State University, CA 
University of Colorado at Boulder
students 
students 
25,500 
24,500 
$1,020,000 
$1,000,000 
1,150,300 
1,500,000 
$40 
$41 
45 
61 
$0.89 
$0.67 
1993 
1991 
Marquette University, WI students 6,700 $400,000 $60 1995 
University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
students 
students 
20,200 
30,400 
$1,247,400 
$2,200,000 
2,300,000 
5,800,000 
$62 
$72 
114 
191 
$0.54 
$0.38 
1994 
1989 
University of Texas at Austin students 49,000 $4,300,000 7,400,000 $88 151 $0.58 1988 
University of California, Santa Cruz students, faculty, staff 12,220 $1,203,800 1,253,000 $99 103 $0.96 1972 
AVERAGE 23,420 $742,368 1,331,781 $32 55 $0.60 
MEDIAN 20,200 $400,000 650,000 $23 32 $0.63 1991 
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Appendix 3-2: Annual Rate of Change in Transit Performance Indicators (Source: Shoup et al, 1999) 
TABLE 6.  ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN TRANSIT AGENCY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
IN THE TWO YEARS BEFORE AND THE TWO YEARS AFTER UNLIMITED ACCESS BEGAN 
Year Total Ridership 
Program 
Transit Agency Began Before After Difference 
(1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) 
Santa Barbara MTD 1986 -4% +6% +10 
(UC Santa Barbara) 
Champaign-Urbana MTD 1989 -2% +76% +78 
(UI Urbana-Champaign) 
Denver RTD 1991 +2% +3% +1 
(UC Boulder) 
Santa Clara Valley TA 1993 +0% -7% -7 
(San Jose State Univ.) 
Boise Urban Stages 1992 +5% +17% +12 
(University of Idaho) 
Utah Transit Authority 1992 +7% -5% -12 
(University of Utah) 
Denver RTD 1994 +5% +3% -2 
(Auraria) 
Milwaukee County Transit 1994 -2% +4% +6 
(UW Milwaukee) 
Milwaukee County Transit 1995 +2% +11% +9 
(Marquette University) 
Port Authority Transit 1995 -2% -1% +1 
(Univ. of Pittsburgh) 
Santa Barbara MTD 1995 +6% +1% -5 
(SB City College) 
Madison Metro 1996 +1% +6% +5 
(UW Madison) 
Sacramento RTD 1996 -1% +2% +3 
(Cal. State U. Sacramento) 
Riders per Bus 
Before After Difference 
(4) (5) (6)=(5)-(4) 
+3% -9% -12 
-3% +37% +40 
-3% +4% +7 
+1% -4% -5 
+2% -2% -4 
-7% -10% -3 
+4% -3% -7 
+5% +3% -2 
-1% +12% +13 
-7% -3% +4 
-5% +4% +9 
+0% +9% +9 
+8% +5% -3 
Operating Cost per Ride 
Before After Difference 
(7) (8) (9)=(8)-(7) 
+12% -4% -16 
+5% -28% -33 
+5% +2% -3 
+4% +3% -1 
-5% +0% +5 
-1% +13% +13 
-1% +4% +5 
+8% -2% -10 
+6% +1% -5 
+2% +3% +1 
+0% -3% -3 
+5% -2% -7 
+7% -6% -13 
Vehicle Miles of Service 
Before After Difference 
(10) (11) (12)=(11)-(10) 
+3% +2% -1 
+0% +15% +15 
+2% +7% +5 
-4% -2% +2 
+0% +13% +13 
+4% +2% -2 
+4% +4% +0 
-1% -1% 0 
-1% +1% +2 
-5% +0% +5 
+1% +3% +2 
+2% -1% -3 
-1% +3% +4 
Operating Subsidy per Ride 
Before After Difference 
(13) (14) (15)=(14)-(13) 
+13% -10% -23 
+7% -32% -39 
+7% +4% -3 
+6% +4% -2 
+2% +3% 1 
+8% +6% -2 
-2% +5% 7 
+9% -4% -13 
+3% -10% -13 
+14% -6% -20 
+1% -5% -6 
+0% +3% 3 
+1% -2% -3 
Total Operating Subsidy 
Before After Difference 
(16) (17) (18)=(17)-(16) 
+8% -5% -13 
+4% +13% 9 
+9% +8% -1 
+5% -3% -8 
+6% +20% 14 
+5% +8% 4 
+4% +9% 5 
+7% -1% -8 
+6% +0% -6 
+12% -7% -19 
+6% -4% -10 
+1% +8% 7 
+5% +5% 0 
Average (unweighted) +1.3% +8.9% +7.6 -0.2% +3.3% +3.5 +3.6% -1.5% -5.1 +0.3% +3.5% +3.2 +5.3% -3.4% -8.7 +6.0% +3.9% -2.1 
Average (weighted) +1.3% +2.7% +1.4 -0.8% +1.3% +2.1 +3.7% +2.0% -1.7 -0.2% +1.6% +1.8 +6.0% -0.9% -6.9 +6.7% +1.9% -4.8 
Note: The performance statistics consider motor bus transit only. Columns 1,4,7,10,13 and 16 refer to the annual rate of change over the two years before  Unlimited Access began. Columns 2,5,8,11,14 and 17 refer to
the annual rate of change over the two years after Unlimited Access began. Columns 3,6,9,12,15 and 18 refer to the difference  between the before and after trends, as measured in percentage points. Three transit
agencies are listed in the table twice because they participate in programs with more than one university.  The average figures in the last two rows refer to the unweighted and weighted averages for the 13 programs; for
the weighted averages, the transit agencies have been waited by the total bus transit ridership during the year that Unlimited Access began. 
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Appendix 3-3: Benefit-Cost Analysis of BruinGO (Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup (2002), Table 3)
Source: Brown, Hess and Shoup (2002), Table 3
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Appendix 3-4: Employment-Based Transit Pass Programs, USA (1997)
Source: Crain & Associates, Inc., “Employer and Student Pass Program Survey”, Prepared for Central Florida Central Regional Transportation 
Authority, August, 1997 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 

Appendix 7-1: The Eco Pass -- Boulder, Colorado
Introduction
The Regional Transportation District (RTD) of the Denver Metropolitan Area has
instituted one of the oldest, employment-based, deep discount transit pass programs in the 
country. The community of Boulder, which is located approximately 20 miles to the 
northwest of the City of Denver, has experimented with various transit programs since 
1989 of which the ECO Pass by the RTD is the most notable. As early as 1991, the 
University of Colorado (CU) students voted to adopt a bus pass program that has been a 
resounding success and still exists today. In 1998, the Faculty and Staff ECO Pass began
initially as a pilot program. Boulder’s experiments with transit programs stemmed from 
the barriers to transit use that were identified in the City’s Transit Development plan as 
follows: 
• Paying a fare and the complications of having exact change 
• Lack of frequent service 
• Indirect routes 
The ECO Pass largely addressed the first of these problems. The other problems are 
being addressed by developing a community transit system with programs referred to as
HOP, SKIP, JUMP, LEAP, and BOUND. 
Due to the popularity of the program, 35,000 households sought the Boulder City 
Council’s approval in August 2000 to pay between $40 and $100 more a year in property 
taxes in exchange for ECO Passes.65 The idea was to make mass transit as much a 
neighborhood feature as a school or sewer system or even a public library. 
Types of Deep Discount Programs 
In addition to the regular monthly pass, the RTD offers its full range of deep discount 
programs in Boulder. One is the employment-based ECO Pass. Another is the CU 
Student Pass. Their success led to the institution of the residential-based deep discount 
pass termed, the Neighborhood ECO Pass and most recently the TeenPass. 
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Goals and Objectives 
The primary goal of the ECO Pass was to increase transit ridership. Its secondary goals 
aimed at improving the quality of life in the region through reductions in traffic 
congestion, air pollution, vehicle miles traveled and the impact of the automobile on the 
environment. The objective of the program was to promote transit as an alternative to 
driving alone through the provision of a low-cost program. 
How the Programs Work 
The deep discount programs are administered as described for Denver since the same
transit agency, the RTD, offers them in Boulder. For all the deep discount programs, the 
features of universality, unlimited ride, innovative financing and pricing are as described. 
For example, a regular monthly RTD bus pass can cost from about $21 per adult for the 
Boulder area to $85 per adult for the entire Denver metropolitan area. By comparison, the 
ECO Passes are sold to households for between $50 and $100 per year or approximately 
$4 to $8 per month.66 Similarly, all Pass cardholders are eligible to use the Guaranteed
Ride Home Program.  
Participation 
Participation rates are among the highest in the metropolitan area and deserve special 
mention. There is significant evidence that the ECO Pass programs have led to substantial 
increases in transit ridership in Boulder. Within five years of program inception, travel by 
transit for work purposes doubled among the employees participating in the downtown 
business ECO Pass program. By 1998, 13 neighborhoods in Boulder were enrolled in the 
Neighborhood ECO Pass program.67 Within six years of the program, the number of 
students riding the bus jumped from 300,000 trips to 1,500,000 trips annually, a
phenomenal fivefold increase.68 By August 2000, there were 50,000 pass holders 
(including CU students and staff and faculty) in a city of 100,000 people.69 
Benefits 
The benefits attributed to the ECO Pass program and described for the Denver 
metropolitan area apply to Boulder. However the following are noteworthy:70 
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•	 The programs are reported to have helped in significantly alleviating increases in 
traffic congestion, air pollution and demand for parking throughout the 
community with special note of downtown and CU campus areas. 
•	 A flip side of the popularity of the programs is that they have become sources of 
frustration for businesses and neighborhoods that for one reason or another are not 
able to participate. 
•	 Apart from being a discount bus pass, the ECO Pass is many other things to many 
people including: 
o	 An employee benefit 
o	 A tool for cutting back on traffic growth and air pollution 
o	 Freer of valuable parking spaces for other paying customers 
o	 Transportation for the youth 
o	 An alternative to driving and parking or to riding a bike or walking in foul 
weather. 
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Appendix 7-2A: Annual Participant Growth  
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Annual Growth in Participants - Various Deep Discount Programs 
ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS 
Enrollment
Eligible Eligible Distributed Distributed CU Enrollment Total 
1991 
Employees1 Residents2 TeenPass3 GradPass3 Boulder4 AHEC5 Eligible6 
3,912 
1992 19,269 25,089 44,358 
1993 17,490 25,013 42,503 
1994 32,401 24,535 56,936 
1995 31,550 266 24,463 31,403 87,682 
1996 32,976 1,110 24,636 31,869 90,591 
1997 39,640 1,771 25,157 32,595 99,163 
1998 46,598 3,269 25,135 32,352 107,354 
1999 55,429 3,613 26,349 31,890 117,281 
2000 67,673 2,959 3,100 26,739 n/a 100,471 
2001 77,512 3,727 5,100 27,289 n/a 113,628 
2002 76,577 3,794 5,630 28,644 n/a 114,645 
PARTICIPATING GROUPS 
Neighbor- Schools Schools Campuses 
Companies hoods Enrolled Included CU Campuses Total 
1991 
Enrolled1 Enrolled2 TeenPass3 GradPass3 Boulder4 AHEC5 Groups6 
47 
1992 365 365 
1993 548 548 
1994 723 723 
1995 1,089 2 1,091 
1996 1,178 3 1 3 1,185 
1997 1,033 4 1 3 1,041 
1998 960 12 1 3 976 
1999 1,040 14 5 1 3 1,063 
2000 1,035 15 74 177 1 3 1,305 
2001 988 17 115 200 1 3 1,324 
2002 1,059 17 124 146 1 3 1,350 
1 Employment-based ECO Pass programs  
2 Residential-based ECO Pass programs 
3 Middle and High School Student ECO Pass programs 
4 College ECO Pass program at Colorado University (CU), Boulder (Fall Semesters) 
5 College ECO Pass program at Auraria Higher Education Center (AHEC) -- Fall data 
AHEC includes CU-Denver, Metro State and Community College of Denver 
6 Deep Discount Passes includes all ECO Pass programs; exclude regular passes 
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Appendix 7-2B: Subsidization – Employee Eco Pass Program   
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Subsidization of the Employment-Based Eco Pass (2002) 
2002 SLA Number of employees 
Total A B C D 1 - 24 25-
249 
250-
999 
1,000+ 
Co’s that 
subsidize 100% 
88% 90% 100% 86% 86% 93% 84% 77% 100% 
Co’s that 
subsidize less 
than 100% 
12% 10% 0% 14% 14% 7% 16% 23% 0% 
Base: companies that subsidize Eco Pass 
2002 SLA Number of employees 
Total A B C D 1 - 24 25-
249 
250-
999 
1,000+ 
Percent of 
TOTAL 
Participating 
Co's. 
74% 74% 84% 75% 60% 78% 71% 62% 100% 
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Appendix 7-3A: Annual Boardings   
Denver Regional Transportation District 
ANNUAL SYSTEM-WIDE PASSENGER BOARDINGS (1981 - 2002) 
Change 
over 
Previous 
% Change 
over 
Previous 
% Change 
over Base 
% Change 
over Eco 
Pass Base 
Year Boardings Year Year Year (1981) Year (1991)
1981 25,432,235 -- -- -- --
1982 38,440,267 13,008,032 51.15% 51.15% --
1983 38,361,395 -78,872 -0.21% 50.84% --
1984 41,049,735 2,688,340 7.01% 61.41% --
1985 56,151,519 15,101,784 36.79% 120.79% --
1986 53,546,971 -2,604,548 -4.64% 110.55% --
1987 50,671,517 -2,875,454 -5.37% 99.24% --
1988 51,240,749 569,232 1.12% 101.48% --
1989 52,470,098 1,229,349 2.40% 106.31% --
1990 54,617,455 2,147,357 4.09% 114.76% --
1991 56,687,001 2,069,546 3.79% 122.89% --
1992 58,374,078 1,687,077 2.98% 129.53% 2.98% 
1993 61,435,948 3,061,870 5.25% 141.57% 8.38% 
1994 62,323,414 887,466 1.44% 145.06% 9.94% 
1995 67,628,196 5,304,782 8.51% 165.92% 19.30% 
1996 70,217,783 2,589,587 3.83% 176.10% 23.87% 
1997 71,517,108 1,299,325 1.85% 181.21% 26.16% 
1998 72,514,988 997,880 1.40% 185.13% 27.92% 
1999 74,603,346 2,088,358 2.88% 193.34% 31.61% 
2000 77,774,567 3,171,221 4.25% 205.81% 37.20% 
2001 82,011,376 4,236,809 5.45% 222.47% 44.67% 
2002 81,322,365 -689,011 -0.84% 219.76% 43.46% 
THREE MAJOR DEEP DISCOUNT PROGRAMS 

Three 
Auraria Majors as 
1991 
Key 7 
Employee 
ECO Pass 
Colorado 
University
Boulder 
Higher 
Education 
Center 
(AHEC)
Total 
Three 
Major 
Programs 
% of
System-
wide
Boardings 
83,652 83,652 0.15% 
1992 779,720 740,137 1,519,857 2.60% 
1993 1,247,128 845,208 2,092,336 3.41% 
1994 n/a 847,393 847,393 --
1995 n/a 819,968 819,968 --
1996 3,770,449 744,760 1,937,000 6,452,209 9.19% 
1997 4,465,559 854,946 1,982,387 7,302,892 10.21% 
1998 5,224,896 1,076,904 2,069,316 8,371,116 11.54% 
1999 4,916,988 1,096,472 2,143,811 8,157,271 10.93% 
2000 5,061,207 1,116,559 2,125,230 8,302,996 10.68% 
2001 5,671,434 1,234,057 2,121,203 9,026,694 11.01% 
2002 5,999,623 1,427,476 2,399,204 9,826,303 12.08% 
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Appendix 7-3B: Boardings By Service Type & By Mode   
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Employee ECO Pass Boardings by Service Type (2002) 
System- % of ECO % of ECO
Type of Bus wide % of All ECO Pass Pass Pass Bus 
Service Boardings Boardings Boardings1 Boardings Rides 
Local 44,636,216 55% 2,745,709 46% 57% 
Express 2,793,112 3% 867,066 14% 18% 
Regional 2,602,719 3% 770,725 13% 16% 
SkyRide 1,914,067 2% 433,533 7% 9% 
Other2 1,253,378 2% --
Subtotal Bus 53,199,492 65% 4,817,034 80% 100% 
1 includes key 7 employee boardings 
2 includes: Denver Circulator, Special Services, Call-n-Ride 
Employee ECO Pass Boardings by Mode (2002) 
System- ECO Pass 
wide % of All ECO Pass as % of 
Transit Mode Boardings Boardings Boardings Mode 
All Bus 53,199,492 65% 4,817,034 9.1% 
Light Rail 10,429,572 13% 1,182,589 11.3% 
Access-a-Ride 454,998 1% -- --
Van Pool 83,006 0% -- --
Mall Shuttle 17,155,297 21% -- --
Total All Modes 81,322,365 100% 5,999,623 7.4% 
Key 7 Employment-Based Eco Pass Related Costs 
Annual 
Sales as % ECO Pass ECO Pass 
Annual of System- Annual Adminis- Administration 
Sales wide Accounting tration Cost as % of 
Revenue Revenue Revenue3 Cost Sales 
1991 $191,651 
1992 $871,095 
1993 $1,142,660 
1994 $1,580,856 8.84% $1,563,131 $17,725 1.12% 
1995 $1,700,343 8.57% $1,669,281 $31,061 1.83% 
1996 $1,919,011 9.46% $1,793,047 $125,964 6.56% 
1997 $2,229,861 9.74% $2,075,434 $154,427 6.93% 
1998 $2,957,784 11.55% $2,812,696 $145,088 4.91% 
1999 $3,208,235 12.11% $3,042,740 $165,495 5.16% 
2000 $3,496,639 13.24% $3,230,935 $265,704 7.60% 
2001 $3,676,526  $3,533,407 $143,119 3.89% 
2002 $4,075,182 
3 Sales revenue minus cost of production and distribution of ECO Passes
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Appendix 7-4A: Annual Fare Revenues In Current Dollars   
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Annual Revenue - Various Eco Pass Sales ($ Current) 
1991
Employee 
ECO Pass1 
Neighborhood 
ECO Pass2 TeenPass3 
CU 
Boulder4 AHEC5 
Total Deep 
Discount 
Passes6 
$261,028  $562,238 $823,266 
1992 $1,222,146  $641,791 $1,863,937 
1993 $1,651,143  $638,928 $2,290,071 
1994 $2,342,828  $666,407 $3,009,235 
1995 $2,591,322 $10,277 $605,159 $1,572,184 $4,778,942 
1996 $3,010,928 $91,932 $618,368 $1,250,980 $4,972,208 
1997 $3,578,927 $66,161 $762,639 $1,204,142 $5,611,869 
1998 $4,821,188 $123,751 $852,639 $1,100,848 $6,898,426 
1999 $5,344,919 $136,834 $100,000 $939,689 $1,167,000 $7,688,442 
2000 $6,021,212 $142,722 $500,000 $973,993 $1,234,400 $8,872,327 
2001 $6,511,128 $163,367 $800,000 $1,007,244 $1,368,477 $9,850,216 
2002 $7,331,252 $172,342 $1,087,568 $1,273,142 $1,558,856 $11,423,160 
System-wide  
System-
wide Fare
Revenue 
Change over 
Previous Year 
Deep Discount Programs6 
Annual 
ECO Pass 
Sales 
Revenue 
Change 
over 
Previous 
Year 
Change in 
Pass Sales 
as % of 
System-
wide
Change 
Total ECO 
Pass Sales 
as % of 
System-
wide
Change 
1991 $823,266 
1992 $1,863,937 $1,040,671 
1993 $19,000,000 $2,290,071 $426,134 
1994 $26,508,526 $7,508,526 $3,009,235 $719,164 10% 40% 
1995 $30,246,000 $3,737,474 $4,778,942 $1,769,707 47% 128% 
1996 $31,835,376 $1,589,376 $4,972,208 $193,266 12% 313% 
1997 $36,746,800 $4,911,424 $5,611,869 $639,661 13% 114% 
1998 $41,749,416 $5,002,616 $6,898,426 $1,286,557 26% 138% 
1999 $44,140,301 $2,390,885 $7,688,442 $790,016 33% 322% 
2000 $45,474,675 $1,334,374 $8,872,327 $1,183,885 89% 665% 
2001 $9,850,216 $977,889 
2002 $11,423,160 $1,572,944 
1 Employment-based ECO Pass programs  
2 Residential-based ECO Pass programs
3 Middle and High School Student ECO Pass programs 
4 College ECO Pass program at Colorado University (CU), Boulder 
5 College ECO Pass program at Auraria Higher Education Center (AHEC) 
AHEC includes CU-Denver, Metro State and Community College of Denver 
6 Deep Discount Passes includes all ECO Pass programs; exclude regular passes
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Appendix 7-4B: Annual Fare Revenues In Constant (1983) Dollars   
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Annual Revenue - Various Eco Pass Sales ($ 1983) 
Total Deep 
Employee Neighborhood CU Discount 
1991
ECO Pass1 ECO Pass2 TeenPass3 Boulder4 AHEC5 Passes6 
$191,651 $412,803 $604,454 
1992 $871,095  $457,442 $1,328,537 
1993 $1,142,660  $442,165 $1,584,824 
1994 $1,580,856  $449,667 $2,030,523 
1995 $1,700,343 $6,743 $397,086 $1,031,617 $3,135,789 
1996 $1,919,011 $58,593 $394,116 $797,310 $3,169,030 
1997 $2,229,861 $41,222 $475,164 $750,244 $3,496,492 
1998 $2,957,784 $75,921 $523,091 $675,367 $4,232,163 
1999 $3,208,235 $82,133 $60,024 $564,039 $700,480 $4,614,911 
2000 $3,496,639 $82,882 $290,360 $565,617 $716,841 $5,152,339 
2001 $3,676,526 $92,246 $451,722 $568,743 $772,714 $5,561,951 
2002 $4,075,182 $95,799 $604,540 $707,694 $866,513 $6,349,728 
1991
System-wide  
System-
wide Fare
Revenue 
Change over 
Previous Year 
Deep Discount Programs6 
Annual 
ECO Pass 
Sales 
Revenue 
Change 
over 
Previous 
Year 
Change in 
Pass Sales 
as % of 
System-
wide
Change 
Total ECO 
Pass Sales 
as % of 
System-
wide
Change 
$604,454 
1992 $1,328,537 $724,083 
1993 $13,148,789 $1,584,824 $256,288 
1994 $17,886,995 $4,738,206 $2,030,523 $445,699 9% 43% 
1995 $19,846,457 $1,959,462 $3,135,789 $1,105,266 56% 160% 
1996 $20,290,233 $443,777 $3,169,030 $33,241 7% 714% 
1997 $22,895,202 $2,604,969 $3,496,492 $327,462 13% 134% 
1998 $25,613,139 $2,717,936 $4,232,163 $735,672 27% 156% 
1999 $26,494,779 $881,640 $4,614,911 $382,748 43% 523% 
2000 $26,408,057 -$86,721 $5,152,339 $537,427 -620% -5941% 
2001 $5,561,951 $409,613 
2002 $6,349,728 $787,776 
1 Employment-based ECO Pass programs  
2 Residential-based ECO Pass programs
3 Middle and High School Student ECO Pass programs 
4 College ECO Pass program at Colorado University (CU), Boulder 
5 College ECO Pass program at Auraria Higher Education Center (AHEC) 
AHEC includes CU-Denver, Metro State and Community College of Denver 
6 Deep Discount Passes includes all ECO Pass programs; exclude regular passes
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Appendix 7-4C: Fare Per Boarding    
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Annual Revenue per Boarding 

REVENUE PER BOARDING ($ CURRENT) 

Three 
Majors 
1991
System-
wide
Key 7 
Employee 
ECO Pass 
CU 
Boulder AHEC 
Combined 
Three Major 
Programs 
as % of 
System-
wide
n/a $3.12 -- -- --
1992 n/a $1.57 $0.87 $1.23 --
1993 $0.31 $1.32 $0.76 $1.09 354% 
1994 $0.43 n/a $0.79 -- --
1995 $0.45 n/a $0.74 -- -- --
1996 $0.45 $0.80 $0.83 $0.65 $0.77 170% 
1997 $0.51 $0.80 $0.89 $0.61 $0.77 150% 
1998 $0.58 $0.92 $0.79 $0.53 $0.82 143% 
1999 $0.59 $1.09 $0.86 $0.54 $0.94 159% 
2000 $0.58 $1.19 $0.87 $0.58 $1.07 183% 
2001 n/a $1.15 $0.82 $0.65 $1.09 --
2002 n/a $1.22 $0.89 $0.65 $1.16 --
REVENUE PER BOARDING ($ 1983) 

Three 
Majors 
1991
System-
wide
Key 7 
Employee 
ECO Pass 
CU 
Boulder AHEC 
Combined 
Three Major 
Programs 
as % of 
System-
wide
n/a $2.29 -- -- --
1992 n/a $1.12 $0.62 $0.87 
1993 $0.21 $0.92 $0.52 $0.76 354% 
1994 $0.29 n/a n/a -- --
1995 $0.29 n/a n/a -- -- --
1996 $0.29 $0.51 $0.53 $0.41 $0.49 170% 
1997 $0.32 $0.50 $0.56 $0.38 $0.48 150% 
1998 $0.35 $0.57 $0.49 $0.33 $0.51 143% 
1999 $0.36 $0.65 $0.51 $0.33 $0.57 159% 
2000 $0.34 $0.69 $0.51 $0.34 $0.62 183% 
2001 n/a $0.46 $0.36 $0.62 --
2002 n/a $0.50 $0.36 $0.65 --
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Appendix 7-4D: Consumer Price Indices & APTA Data
U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR APTA TRANSIT FACT BOOK, 2000 
All Transit Agencies in the U.S. 
Average CPI1 
OBJECT 
CLASS FUNCTION CLASS 
Total 
Operating 
Expenses
($m) 
(M&S) 
Materials 
& 
Supplies 
($m) 
M&S 
as %
of 
Total 
(GA) General 
Administration 
($m)
GA as 
% of
Total 
1981 90.9 -- -- -- -- --
1982 96.5 
base 
-- -- -- -- --
1983 99.6 year -- -- -- -- --
1984 103.9 11574.0 1462.2 12.6% 2914.7 25.2% 
1985 107.6 12380.9 1561.2 12.6% 2505.3 20.2% 
1986 109.6 12951.7 1524.3 11.8% 2748.0 21.2% 
1987 113.6 13472.1 1421.0 10.5% 2869.4 21.3% 
1988 118.3 14287.3 1446.2 10.1% 3077.8 21.5% 
1989 124.0 14972.3 1507.6 10.1% 3251.0 21.7% 
1990 130.7 15742.1 1608.4 10.2% 3449.9 21.9% 
1991 136.2 16541.4 1559.7 9.4% 3584.5 21.7% 
1992 140.3 16781.4 1529.1 9.1% 2674.2 15.9% 
1993 144.5 17349.8 1536.1 8.9% 2714.0 15.6% 
1994 148.2 17919.9 1593.9 8.9% 2752.0 15.4% 
1995 152.4 17848.7 1613.4 9.0% 2589.5 14.5% 
1996 156.9 18340.7 1677.0 9.1% 2744.3 15.0% 
1997 160.5 18936.1 1734.1 9.2% 2919.9 15.4% 
1998 163.0 19249.1 1818.1 9.4% 3013.1 15.7% 
1999 166.6 -- -- -- -- --
2000 172.2 -- -- -- -- --
2001 177.1 -- -- -- -- --
2002 179.9 -- -- -- -- --
U.S. city average for all items by all urban consumers 
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Appendix 7-5: Autocorrelation Plots & OLS Results
DESCRIPTIVES
(a) Trends in Service Supply and Ridership 
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(b) Trends in Revenue (constant 1983 Dollars) 
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(c) Trends in Fare per Boarding (constant 1983 Dollars) 
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PLOTS OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS
 
Residual plots show positive serial correlation whereby clusters of positive 
and clusters of negative errors alternatively follow each other. 
(a) Two Decades for System-wide Revenues and Ridership 
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(b) One Decade with Eco Pass for System-wide Revenues and Ridership 
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CHECKS FOR SERIAL CORRELATION 

WITH DURBIN-WATSON STATISTICS
 
Hypothesis DW_stat1 rho2  dL dU Serial 
Correlation 
d = 2(1-ρ) ρ = (2-d)/2 1 predictor; 22 
or 12 data points 
d significant 
@ 5% level? 
1. supply →
system-wide rides 0.833 
0.5835 1.24 1.43 Yes 
2. system rides →
system  revenue 0.292 
0.854 1.24 1.43 Yes 
3. supply → system
revenue 0.81 
0.595 1.24 1.43 Yes 
4. Eco Pass rides →
system rides 1.252 
0.374 1.08 1.36 inconclusive 
5. Eco Pass revenue 
→ system revenue 
0.743 
0.6285 1.08 1.36 Yes 
6. Eco Pass rides →
system revenue 1.888 
0.056 1.08 1.36 No 
7. Eco Pass revenue 
→ system rides 
2.275 
-0.1375 1.08 1.36 No 
NOTES: 
1 DW = {Σt=2. .T (εt − εt-1)2} / {Σt=1 . .T (εt)2 }
  Pindyck and Rubinfeld -- Equation 6.22, p165 
The plots of residuals indicate the possibility of positive serial correlation
(a) Values of d below dL allow us to reject the null hypothesis of "no serial correlation" 
(b) If d is greater than dU, we retain the null hypothesis 
(c) Where d lies between dL and dU, the results are inconclusive. 
In the majority of cases, where d is less than dL, d is significant at the 5% level 
Therefore, serial correlation is present 
2 Rho ( ρ ) measures the strength of correlation between variables. 
   The closer it is to 1, the stronger the correlation. 
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PLOTS OF SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Plots of serial correlation coefficients indicate that the 1-year lag is dominant. 
Autocorrelations:  SUPPLY
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .812   .199 .     ó*******.********     16.574 .000 
2 .619   .195 .     ó*******.****         26.679 .000 
3 .402   .190 .     ó********       31.163 .000 
4 .242   .185 .     ó***** .        32.884 .000 
5 .161   .179 .     ó***   .     33.690 .000 
6 .120   .174 .     ó**    .     34.169 .000 
7 .059   .169 .     ó* .     34.292 .000 
8 -.029   .163 . *ó .     34.324 .000 
9 -.093   .157 . **ó  .     34.673 .000
 10  -.217   .151     . ****ó  .     36.736 .000
 11  -.250   .144     .*****ó  .     39.735 .000
 12  -.305   .138     ******ó  .     44.637 .000
 13  -.284   .131     *.****ó  .     49.379 .000
 14  -.273   .123      *****ó  .     54.297 .000
 15  -.244   .115      *****ó  .     58.798 .000
 16  -.239   .107      *.***ó  .     63.843 .000 
Partial Autocorrelations:   SUPPLY
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .812   .213 .     ó********.*******
 
2 -.119   .213 . **ó  .
 
3 -.190   .213 . ****ó  .
 
4 .023   .213 . *  . 
5 .111   .213 .     ó**    . 
6 .009   .213 . *  .
 
7 -.151   .213 . ***ó  .
 
8 -.134   .213 . ***ó  .
 
9 .057   .213 .     ó*  .

 10  -.250   .213 . *****ó  .

 11   .101   .213 .     ó**    .

 12  -.157   .213 . ***ó  .

 13   .103   .213 .     ó**    .

 14  -.102   .213 . **ó  .

 15   .000   .213 . *  .

 16  -.079   .213 . **ó  .
 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
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Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual --  SUPPLY
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .408   .199 .     ó********        4.189 .041 
2 .160   .195 .     ó***   .      4.867 .088 
3 .164   .190 .     ó***   .      5.612 .132 
4 -.105   .185 . **ó .      5.937 .204 
5 -.107   .179 . **ó .      6.296 .278 
6 -.059   .174 . *ó .      6.412 .379 
7 -.033   .169 . *ó .      6.450 .488 
8 -.160   .163 . ***ó .      7.420 .492 
9 -.191   .157     . ****ó  .      8.905 .446
 10  -.172   .151 . ***ó  .     10.202 .423
 11  -.107   .144 . **ó  .     10.757 .464
 12   .071   .138 .     ó*  .     11.025 .527
 13   .031   .131 .    ó*  .     11.083 .604
 14  -.018   .123 .  *  .     11.105 .678
 15   .045   .115 .    ó*  .     11.258 .734
 16  -.008   .107 . *  .     11.264 .793 
Partial Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual --  SUPPLY
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .408   .213 .     ó********.
 
2 -.008   .213 . *  .
 
3 .121   .213 .     ó**    .
 
4 -.259   .213 . *****ó  .
 
5 .027   .213 .     ó*  .
 
6 -.032   .213 . *ó  .
 
7 .079   .213 .     ó**    .
 
8 -.241   .213 . *****ó  .
 
9 -.066   .213 . *ó  .

 10  -.111   .213 . **ó  .
 11   .115   .213 .     ó**    .
 12   .108   .213 .     ó**    .

 13  -.086   .213 . **ó  .

 14  -.118   .213 . **ó  .

 15   .053   .213 .     ó*  .
 16   .014   .213 . *  . 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
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Autocorrelations:  SYS_RIDE
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .773   .199 .     ó*******.*******      15.026 .000 
2 .621   .195 .     ó*******.****         25.215 .000 
3 .482   .190 .     ó*******.**     31.664 .000 
4 .326   .185 .     ó*******        34.788 .000 
5 .283   .179 .     ó******.        37.277 .000 
6 .217   .174 .     ó****  .     38.831 .000 
7 .120   .169 .     ó**    .     39.340 .000 
8 .027   .163 .     ó* .     39.367 .000 
9 -.052   .157 . *ó  .     39.475 .000
 10  -.120   .151 . **ó  .     40.108 .000
 11  -.183   .144     . ****ó  .     41.712 .000
 12  -.247   .138     .*****ó  .     44.925 .000
 13  -.286   .131     *.****ó  .     49.735 .000
 14  -.325   .123    **.****ó  .     56.718 .000
 15  -.331   .115    **.****ó  .     64.960 .000
 16  -.328   .107    ***.***ó  .     74.410 .000 
Partial Autocorrelations:   SYS_RIDE
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .773   .213 .     ó********.****** 
2 .059   .213 .     ó*  .
 
3 -.039   .213 . *ó  .
 
4 -.123   .213 . **ó  .
 
5 .159   .213 .     ó***   .
 
6 -.039   .213 . *ó  .
 
7 -.134   .213 . ***ó  .
 
8 -.114   .213 . **ó  .
 
9 -.001   .213 . *  .

 10  -.051   .213 . *ó  .

 11  -.104   .213 . **ó  .

 12  -.109   .213 . **ó  .

 13  -.009   .213 . *  .

 14  -.062   .213 . *ó  .

 15  -.016   .213 . *  .

 16  -.048   .213 . *ó  .
 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
245
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                  
                  
                        
                        
                              
                              
                              
                              
                              
                             
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                                 
 
  
                  
             
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                 
                 
                 
           
                
                 
                 
     
Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- SYS_RIDE
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .807   .199 .     ó*******.********     16.373 .000 
2 .502   .195 .     ó*******.**     23.017 .000 
3 .231   .190 .     ó***** .     24.504 .000 
4 .016   .185 . * .     24.511 .000 
5 -.124   .179 . **ó .     24.990 .000 
6 -.212   .174 . ****ó .     26.475 .000 
7 -.253   .169    . *****ó .     28.735 .000 
8 -.323   .163    .******ó .     32.677 .000 
9 -.390   .157   **.*****ó  .     38.844 .000
 10  -.399   .151   **.*****ó  .     45.848 .000
 11  -.390   .144   **.*****ó  .     53.142 .000
 12  -.392   .138   **.*****ó  .     61.246 .000
 13  -.322   .131     *.****ó  .     67.329 .000
 14  -.163   .123      . ***ó  .     69.090 .000
 15   .017   .115 .  *  .     69.111 .000
 16   .168   .107 . ó***.      71.586 .000 
Partial Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- SYS_RIDE
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .807   .213 .     ó********.*******
 
2 -.429   .213  *********ó  .
 
3 -.004   .213 . *  .
 
4 -.122   .213 . **ó  .
 
5 -.008   .213 . *  .
 
6 -.106   .213 . **ó  .
 
7 -.023   .213 . *  .
 
8 -.291   .213 . ******ó  .
 
9 -.043   .213 . *ó  .

 10  -.043   .213 . *ó  .

 11  -.169   .213 . ***ó  .

 12  -.226   .213 . *****ó  .

 13   .137   .213 .     ó***   .
 14   .050   .213 .     ó*  .
 15   .022   .213 . *  .

 16  -.015   .213 . *  .
 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
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Autocorrelations:  SYS_REV
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .858   .199 .     ó*******.*********     18.495 .000 
2 .720   .195 .     ó*******.******       32.186 .000 
3 .565   .190 .     ó*******.***     41.060 .000 
4 .380   .185 .     ó******.*       45.306 .000 
5 .190   .179 .     ó****  .     46.431 .000 
6 .035   .174 .     ó* .     46.471 .000 
7 -.069   .169 . *ó .     46.641 .000 
8 -.165   .163 . ***ó .     47.669 .000 
9 -.234   .157     .*****ó  .     49.890 .000
 10  -.271   .151     .*****ó  .     53.123 .000
 11  -.286   .144     ******ó  .     57.050 .000
 12  -.309   .138     ******ó  .     62.092 .000
 13  -.320   .131     *.****ó  .     68.085 .000
 14  -.310   .123     *.****ó  .     74.419 .000
 15  -.278   .115     *.****ó  .     80.267 .000
 16  -.259   .107      *.***ó  .     86.162 .000 
Partial Autocorrelations:   SYS_REV
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .858   .213 .     ó********.********
 
2 -.058   .213 . *ó  .
 
3 -.146   .213 . ***ó  .
 
4 -.216   .213 . ****ó  .
 
5 -.163   .213 . ***ó  .
 
6 -.011   .213 . *  .
 
7 .086   .213 .     ó**    .
 
8 -.072   .213 . *ó  .
 
9 -.066   .213 . *ó  .

 10  -.043   .213 . *ó  .

 11  -.021   .213 . *  .

 12  -.107   .213 . **ó  .

 13  -.058   .213 . *ó  .

 14  -.012   .213 . *  .

 15   .053   .213 .     ó*  .

 16  -.070   .213 . *ó  .
 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
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Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- SYS_REV
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .807   .199 .     ó*******.********     16.373 .000 
2 .502   .195 .     ó*******.**     23.017 .000 
3 .231   .190 .     ó***** .     24.504 .000 
4 .016   .185 . * .     24.511 .000 
5 -.124   .179 . **ó .     24.990 .000 
6 -.212   .174 . ****ó .     26.475 .000 
7 -.253   .169    . *****ó .     28.735 .000 
8 -.323   .163    .******ó .     32.677 .000 
9 -.390   .157   **.*****ó  .     38.844 .000
 10  -.399   .151   **.*****ó  .     45.848 .000
 11  -.390   .144   **.*****ó  .     53.142 .000
 12  -.392   .138   **.*****ó  .     61.246 .000
 13  -.322   .131     *.****ó  .     67.329 .000
 14  -.163   .123      . ***ó  .     69.090 .000
 15   .017   .115 .  *  .     69.111 .000
 16   .168   .107 . ó***.      71.586 .000 
Partial Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- SYS_REV
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .807   .213 .     ó********.*******
 
2 -.429   .213  *********ó  .
 
3 -.004   .213 . *  .
 
4 -.122   .213 . **ó  .
 
5 -.008   .213 . *  .
 
6 -.106   .213 . **ó  .
 
7 -.023   .213 . *  .
 
8 -.291   .213 . ******ó  .
 
9 -.043   .213 . *ó  .

 10  -.043   .213 . *ó  .

 11  -.169   .213 . ***ó  .

 12  -.226   .213 . *****ó  .

 13   .137   .213 .     ó***   .
 14   .050   .213 .     ó*  .
 15   .022   .213 . *  .

 16  -.015   .213 . *  .
 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  21 
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Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- Eco-Ride
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1  Box-Ljung Prob.
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .337   .256 .     ó*******  .      1.731 .188 
2 -.264   .244 . *****ó  .      2.900 .235 
3 -.611   .231    ***.********ó  .      9.879 .020 
4 -.329   .218  . *******ó  .     12.152 .016 
5 .125   .204 .     ó**    .     12.526 .028 
6 .404   .189 .     ó********       17.101 .009 
7 .254   .173 .     ó***** .        19.273 .007 
8 -.058   .154 . *ó  .     19.412 .013 
9 -.183   .134      .****ó  .     21.289 .011
 10  -.138   .109 .***ó  .     22.884 .011 
Partial Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- Eco-Ride
 Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag  Corr.   Err. -1  -.75  -.5 -.25  0  .25  .5 .75 1
 ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú 
1 .337   .289 .     ó*******    .
 
2 -.425   .289 .  *********ó .
 
3 -.471   .289 .  *********ó .
 
4 -.092   .289 . **ó .
 
5 -.030   .289 . *ó .
 
6 .019   .289 . * .
 
7 -.040   .289 . *ó .
 
8 -.012   .289 . * .
 
9 .135   .289 .     ó***   .
 10   .030   .289 .     ó* . 
Plot Symbols:  Autocorrelations *     Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22    Computable first lags:  11 
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Autocorrelations: Unstandardized Residual -- Eco-Revenue
     Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr. Err. -1  -.75 -.5 -.25  0 .25 .5 .75 1 
   ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú
Box-Ljung  Prob.
 1 .486 .256  . ó**********                 3.611  .057
 2 -.037 .244  . *ó .                 3.635  .162
 3 -.414 .231  .********ó  .                 6.841  .077
 4 -.548 .218  **.********ó  .                13.151  .011
 5 -.391 .204  ********ó  .                16.817  .005
 6 -.028 .189  . *ó .                16.839  .010
 7 .153 .173  . ó*** .                17.628  .014
 8 .192 .154  .  ó**** .                19.178  .014
 9 .164 .134                 . ó*** .                20.682  .014
 10 .051 .109                 . ó* .                20.902  .022 
Partial Autocorrelations:Unstandardized Residual - Eco-Revenue
   Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag Corr. Err. -1  -.75 -.5 -.25  0 .25 .5 .75 1
   ùòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòôòòòòú
 1 .486 .289  .      ó********** .
 2 -.358 .289  . *******ó           .
 3 -.324 .289  . ******ó           .
 4 -.286 .289  . ******ó           .
 5 -.160 .289  . ***ó .
 6 .003 .289  . * .
 7 -.229 .289  . *****ó .
 8 -.172 .289  . ***ó .
 9 -.072 .289  . *ó .
 10 -.120 .289  . **ó . 
Plot Symbols:    Autocorrelations *  Two Standard Error Limits . 
Total cases: 22     Computable first lags:  11 
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Appendix 7-6: Granger Causality Test Results 
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Reduced 
Model (RM) Full Model (FM) 
supply changes do not cause
Model (RM) Full Model (FM) 
ridership changes do not cause 
Statement ridership changes supply changes
Hypothesis Test 
dependent variable 
1a 1b 1aR 1bR 
(effect) ridest ridest supplyt supplyt 
explanatory 
variable (cause) ridest-1 ridest-1, supplyt-1 * supplyt-1 supplyt-1, ridest-1 *
standardized beta 
weights 0.956  0.782, 0.206, 0.881 0.598, 0.335
Adjusted R-square 0.91 0.918 0.765 0.788 
F-statistic 203.015 113.552 66.138 38.126 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 3.0221E+14 2.59334E+14 1.55973E+14 1.33474E+14 
explanatory 
variables in RM (q) 
explanatory 
1  -- 1 --
variables in FM (k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 21 21 21 21 
k-q 1 1 
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 
SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 
2.59334E+14
4.28749E+13
 1.33474E+14
 2.24989E+13
T-k-1 18 18 
SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 1.44074E+13 7.4152E+12 
{SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-
q)}/{SSE(FM) / (T-
k-1)} = Fcalc 2.975882385 3.034153253
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1 = 
Fcrit 4.41 4.41 
Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Accept Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Reduced 
Model (RM) Full Model (FM) Model (RM) Full Model (FM) 
ridership changes do not cause revenue changes do not cause 
Statement revenue changes ridership changes 
Hypothesis Test 2a 2b 2aR 2bR 
dependent 
variable (effect) revenuet revenuet ridest ridest 
explanatory 
variable (cause) revenuet-1 revenuet-1, ridest-1 * ridest-1 ridest-1, revenuet-1 *
standardized beta 
weights 0.959 0.935, 0.031 0.956 0.818, 0.177 
Adjusted R-
square 0.915 0.911 0.91 0.919 
F-statistic 217.122 103.375 203.015 113.728 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 2.8624E+13 2.84895E+13 3.02209E+14 2.58961E+14 
explanatory 

variables in RM 

(q) 1  -- 1 --
explanatory 

variables in FM 

(k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 21 21 21 21 
k-q 1 1 
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 2.84895E+13 2.58961E+14
SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 1.34522E+11 4.3248E+13 
T-k-1 18 18 
SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 1.58275E+12 1.43867E+13
{SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-

q)}/{SSE(FM) / 

(T-k-1)} = Fcalc 0.084992367 3.006106981
 
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1

= Fcrit 4.41 4.41 

Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Accept Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Reduced 
Model (RM) Full Model (FM) 
supply changes do not cause
Model (RM) Full Model (FM) 
revenue changes do not cause 
Statement revenue changes supply changes
Hypothesis 
Test 3a 3b 3aR 3bR 
dependent 
variable (effect) revenuet revenuet supplyt supplyt 
explanatory 
variable (cause) revenuet-1 
revenuet-1, supplyt-
1 * supplyt-1 
supplyt-1, revenuet-
1 *
standardized 
beta weights 0.959 0.811, 0.186 0.881 0.663, 0.274 
Adjusted R-
square 0.915 0.925 0.765 0.783 
F-statistic 217.122 123.841 66.138 37.049 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 2.8624E+13 2.41004E+13 1.55973E+14 1.36597E+14 
explanatory 
variables in RM 
(q) 
explanatory 
1 -- 1 --
variables in FM 
(k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data 
points (T) 21 21 21 21 
k-q 1 1 
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 
SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 
2.41004E+13
4.52361E+12
 1.36597E+14
 1.9376E+13 
T-k-1 18 18 
SSE(FM) / (T-k-
1) 1.33891E+12 7.5887E+12 
{SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-
q)}/{SSE(FM) / 
(T-k-1)} = Fcalc 3.378574674 2.553267277
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-
1 = Fcrit 4.41 4.41 
Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Accept Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 

Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Full Model Reduced Full Model 
Model (RM) (FM) 
ECO ride changes do not cause 
Model (RM) (FM) 
system ride changes do not 
Statement system ride changes cause ECO ride changes 
Hypothesis Test 
dependent variable 
4a 4b 4aR 4bR 
(effect) system-ridest system-ridest ECO-ridest ECO-ridest 
explanatory variable 
(cause) system-ridest-1 
system-ridest-1, 
ECO-ridet-1 * ECO-ridest-1 
ECO-ridest-1 *, 
system-ridest-1 
standardized beta 
weights 0.983 1.047, -0.076 0.886 0.240, 0.715 
Adjusted R-square 0.963 0.948 0.761 0.848 
F-statistic 289.341 92.752 32.89 28.943 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 2.71263E+13 2.59322E+13 2.77214E+13 1.56669E+13 
explanatory 
variables in RM (q) 1  -- 1 --
explanatory 
variables in FM (k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 11 11 11 11 
k-q 1 1 
SSE(FM) / (k-q) 
SSE(RM) - SSE(FM) 
/ (k-q) 
2.59322E+13
1.19411E+12
 1.56669E+13
 1.20545E+13
T-k-1 8 8 
SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 3.24152E+12 1.95836E+12
{SSE(RM) -
SSE(FM) / (k-
q)}/{SSE(FM) / (T-k-
1)} = Fcalc 0.368379773 6.155388505
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1 = 
Fcrit 5.32 5.32 
Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Accept Reject 
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Full Model Reduced Full Model 
Model (RM) (FM) Model (RM) (FM) 
ECO revenue changes do not system revenue changes do not 
Statement cause system revenue changes cause ECO revenue changes 
Hypothesis Test 5a 5b 5aR 5bR 
dependent variable 
(effect) sys-revenuet sys-revenuet ECO-revenuet ECO-revenuet 
sys-revenuet-1, ECO-revenuet-
ECO-revenuet- 1, sys-revenuet-explanatory variable 
(cause) sys-revenuet-1 1 * ECO-revenuet-1 1 *
standardized beta 
weights 0.97 0.763, 0.211 0.984 0.856, 0.133 
Adjusted R-square 0.934 0.919 0.964 0.961 
F-statistic 156.706 58 269.231 125.078 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 1.23394E+13 1.13946E+13 8.81266E+11 8.44266E+11 
explanatory 
variables in RM (q) 1 -- 1 --
explanatory 
variables in FM (k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 11 11 11 11 
k-q 1 1 

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 1.13946E+13 8.44266E+11
 
SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 9.44821E+11 37000185579
 
T-k-1 8 8 

SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 1.42432E+12 1.05533E+11
 
{SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-

q)}/{SSE(FM) / (T-
k-1)} = Fcalc 0.66334668 0.35060234 
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1 = 

Fcrit 5.32 5.32 

Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Accept Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Statement 
Hypothesis Test 
dependent 
variable (effect) 
explanatory 
variable (cause) 
standardized beta 
weights 
Adjusted R-
square 
F-statistic 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 
explanatory 
variables in RM (q) 
explanatory 
variables in FM (k) 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 
k-q 

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 

SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 

T-k-1 

SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 

{SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-

q)}/{SSE(FM) / (T-
k-1)} = Fcalc
 
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1 
= Fcrit 
Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement 
Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Model Reduced Full Model 
(RM) Full Model (FM) Model (RM) (FM) 
ECO ride changes do not cause system revenue changes do 
system revenue changes not cause ECO ride changes 
6a 6b 6aR 6bR 
system-revenuet system-revenuet ECO-ridest ECO-ridest 
ECO-ridest-1 *, 
syst-revenuet-1, system-system-revenuet-
1 ECO-ridet-1 * ECO-ridest-1 revenuet-1 *
0.97 0.624, 0.371 0.886 0.299, 0.639 
0.934 0.942 0.761 0.81 
156.706 81.524 32.89 22.304 
1.23394E+13 8.26049E+12 2.77214E+13 1.96215E+13 
1  -- 1 --
-- 2 -- 2 
11 11 11 11 
1 1 
8.26049E+12 1.96215E+13
4.07892E+12 8.0999E+12 
8 8 
1.03256E+12 2.45268E+12
3.950288805 3.302466204
5.32 5.32 
Accept Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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Denver Regional Transportation District 
Granger Causality Tests 
Original Statement Reverse of Statement 
Reduced Full Model Reduced Full Model 
Model (RM) (FM) Model (RM) (FM) 
ECO revenue changes do not system revenue changes do not 
Statement cause system ride changes cause ECO ride changes 
Hypothesis Test 7a 7b 7aR 7bR 
dependent variable 
(effect) system-ridet system-ridet ECO-revenuet ECO-revenuet 
ECO-revenuet-system-ridet-1 *, 
ECO-revenuet- 1 *, system-ridet-explanatory 
variable (cause) system-ridet-1 1 * ECO-revenuet-1 1 *
standardized beta 
weights 0.983 -0.058, 1.048 0.984 0.612, 0.376 
Adjusted R-square 0.963 0.975 0.964 0.963 
F-statistic 289.341 198.013 269.231 131.861 
sum of squared 
residuals (SSE) 2.71263E+13 1.24199E+13 8.81266E+11 8.02113E+11 
explanatory 
variables in RM (q) 1 -- 1 --
explanatory 
variables in FM (k) -- 2 -- 2 
number of time 
series data points
(T) 11 11 11 11 
k-q 1 1 

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 1.24199E+13 8.02113E+11
 
SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-q) 1.47064E+13 79152938258
 
T-k-1 8 8 

SSE(FM) / (T-k-1) 1.55248E+12 1.00264E+11
 
{SSE(RM) -

SSE(FM) / (k-

q)}/{SSE(FM) / (T-
k-1)} = Fcalc 9.472807365 0.789444442
Ftable α=0.5, df=q, T-k-1 = 

Fcrit 5.32 5.32 

Accept/Reject
Hypothesis 
Statement Reject Accept
* Variable not significant (p-value greater than 5%)
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 8 
Appendix 8-1: Primary Mode from Residence to Central Campus 
Primary Mode from Residence to Central Campus (Percentages) 
BEFORE AFTER 
1996 1997 1999 2000 
Summary
Walk 42.88% 53.51% 42.31% 51.57% 
Auto Drive Alone 8.50% 12.46% 9.13% 11.51% 
Transit  9.07% 12.24% 15.37% 21.71% 
All Others 39.55% 21.79% 33.19% 15.22% 
Details 
Walk 42.88% 53.51% 42.31% 51.57% 
Bike 10.42% 13.56% 7.62% 8.66% 
Drive Alone 8.50% 12.46% 9.13% 11.51% 
Share Ride 3.06% 4.48% 1.19% 1.97% 
Motorcycle 0.89% 1.00% 0.51% 0.65% 
AC Transit 3.93% 5.65% 8.71% 14.09% 
BART 4.94% 6.32% 5.57% 6.32% 
Other Transit 0.20% 0.27% 1.09% 1.30% 
Shuttles 0.73% 1.17% 1.49% 2.32% 
Not enrolled 24.45% 1.58% 22.38% 1.62% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Primary Mode from Residence to Central Campus (Students)
BEFORE AFTER 
1996 1997 1999 2000 
Summary
Walk 12953 16162 13232 16127 
Auto Drive Alone 2567 3765 2855 3600 
Transit  2740 3698 4806 6789 
All Others 11949 6581 10380 4759 
Details 
Walk 12953 16162 13232 16127 
Bike 3148 4095 2382 2707 
Drive Alone 2567 3765 2855 3600 
Share Ride 924 1352 373 615 
Motorcycle 270 303 160 204 
AC Transit 1187 1706 2725 4406 
BART 1492 1910 1741 1977 
Other Transit 61 82 340 406 
Shuttles 222 354 467 726 
Not enrolled 7385 477 6998 507 
Total 30209 30206 31273 31275 
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Appendix 8-2: Reasons for Change in Primary Mode
Reasons for Change in Primary Mode from Residence to Central Campus (Between Last 
Year and This Year) 
1997 Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative
Percent 
No change in primary mode 0 23600 78.1 78.1 
 Change in employment 1 243 0.8 78.9 
 Change in residential location 2 3261 10.8 89.7 1 
 Child care changes 3 49 0.2 89.9 
 Increased parking costs 4 159 0.5 90.4 
 Increased traffic congestion 5 130 0.4 90.8 
 Change in class or work schedule 6 418 1.4 92.2 3 
 Change in AC Transit routes or 
service 7 61 0.2 92.4 
 Discounted BART, Muni or BART Plus 
pass 8 37 0.1 92.6 
 Student Carpool Program 9 28 0.1 92.6 
 Increased transit fares 10 91 0.3 92.9 
 Safety factors 11 119 0.4 93.3 
 AC Transit Class Pass 12 224 0.7 94.1 
 City parking restrictions 13 35 0.1 94.2 
 Other 14 1753 5.8 100 2 
Total 30207 100 
2000 Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative
Percent 
No change in primary mode 0 19315 61.8 61.8 
 Not enrolled at UC Berkeley 1 3589 11.5 73.2 
A 
1 
 Change in employment 2 62 0.2 73.4 
 Change in residential location 3 3093 9.9 83.3 1 
 Child care changes 4 9 0 83.4 
 Increased parking costs 5 179 0.6 83.9 
 Increased traffic congestion 6 178 0.6 84.5 
 Change in class or work schedule 7 722 2.3 86.8 
 Change in AC Transit routes or 
service 8 85 0.3 87.1 
 Discounted BART, Muni or BART Plus 
pass 9 87 0.3 87.4 
 Student Carpool Program 10 
 Increased transit fares 11 19 0.1 87.4 
 Safety factors 12 169 0.5 88 
 AC Transit Class Pass 13 1130 3.6 91.6 3 
 City parking restrictions 14 182 0.6 92.1 
 Other 15 2456 7.9 100 2 
Total 31274 100
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Appendi
 less 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 or 
less 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 or 
x 8-3: Distribution of Distances from Residence to Central Campus 
Distribution of Distances from Residence to Central Campus 
39.3 0.25 
56.1 0.70 
67.6 1.45 
73.1 2.45 
80 3.95 
85.2 7.45 
90.514.95 
93.924.95 
95.734.95 
96.444.95 
97.450.00 
4.28 Avg.
25.5 0.25 
52.6 0.70 
67.8 1.45 
74.7 2.45 
80.5 3.95 
85.9 7.45 
90.314.95 
92.724.95 
94.434.95 
9544.95 
9650.00 
3.88 Avg.
Distance (miles) 
than0.5 
0.5 - 0.9 
1.0 - 1.9 
2.0 - 2.9 
3.0 - 4.9 
5.0 - 9.9 
- 19.9 
- 29.9 
- 39.9 
- 49.9 
more11 
NA 
Distance (miles) 
than0.5 
0.5 - 0.9 
1.0 - 1.9 
2.0 - 2.9 
3.0 - 4.9 
5.0 - 9.9 
- 19.9 
- 29.9 
- 39.9 
- 49.9 
more 
NA 
1997 Frequency Percent Dist x freq 
Cum %
1 11865 39.3 2966.25 
2 5086 16.8 3560.2 
3 3480 11.5 5046 
4 1664 5.5 4076.8 
5 2070 6.9 8176.5 
6 1572 5.2 11711.4 
7 1610 5.3 24069.5 
8 1032 3.4 25748.4 
9 552 1.8 19292.4 
10 199 0.7 8945.05 
311 1 15550 
0 765 2.5 99.9
Total 30207 100 129142.5 
2000 Frequency Percent 
Dist x freq 
Cum %
1 7971 25.5 1992.75 
2 8485 27.1 5939.5 
3 4751 15.2 6888.95 
4 2169 6.9 5314.05 
5 1822 5.8 7196.9 
6 1683 5.4 12538.35 
7 1375 4.4 20556.25 
8 746 2.4 18612.7 
9 537 1.7 18768.15 
10 182 0.6 8180.9 
11 306 1 15300 
0 1246 4 100
Total 31274 100 121288.5 
% Change 
from 1997 
-35.11% 
-6.24% 
0.30% 
2.19% 
0.63% 
0.82% 
-0.22% 
-1.28% 
-1.36% 
-1.45% 
-1.44% 
0.10% 
-9.29% 
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Appendix 8-4: Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode 
Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode 
Q31997 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
N/A 
Distance 
(miles) < 0.5 0.5 - 0.9 1.0 - 1.9 2.0 - 2.9 3.0 - 4.9 5.0 - 9.9 10.0 - 19.9 20.0 - 29.9 30.0 - 39.9 40.0 - 49.950.0+ 
Walk 1 10338 3722 1500 265 70 32 37 17 27 12 516025 
Auto - driver 2 
114 
173 377 330 737 871 885 531 229 101 157 4505 
Auto passenger 4 30 14 21 25 54 46 36 13 15 10 15 279 
Carpool 5 12 37 5 43 29 29 155 
Motorcycle  6 63 46 42 42 12 38 44 287 
Bicycle 7 967 877 1042 592 436 74 37 7 6 4038 
AC Transit 8 43 39 355 324 577 122 89 23 7 12 1591 
BART 9 24 29 39 70 119 329 400 392 227 67 86 1782 
Campus Shuttle 10 123 123 17 10 15 15 303 
LBL or RFS bus 11 12 21 7 3 9 52 
Other transit 12 23 38 2 20 83 
Not enrolled 13 
Total 1255 1135 1540 1028 1144 573 585 427 242 74 13329100 
Auto - drive 
alone 2 53 127 287 261 649 702 715 498 169 75 131 3667 
Drive with 1 
passenger 3 61 46 90 69 88 169 170 33 60 26 26 838 
261

 
 
        
    
      
  
           
        
     
        
         
            
            
        
    
          
                
      
                          
                  
    
 
Student Travel Distances (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode
 2000 Q3A 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
N/A 
Distance 
(miles) < 0.5 0.5 - 0.9 1.0 - 1.9 2.0 - 2.9 3.0 - 4.9 5.0 - 9.9 10.0 - 19.9 20.0 - 29.9 30.0 - 39.9 40.0 - 49.950.0+ 
Walk 12 6807 6541 1887 254 55 72 35 13 1615680 
Auto - driver 3 172 188 222 271 458 756 637 312 258 88 112 3474 
Auto passenger 4 28 29 36 110 88 55 85 22 20 473 
Carpool 8 13 15 9 16 11 10 16 16 5 111 
Motorcycle  10 6 6 62 50 26 23 11 184 
Bicycle 6 417 581 833 542 274 43 5 2695 
AC Transit 2 259 630 1232 739 754 289 160 35 18 4116 
BART 5 31 110 24 29 80 364 391 343 201 82 132 1787 
Campus Shuttle 7 154 204 154 25 19 5 13 10 584 
LBL or RFS bus 9 20 8 70 34 9 141 
Other transit 11 35 38 87 78 67 16 16 18 19 11 385 
Not enrolled 1 
Total 7942 8350 4616 2148 1821 1643 1363 746 532 183 28629630 
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Appendix 8-5: Distribution of Travel Times from Residence to Central Campus 
Distribution of Travel Times from Residence to Central Campus 
Travel Time (min.) 
15.0 or less 
16.0 - 30.0 

31 - 45 

46 - 60 

61.0 	 or more 

N/A 

1997 Frequency Percent Time x freq 
Cum %
Valid 
1 15601 51.6 117007.5 51.6 
2 8702 28.8 200146 80.4 
3 2828 9.4 107464 89.8 
4 1450 4.8 76850 94.6 
5 1000 3.3 61000 97.9 
0 626 2.1 100 
Total 30207 100 562467.5 
7.5 
23.0 
38.0 
53.0 
61.0 
18.62 Avg.
Travel Time (min.) 
15.0 or less 
16.0 - 30.0 

31 - 45 

46 - 60 

61.0 	 or more 

N/A 

2000 Frequency Percent 
Time x freq 
Cum %
Valid 
1 15441 49.4 115807.5 49.4 
2 9520 30.4 218960 79.8 
3 3029 9.7 115102 89.5 
4 1483 4.7 78599 94.2 
5 1081 3.5 65941 97.7 
0 720 2.3 100 
Total 31274 100 594409.5 
7.5 
23.0 
38.0 
53.0 
61.0 
19.01 Avg. 
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Appendix 8-6: Distribution of Travel Times by Primary Mode
Student Travel Times (Home to Campus) by Primary Mode 
Q25
1997 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
N/A 
Travel 
Time 
up to 15 
minutes 
16 - 30 
minutes 
31 - 45 
minutes 
46 - 60 
minutes 
over 60 
minutes 
Walk 1 11377 4110 314 25 45 15871 
Auto – driver 2 
887 
1789 1077 605 257 4615 
Auto passenger 4 80 106 30 51 15 282 
Carpool 5 42 56 28 31 19 176 
Motorcycle  6 159 104 25 288 
Bicycle 7 2592 1236 165 31 4024 
AC Transit 8 123 712 676 127 42 1680 
BART 9 80 304 409 555 554 1902 
Campus Shuttle 10 122 120 31 6 15 294 
LBL or RFS bus 11 3 28 9 12 52 
Other transit 12 48 12 22 82 
Not enrolled 
Total 15513 8577 2764 1431 981 29266 
Auto - drive alone 2 663 1479 850 550 178 3720 
Drive with 1 passenger 3 224 310 227 55 79 895 
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Q20A
2000 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
N/A 
Travel Time up to 15 
minutes 
16 - 30 
minutes 
31 - 45 
minutes 
46 - 60 
minutes 
over 60 
minutes 
Walk 12 11555 3989 203 57 15804 
Auto – driver 3 668 1417 983 253 236 3557 
Auto passenger 4 153 172 70 97 492 
Carpool 8 37 17 48 16 5 123 
Motorcycle  10 137 41 26 204 
Bicycle 6 1669 875 102 15 2661 
AC Transit 2 669 2104 1038 402 136 4349 
BART 5 46 223 388 613 648 1918 
Campus Shuttle 7 217 276 43 23 559 
LBL or RFS bus 9 16 77 30 5 128 
Other transit 11 102 170 51 30 29 382 
Not enrolled 
Total 15269 9361 2982 1483 1082 30177 
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Appendix 8-7: Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times 
Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times (1997) 
Arrival Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
No Response 1151 1262 1210 1266 2468 10898 11257 
Before 7:30 am 864 879 911 766 764 193 58 
7:30am - 8:29am 6522 7050 6735 6783 5830 356 238 
8:30am - 9:29am 8556 7741 8911 7952 7295 1009 661 
9:30am - 10:29am 6007 5607 6025 5585 5737 1364 1138 
10:30am - 12:59pm 4553 5367 4217 5573 4736 2512 2285 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 1417 1323 1405 1258 1515 1762 2231 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 221 178 158 205 168 264 281 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 43 84 76 95 45 182 202 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 117 169 81 188 50 135 219 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 26 23 30 57 39 80 196 
After 10:00pm 7 16 7 38 94 69 
No Trip to Campus 731 516 431 473 1521 11359 11372 
Total 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 
Departure Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
No Response 7141 7065 6976 7107 9194 24249 24361 
Before 7:30 am 
7:30am - 8:29am 8 44 12 9 8 
8:30am - 9:29am 67 55 43 61 93 12 
9:30am - 10:29am 278 245 284 267 533 38 38 
10:30am - 12:59pm 1272 1166 1201 1208 2156 119 83 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 3929 2881 4023 3231 4470 382 282 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 3602 4277 3560 3913 2934 516 440 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 4808 4975 5007 4968 4191 1754 1252 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 5283 5622 5186 5584 4161 1314 1191 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 2370 2288 2288 2211 1356 789 881 
After 10:00pm 1448 1589 1622 1633 1073 893 1583 
No Trip to Campus 5 14 38 141 96 
Total 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 30207 
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Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times (1997) 
2-way travel Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
No Response 8292 8327 8186 8373 11662 35147 35618 
Before 7:30 am 864 879 911 766 764 193 58 
7:30am - 8:29am 6530 7094 6747 6792 5838 356 238 
8:30am - 9:29am 8623 7796 8954 8013 7388 1021 661 
9:30am - 10:29am 6285 5852 6309 5852 6270 1402 1176 
10:30am - 12:59pm 5825 6533 5418 6781 6892 2631 2368 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 5346 4204 5428 4489 5985 2144 2513 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 3823 4455 3718 4118 3102 780 721 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 4851 5059 5083 5063 4236 1936 1454 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 5400 5791 5267 5772 4211 1449 1410 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 2396 2311 2318 2268 1395 869 1077 
After 10:00pm 1448 1596 1638 1640 1111 987 1652 
No Trip to Campus 731 516 436 487 1559 11500 11468 
Total 60414 60414 60414 60414 60414 60414 60414 
Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times (2000) 
2-way travel Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
No Trip to Campus 903 1010 989 929 928 343 159 
Before 7:30 am 6643 7297 6668 6884 5674 372 285 
7:30am - 8:29am 8307 8474 8684 8527 7833 874 629 
8:30am - 9:29am 6355 5705 6210 5722 5985 1048 803 
9:30am - 10:29am 6408 6661 6069 6828 6499 2252 1936 
10:30am - 12:59pm 5559 4491 5288 4165 6515 2004 2268 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 4115 4358 4153 4089 3447 890 794 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 4029 4948 4251 4866 3555 1232 1054 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 5576 5339 5449 5520 3218 1461 1451 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 2543 2470 2504 2239 1417 707 986 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 1416 1574 1621 1569 1113 835 1425 
After 10:00pm 1259 901 1113 1335 3649 17038 16885 
Total 53113 53228 52999 52673 49833 29056 28675 
No Response 9435 9320 9549 9875 12715 33492 33873 
Total 62548 62548 62548 62548 62548 62548 62548 
268
 
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
Average Distribution of Arrival & Departure Times 
Weekdays Weekends 
Hours of Day 
Weekday Weekday Weekend Weekend 
1997 2000 1997 2000 
Weighted Trips 
Before 7:30 am 837 6633 126 329 
7:30am - 8:29am 6600 8365 297 752 
8:30am - 9:29am 8155 5995 841 926 
9:30am - 10:29am 6114 6493 1289 2094 
10:30am - 12:59pm 6290 5204 2500 2136 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 5090 4032 2329 842 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 3843 4330 751 1143 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 4858 5020 1695 1456 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 5288 2235 1430 847 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 2138 1459 973 1130 
After 10:00pm 1487 1651 1320 16962 
Average Daily
 50700
 51417
 13548 
 28615
 
Percentages
Before 7:30 am 
 1.65%
 12.90%
 0.93% 
 1.15%
 
7:30am - 8:29am 
 13.02%
 16.27%
 2.19% 
 2.63%
 
8:30am - 9:29am 
 16.08%
 11.66%
 6.21% 
 3.23%
 
9:30am - 10:29am 
 12.06%
 12.63%
 9.51% 
 7.32%
 
10:30am - 12:59pm 
 12.41%
 10.12%
 18.45% 
 7.46%
 
1:00pm - 3:29pm 
 10.04%
 7.84%
 17.19% 
 2.94%
 
3:30pm - 4:29pm 
 7.58%
 8.42%
 5.54% 
 3.99%
 
4:30pm - 5:29pm 
 9.58%
 9.76%
 12.51% 
 5.09%
 
5:30pm - 7:29pm 
 10.43%
 4.35%
 10.55% 
 2.96%
 
7:30pm - 10:00pm 
 4.22%
 2.84%
 7.18% 
 3.95%
 
After 10:00pm 
 2.93%
 3.21%
 9.74% 
 59.28%
 
Average Daily
 100.00%
 100.00%
 100.00% 
 100.00%
 
269
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
1997 Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times 
Period 
of Day 
Hours of Day 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
AM 
Peak 
Before 8:30 a.m. 
7394 7973 7658 7558 6602 549 296 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.
26079 24385 26109 25135 26535 7198 6718 
PM 
Peak 
3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m.
14074 15305 14068 14953 11549 4165 3585 
Evening After 7:30 p.m. 
3844 3907 3956 3908 2506 1856 2729 
Total to/from Campus 51391 51570 51791 51554 47192 13768 13328 
AM 
Peak 
Before 8:30 a.m. 
14.39% 15.46% 14.79% 14.66% 13.99% 3.99% 2.22% 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.
50.75% 47.29% 50.41% 48.75% 56.23% 52.28% 50.41% 
PM 
Peak 
3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m.
27.39% 29.68% 27.16% 29.00% 24.47% 30.25% 26.90% 
Evening After 7:30 p.m. 
7.48% 7.58% 7.64% 7.58% 5.31% 13.48% 20.48% 
Total to/from Campus100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00% 
2000 Distribution of Typical Student Arrival and Departure Times 
Period 
of Day 
Hours of Day 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
AM 
Peak 
Before 8:30 a.m. 
14950 15771 15352 15411 13507 1246 914 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.
22437 21215 21720 20804 22446 6194 5801 
PM 
Peak 
3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m.
12148 12757 12204 12625 8190 3400 3491 
Evening After 7:30 p.m. 
2675 2475 2734 2904 4762 17873 18310 
Total to/from Campus 52210 52218 52010 51744 48905 28713 28516 
AM 
Peak 
Before 8:30 a.m. 
28.63% 30.20% 29.52% 29.78% 27.62% 4.34% 3.21% 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.
42.97% 40.63% 41.76% 40.21% 45.90% 21.57% 20.34% 
PM 
Peak 
3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m.
23.27% 24.43% 23.46% 24.40% 16.75% 11.84% 12.24% 
Evening After 7:30 p.m. 
5.12% 4.74% 5.26% 5.61% 9.74% 62.25% 64.21% 
Total to/from Campus 100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00% 
270
 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
Averages of the Distribution of Arrival & Departure Times 
Weekdays Weekends 
Period of Hours of Day 
Day 
1997 2000 1997 2000 
AM Peak Before 8:30 a.m. 
7437 14998 423 1080 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. 
25649 21724 6958 5998 
PM Peak 3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m. 
13990 11585 3875 3446 
Evening After 7:30 p.m.
3624 3110 2293 18092 
Total to/from Campus 50700 51417 13548 28615 
AM Peak Before 8:30 a.m. 
14.67% 29.17% 3.12% 3.77% 
Midday 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. 
50.59% 42.25% 51.36% 20.96% 
PM Peak 3:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m. 
27.59% 22.53% 28.60% 12.04% 
Evening After 7:30 p.m.
7.15% 6.05% 16.92% 63.22% 
Total to/from Campus 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Appendix 8-8: Test of “Before” and “After” Proportions 
Test of Proportions1 
For a pair of sampl es, say one for “before” and the other for “after” conditions; let 
Ps1 = proportional attribute of sample 1 
P s2 = proportional attribute of sample 2 
N1 = size of sample 1 
N2 = size of sample 2 
Pu = the population proportion 
σp-p = the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the 
differences in sample proportions 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the pair of proportions, that is: 
Ho: Pu1 = Pu2 (say, Pu1 for “before” and Pu2 for “after” conditions) 
1. Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples: 
Pu = N1Ps1 + N2Ps2

 N1 + N2
 
2. Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
σp-p = √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)} 
3. Calculate the test statistic, Z: 
Zcalc = Ps1 - Ps2

 σp-p
 
Reject the null hypothesis if Zcalc is greater than ±1.96 corresponding to the alpha level of 
0.05. Rejection means there is a statistically significant difference between the two 
proportional attributes. 
1 Joseph F. Healey, Statistics: A Tool for Social Research, 5th Ed., Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999, 
pp 213-217. 
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Choice of Travel Mode Before & After Introduction of the UCB ClassPass Program 
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.056 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.141 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
3357 = N1 size of sample 1 
3008 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.0962 = Pu the population proportion 
0.0074 = σp-p standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 
0.0962 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 
Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling 
distribution 
0.0074 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
Calculate the test statistic, Z: 
-11.4834 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
Walk Auto All AC BART Other 
Drive Transit Transit Transit 
INPUT: Alone 
Ps1 = 53.50% 12.50% 12.20% 5.60% 6.30% 0.30% 
P s2 = 51.60% 11.50% 21.70% 14.10% 6.30% 1.30% 
N1 = 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357 
N2 = 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Pu = 0.5260 0.1203 0.1669 0.0962 0.0630 0.0077 
σp-p = 0.0125 0.0082 0.0094 0.0074 0.0061 0.0022 
CALCULATE: 
Pu = 0.5260 0.1203 0.1669 0.0962 0.0630 0.0077 
σp-p = 0.0125 0.0082 0.0094 0.0074 0.0061 0.0022 
-
Zcalc = 1.5156 1.2245 -10.1477 11.4834 0.0000 -4.5491 
RESULTS:
Zcalc within critical 
region ±1.96 Y Y N N Y N 
Reject null hypothesis: 
Ps1=Ps2? N N Y Y N Y 
Stat. significant 
difference? N N Y Y N Y 
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Distribution of Travel Distances Before & After the UCB ClassPass Program
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.393 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.255	 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
3357 = N1 size of sample 1 
3008 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.3278 = Pu the population proportion 
standard deviation of the sampling 
0.0118 = σp-p distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 
0.3278 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 
Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
0.0118 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
Calculate the test
statistic, Z: 
11.7097 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
Within Within 1.0 Within Within 
INPUT: 0.5 mile mile 2.0 miles 5.0 miles 
Ps1 = 39.30% 56.10% 67.60% 80.00% 
P s2 = 25.50% 52.60% 67.80% 80.50% 
N1 = 3357 3357 3357 3357 
N2 = 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Pu = 0.3278 0.5445 0.6769 0.8024 
σp-p = 0.0118 0.0125 0.0117 0.0100 
CALCULATE: 
Pu = 0.3278 0.5445 0.6769 0.8024 
σp-p = 0.0118 0.0125 0.0117 0.0100 
Zcalc = 11.7097 2.7992 -0.1703 -0.5001  
RESULTS:
Zcalc within critical region
±1.96  N N Y Y 
Reject null hypothesis: 
Ps1=Ps2? Y Y N N 
Stat. significant difference? Y Y N N 
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Distribution of Travel Times Before & After the UCB ClassPass Program 
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.516 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.494 	 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
3357 = N1 size of sample 1 
3008 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.5056 = Pu the population proportion 
0.0126 = σp-p standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 
0.5056 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 
Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
0.0126 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
Calculate the test
statistic, Z: 
1.7527 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
Within 
15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 Over 60 
INPUT: minutes minutes minutes minutes minutes 
Ps1 = 51.60% 28.80% 9.40% 4.80% 3.30% 
P s2 = 49.40% 30.40% 9.70% 4.70% 3.50% 
N1 = 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357 
N2 = 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Pu = 0.5056 0.2956 0.0954 0.0475 0.0339 
σp-p = 0.0126 0.0115 0.0074 0.0053 0.0045 
CALCULATE: 
Pu = 0.5056 0.2956 0.0954 0.0475 0.0339 
σp-p = 0.0126 0.0115 0.0074 0.0053 0.0045 
Zcalc = 1.7527 -1.3967 -0.4067 0.1872 -0.4399 
RESULTS:
Zcalc within critical region
±1.96  Y Y Y Y Y 
Reject null hypothesis: 
Ps1=Ps2? N N N N N 
Stat. significant difference? N N N N N 
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Distribution of Weekday Travel Periods Before & After the UCB ClassPass Program 
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.1467 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.2917 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
3357 = N1 size of sample 1 
3008 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.2152 = Pu the population proportion 
standard deviation of the sampling 
0.0103 = σp-p distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 
0.2152 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 
Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
0.0103 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
Calculate the test
statistic, Z: 
-14.0529 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
INPUT: 

Before 
8:30 a.m. 
8:30 a.m. – 
3:30 p.m. 
3:30 p.m. – 
7:30 p.m. 
After 
7:30 
p.m. 
Ps1 = 14.67% 50.59% 27.59% 7.15% 
P s2 = 29.17% 42.25% 22.53% 6.05% 
N1 = 3357 3357 3357 3357 
N2 = 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Pu = 0.2152 0.4665 0.2520 0.0663 
σp-p 
CALCULATE: 
= 0.0103 0.0125 0.0109 0.0062 
Pu = 0.2152 0.4665 0.2520 0.0663 
σp-p = 0.0103 0.0125 0.0109 0.0062 
Zcalc = 
RESULTS:
Zcalc within critical region
±1.96  
Reject null hypothesis: 
Ps1=Ps2? 
Stat. significant difference?
-14.0538 
N 
Y 
Y 
6.6573 
N 
Y 
Y 
4.6444 
N 
Y 
Y 
1.7609 
Y 
N 
N 
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Distribution of Weekend Travel Periods Before & After the UCB ClassPass Program 
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.0312 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.0377 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
3357 = N1 size of sample 1 
3008 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.0343 = Pu the population proportion 
0.0046 = σp-p standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 
0.0343 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 
Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
0.0046 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
Calculate the test
statistic, Z: 
-1.4231 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
INPUT: 

Before 
8:30 a.m. 
8:30 a.m. – 
3:30 p.m. 
3:30 p.m. – 
7:30 p.m. 
After 7:30 
p.m. 
Ps1 = 3.12% 51.36% 28.60% 16.92% 
P s2 = 3.77% 20.96% 12.04% 63.22% 
N1 = 3357 3357 3357 3357 
N2 = 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Pu = 0.0343 0.3699 0.2078 0.3880 
σp-p = 0.0046 0.0121 0.0102 0.0122 
CALCULATE: 
Pu = 0.0343 0.3699 0.2078 0.3880 
σp-p = 0.0046 0.0121 0.0102 0.0122 
Zcalc = -1.4355 25.0793 16.2590 -37.8470 
RESULTS:
Zcalc within critical region
±1.96  Y N N N 
Reject null hypothesis: 
Ps1=Ps2? N Y Y Y 
Stat. significant difference? N Y Y Y 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9 
Appendix 9-1: Monthly Averages 
City of Berkeley ECO Pass
Magnetic Dip Data Tracking (Jan - Nov, 2002)
Total 
Boardings 
Frequency
Ranges of 
Riders 
Top 5 bus 
boardings 
by time of
day
Monthly
Average 
Stan 
Dev Variance Min Max
Passes Used 194 12.7 160.5 173 208 
Total Monthly 3094 246.4 60723.2 2670 3394 
Avg Weekday 125 8.8 77.5 112 138 
Avg Weekend Day 44 4.7 22.3 35 50 
1 - 10 times 108 11.3 127.7 91 124 
11 - 20 times 34 3.8 14.3 27 40 
21 - 40 times 33 4.8 23.1 27 43 
>40 times 20 4.0 16.4 12 25 
AM Pk (6a-10a) 558 52.9 2796.2 468 639 
MD (10a-3p) 463 31.4 989.1 416 514 
PM Pk (3p-7p) 600 53.4 2853.1 524 686 
Eve (7p-12mn) 149 12.0 143.5 132 165 
Revenue per boarding $2.15 $0.16 0.02 2.01 2.47 
Frequency of Riders by Number of Days (2002) 
Number of Riders Mean Median Mode St-Dev 
1 day 23 23 
2 days 70 82 80 74 75 
64 
3 days 103 89 96 96 
4 days 114 105 110 110 
5 days 93 113 119 116 119 
128 129 
6 days 130 120 120 123 120 
7 days 118 114 111 127 128 135 8 
118 117 131 
135 124 124 
133 131 129 
133 135 142 
134 133 135 
117 124 119 
122 133 125 
126 119 126 
131 136 142 
136 135 122 
139 121 122 
132 118 
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 Appendix 9-2: Monthly Data
City of Berkeley ECO Pass 
Magnetic Dip Data Tracking (Jan - Nov, 2002) 
Passes Used 
Jan 
173 
Feb 
176 
Mar 
185 
Apr 
204 
May
203 
Jun 
190 
Total 
Boardings 
Total Monthly 
Avg Weekday 
Avg Weekend Day 
2,848 
113 
35 
2,670 
119 
36 
3,257 
133 
47 
3,260 
132 
43 
3,290 
127 
45 
2,950 
124
48 
Frequency
Ranges of 
Riders 
1 - 10 times 
11 - 20 times 
21 - 40 times 
>40 times 
--
--
--
--
93 
35 
36 
12 
91 
40 
30 
24 
111 
34 
28 
21 
108 
36 
43 
16 
102 
35 
36 
17 
Top 5 bus 
boardings 
by time of
day
AM Pk (6a-10a) 
MD (10a-3p) 
PM Pk (3p-7p) 
 Eve (7p-12mn) 
510 
439 
571 
143 
479 
416 
524 
165 
570 
500 
598 
147 
594 
500 
629 
165 
601 
467 
628 
161 
557 
454 
540 
152 
Revenue per boarding $2.32 $2.47 $2.03 $2.03 $2.01 $2.24 
Passes Used 
Jul 
207 
Aug 
204 
Sep 
198 
Oct 
208 
Nov
185 
Total 
Boardings 
Total Monthly 
Avg Weekday 
Avg Weekend Day 
2,945 
112 
46 
3,267 
128 
50 
3,312 
138 
46 
3,394 
132 
46 
2,841 
116 
46 
Frequency
Ranges of 
Riders 
1 - 10 times 
11 - 20 times 
21 - 40 times 
>40 times 
124 
36 
27 
19 
118 
31 
31 
24 
105 
37 
35 
20 
123 
30 
30 
25 
107 
27 
31 
20 
Top 5 bus 
boardings 
by time of
day
AM Pk (6a-10a) 
MD (10a-3p) 
PM Pk (3p-7p) 
 Eve (7p-12mn) 
554 
434 
589 
141 
593 
514 
612 
159 
573 
435 
686 
140 
639 
469 
676 
132 
468 
466 
543 
135 
Revenue per boarding $2.24 $2.24 $2.03 $2.03 $2.03 
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Appendix 9-3: Test of AC Transit Choice Proportions 
Change in Choice of AC Transit due to City of Berkeley ECO Pass 
Test of Proportions 
INPUT: 
0.062 = Ps1 proportional attribute of sample 1 (BEFORE) 
0.107 	 = P s2 proportional attribute of sample 2 (AFTER) 
428 = N1 size of sample 1 
703 = N2 size of sample 2 
0.089971 = Pu the population proportion 
0.017543 = σp-p the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 
of the differences in sample proportions 
Estimate the population proportion as the weighted average of the two samples 

0.089971 = Pu ( N1Ps1 + N2Ps2 ) / (N1 + N2) 

Estimate the standard deviation of the sampling distribution 

0.017543 = σp-p √{Pu(1 - Pu)} √{(N1 + N2) / (N1N2)}
 
Calculate the test statistic, Z: 

-2.56509 = Zcalc (Ps1 - Ps2) /( σp-p )
 
Reject the null hypothesis if Zcalc is greater than ±1.96 

corresponding to the alpha level of 0.05. 

significant difference between the two proportional attributes ?
 
RESULT: 
Zcalc	 is outside the critical region at alpha level of 0.05 
Reject the null hypothesis 
Statistically significant difference between "before" and "after" 
proportions 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 10 
Appendix 10-1: The Federal Law on Employer-Provided Transit Benefits 
Federal laws (Internal Revenue Code 132(f)), provide significant tax savings to both 
employers and employees for the use of public transit. By the simplest interpretation, the 
laws allow employers the flexibility to do any of the following: 
An employee benefit ~ each employee can receive up to $100 a month ($1200 a year) as a 
tax-free benefit toward the purchase of public transit tickets. Such a benefit is a fully 
deductible business expense at the federal level, which means an employer pays less than 
the full face value. Assuming a 30 percent company tax rate, for instance, a $35 voucher 
would cost about $24 after tax deductions. Issued as a voucher, a commuter check, or 
other instrument for purchase of transit services, it is a tax-free employee benefit that 
avoids all payroll-related taxes. For example, the after-tax value of a $35 transit voucher 
would require a raise of more than $55, which would cost the employer $60 when all 
payroll taxes are included. 
A pre-tax salary deduction ~ employees can ask their employers to withhold up to $100 a 
month ($1200 a year) of their pre-tax salary to purchase public transit tickets. When 
transit services are purchased with employees' pre-tax salary, employers save money 
from reduced payroll taxes, which include employer-paid FICA, unemployment, workers 
compensation, disability, pension and other payroll-driven costs that amount to 
approximately 10 percent of the salary. Employees can save approximately 40 percent of 
their commuting costs by avoiding federal and state income taxes and employee-paid 
FICA. For example, if an employee's gross salary is reduced by $35 a month for buying a 
transit voucher, the employee's take-home pay is reduced only $21 resulting in a $14
saving in taxes. 
A combination of benefit and deduction ~ employers may offer a combination of both 
tax-free benefit and pre-tax deduction to a combined total of $100 a month ($1200 a 
year). For example, an employer can provide $50 as an employee benefit and the 
employee can request an additional $50 from pre-tax salary.  
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It is apparent that irrespective of how the employer-sponsored transit benefit is issued, it
is likely to yield benefits for and from both employers and employees. With its 
administration, employers can enhance compensation packages, save costs of employee 
parking, help reduce traffic congestion, enhance company image and improve employee 
morale. By riding transit, employees can reduce the stress of driving and lessen air 
pollution. 
In the San Francisco Bay Area, for instance, over 3,200 employers of all sizes have 
enrolled in the “Commuter Check” program. “Commuter Check” is a special voucher 
used to purchase Bay Area transit tickets or pay for qualified vanpool costs. It comes in
six denominations: $20, $25, $30, $35, $45 and $50. A 1994 survey of Bay Area 
employees receiving Commuter Checks found that about a third (31 percent) of the 
recipients increased their use of transit. The survey also showed that a large majority (79
percent) of respondents noted improved opinions of their employer as a result of
receiving Commuter Checks, a third (35 percent) noted reduced stress from not driving to 
work or driving less often, and a third (33 percent) said job satisfaction had improved. 
Improvements in on-time arrival and productivity were also noted.71 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 11 

Appendix 11-1: Annual ECO Pass Prices and Multipliers – Denver RTD 
Eco Pass Pricing 2003 -- Denver RTD 
EMPLOYEES 
Service Level Area (SLA)
A B C  D 
Suburban CBD Fringe Downtown Airport 
   ECO Pass Price (per employee/per year)
1 - 24 $44 $95 $242 $247 
25 - 249 $39 $85 $225 $236 
250-999 $34 $78 $213 $219 
1,000 - 1,999 $29 $73 $208 $213 
2,000+ $27 $69 $197 $202
   ECO Pass Price as % of Annual Monthly Regular Pass
1 - 24 10.5% 22.6% 57.6% 58.8% 
25 - 249 9.3% 20.2% 53.6% 56.2% 
250-999 8.1% 18.6% 50.7% 52.1% 
1,000 - 1,999 6.9% 17.4% 49.5% 50.7% 
2,000+ 6.4% 16.4% 46.9% 48.1% 
Mean 8.2% 19.0% 51.7% 53.2%
   Area Multiplier Implicit in ECO Pass Price
1 - 24 1.0 2.2 5.5 5.6 
25 - 249 1.0 2.2 5.8 6.1 
250-999 1.0 2.3 6.3 6.4 
1,000 - 1,999 1.0 2.5 7.2 7.3 
2,000+ 1.0 2.6 7.3 7.5 
Mean 1.0 2.3 6.4 6.6
   ECO Pass Contract Minima
1 - 10 $420 $900 $1,260 $1,260 
11 - 20 $840 $1,800 $2,520 $2,520 
21 + $1,260 $2,700 $3,780 $3,780 
Notes: 
1. Employees added during the year are pro-rated based upon the above pricing 
2. Regular Bus & LRT fares: $1.15 base per trip; $35 per month; $420 per year 
3. Definitions of Service Level Area (SLA):   
A ~ Outer suburban and major employment centers outside CBD* 

B ~ Downtown Boulder CBD* and fringe Denver CBD*
 
C ~ Downtown Denver CBD*

D ~ Denver International Airport (DIA) and home businesses
 
*CBD = Central Business District
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Appendix 11-2: AC Transit Operating Costs & Revenues 
AC Transit -- Recent (2000) Unit Operating Costs1 
Operating Expenses (Dollars in 000's) 
Vehicle 
Operating 
Cost
Vehicle 
Mtnce 
Cost 
Non-Veh 
Mtnce Cost 
General
Admin
Cost 
Total
Operating 
Cost 
α β χ δ ε 
$103,283.43 $37,564.74 $3,880.48 $33,690.92 $178,419.56 
Service Supply 
Revenue Vehicle Miles2 
Vehicles 
in Max 
Service 
Annual Veh 
Revenue Mls
per Max Svc
Veh 
Total Veh
Revenue Mls
Vehicle 
Operating 
Cost per
Rev Ml 
Vehicle 
Mtnce 
Cost per
Rev Ml 
Non-Veh 
Mtnce Cost
per Rev Ml 
General
Admin
Cost per 
Rev Ml 
Total
Operating 
Cost per Rev
Ml 
1 2 3 = 1∗ 2 α / 3 β / 3 χ / 3 δ / 3 ε / 3 
606 35,150 21,300,898 $4.85 $1.76 $0.18 $1.58 $8.38 
Revenue Vehicle Hours3 
Vehicles 
in Max 
Service 
Annual Veh 
Revenue Hrs
per Max Svc
Veh 
Total Veh
Revenue Hrs
Vehicle 
Operating 
Cost per
Rev Hr 
Vehicle 
Mtnce 
Cost per
Rev Hr 
Non-Veh 
Mtnce Cost
per Rev Hr 
eral
Admin
Cost per 
Rev Hr 
Gen Total
Operating 
Cost per Rev
Hr 
4 5 6 = 4∗ 5 α / 6 β / 6 χ / 6 δ / 6 ε / 6 
606 2,970.68 1,800,234 $57.37 $20.87 $2.16 $18.71 $99.11 
Annual Vehicle Revenue Miles per Vehicle Revenue Hour = 11.8 
1 All data for publicly operated transit service; privately operated, purchased transportation excluded 
2 Source: Table 30, FTA Section 15 Data, National Transit Database 
3 Source: Table 11, FTA Section 15 Data, National Transit Database 
Fare Revenue 
2000 1999 1998 
Fare Revenues Earned 
Directly Operated $44,183,065 $40,371 ,863 
Purchased Transportation $1,141,229 1,049,029 
Total Fare Revenues Earned $45,324,294 $41,420,892 $45,230,439 
Annual Unlinked Trips 67,632,612 65,897,176 65,667,960 
Revenue per boarding $0.67 $0.63 $0.69 
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Appendix 11-3: Program-Specific Operating Costs – Example Application 
Program-Specific Operating Costs 
unit cost per revenue vehicle mile TOCum = SOEa / vrma $8.38 
unit cost per revenue vehicle hour TOCuh = SOEa / vrha $99.11 
Route Extensions Lr = md * rm * TOCum 
additional directional miles of service (md), 0.25 
number of service runs affected per month (rm) 1512 
operating costs per revenue mile (TOCum) $8.38 
monthly program cost due to route extensions (Lx), $3,166 
Increase in service runs Lf = r * hm * TOCuh 
additional directional runs of service (r) 8 
average directional run time  in hours per month (hm) 0.5 
operating costs per revenue hour (TOCuh) $99.11 
monthly program cost due to increased service runs (Lf) $396 
Additional “tripper” operators Lt = tnd * tcd * tm 
additional tripper operators per day (tnd), 1 
the average unit tripper cost per day (tcd) 60 
number of tripper service days per month (tm) 22 
monthly program cost of tripper operators (Lt), $1,320 
Guaranteed rides home (GRH) E(Lg) = ΣN  Pg * Xg 
probability of service use a month (Pg) 0.0075188 
average cost of GRH per month (Xg) $300 
probability of "no use" a month 0.9924812 
monthly cost of GRH service per participant (Lg) $2.26 
Production cost of pass instrument 
$5 to $6 per participant per year 
monthly cost of the pass instrument per participant (Pp) $0.50 
Administrative assistance 
 1% to 3% of program costs 
multiplier for additional administrative assistance (Aac) 1.03 
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Appendix 11-4: Example Applications of Alternative Objective Functions 
Linear Program #1: Maximize Net Revenue 
Cost Factors Optimization 
Number of participants 1330 
Location and accessibility multiplier 1 
0 
Decision Variables 
Pg = base monthly unit pass cost [default = 1] $2.68 
Revenue increase target [default =0] 1.53 
Maximum number of participants 1330 
Obj Func: max In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca 
Pret = base monthly retail price per participant (cost+Lg + Pp) & Aac $7.50 
Ps = regular price or weighted average price of monthly passes $20.10 
Ng = number of persons passes are purchased for in a group 1330 
Rb = number of transit riders in the group before pass 
implementation 120 
Ra = number of transit riders in the group after pass implementation 
Io = revenue from passes sold to the group before pass 
implementation $2,412.00 
Ic = revenue from passes sold to the group after pass implementation $9,975.00 
Im = minimum revenue defined by agency policy to warrant program
inception $2,412.00 
Tm = targeted revenue goal, that is, proportional increase 1.533424452 
Ca = additional operating cost necessitated by the program. $0.00 
Lx = additional costs related to route extensions $0.00 
Lf = additional costs related to increase in service runs $0.00 
Lt = additional costs related to tripper operators $0.00 
Lg = additional costs related to guaranteed ride home service $0.00 
Aac = multiplier for additional administrative assistance to the group 1.03 
Pp = additional costs related to production cost of pass instrument $0.50 
AIm = pass price multiplier related to location accessibility. 1 
PAI = location-based monthly pass price per participant. $7.50 
Objective Function 
maximize: In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca $7,563.00 
Constraints 
In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca $7,563.00 
Ic ≥ (1+Tm) * max (Io, Im) $6,110.62 
Ic ≥ Io + Ca $2,412.00 
PAI ≤ (0.15, 0.30, 0.45, 0.60)*Ps for AIm = 1, 2, 3, 4 7.5 
decision variables are non-negative: b7, b8, b9, b32 > 0 
Ps = regular price of monthly passes $50.00 
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Linear Program #2: Maximize Net Revenue Plus Improvements
 
Cost Factors Optimization 
Number of participants 1330 
Location and accessibility multiplier 1 
0 
Decision Variables 
Pg = base monthly unit pass cost [default = 1] $2.41 
Revenue increase target [default =0] 1.03 
Maximum number of participants 1330 
Obj Func: max In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca 
Pret = base monthly retail price per participant (cost+Lg + Pp) & Aac $7.87 
Ps = regular price or weighted average price of monthly passes $20.10 
Ng = number of persons passes are purchased for in a group 1330 
Rb = number of transit riders in the group before pass 
implementation 120 
Ra = number of transit riders in the group after pass implementation 
Io = revenue from passes sold to the group before pass 
implementation $2,412.00 
Ic = revenue from passes sold to the group after pass 
implementation $10,460.81 
Im = minimum revenue defined by agency policy to warrant 
program inception $2,412.00 
Tm = targeted revenue goal, that is, proportional increase 1.026323887 
Ca = additional operating cost necessitated by the program. $8,048.81 
Lx = additional costs related to route extensions $6,332.37 
Lf = additional costs related to increase in service runs $396.44 
Lt = additional costs related to tripper operators $1,320.00 
Lg = additional costs related to guaranteed ride home service $2.26 
Aac = multiplier for additional administrative assistance to the group 1.03 
Pp = additional costs related to production cost of pass instrument $0.50 
AIm = pass price multiplier related to location accessibility. 1 
PAI = location-based monthly pass price per participant. $7.87 
Objective Function 
maximize: In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca $0.00 
Constraints 
In = Ic - Io - Ca = ΣNg Pg - ΣRb Ps - Ca $0.00 
Ic ≥ (1+Tm) * max (Io, Im) $4,887.49 
Ic ≥ Io + Ca $10,460.81 
PAI ≤ (0.15, 0.30, 0.45, 0.60)*Ps for AIm = 1, 2, 3, 4 7.5 
decision variables are non-negative: b7, b8, b9, b32 > 0 
Ps = regular price of monthly passes $50.00 
287
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Comparative Analysis of LP Results 
(a) LP Solution Base Pass
Cost 
Retail 
Pass Price 
Number of
Participants
Revenue 
Margin
Maximize net revenue $2.68 $7.50 1330 274% 
Max net revenue + improvements $7.50 1330 71% 
Min. base cost of pass $1.26 $3.76 1330 74% 
Min. participants $6.78 $7.50 360 1% 
As Implemented $5.00 1330 140% 
Maximize net revenue $3,564.40 $9,975.00 
Max net revenue + improvements $0.00 $9,975.00 
Min. base cost of pass $1,675.80 $5,000.80 
Min. participants $2,440.80 $2,700.00 
(b) LP-based Revenue 
$2,412 
As Implemented $6,650.00 
Maximize net revenue $3,457.47 $9,675.75 
Max net revenue + improvements $0.00 $9,675.75 
Min. base cost of pass $1,625.53 $4,850.78 
Min. participants $2,367.58 $2,619.00 
(c) Less 3% admin mark-up 
As Implemented $6,450.50 
Maximize net revenue $2,792.47 $9,010.75 
Max net revenue + improvements -$665.00 $9,010.75 
Min. base cost of pass $960.53 $4,185.78 
Min. participants $2,187.58 $2,439.00 
(d) Less pass production cost ($0.50 ea.) 
As Implemented $5,785.50 
Maximize net revenue $380.47 $6,598.75 
Max net revenue + improvements -$3,077.00 $6,598.75 
Min. base cost of pass -$1,451.47 $1,773.78 
Min. participants -$224.42 $27.00 
As Implemented $3,373.50 
(e) Less lost fare revenue ($) 
Maximize net revenue 0 0 
Max net revenue + improvements $4,882.62 $4,882.62 
Min. base cost of pass 0 0 
Min. participants 0 0 
(f) Service Expansion cost 
As Implemented 0 
Maximize net revenue $380.47 $6,598.75 
Max net revenue + improvements -$7,959.62 $1,716.13 
Min. base cost of pass -$1,451.47 $1,773.78 
Min. participants -$224.42 $27.00 
(g) Net revenue [ (e) - (f) ] 
As Implemented $3,373.50 
Maximize net revenue 15.77% 273.58% 
Max net revenue + improvements -330.00% 71.15% 
Min. base cost of pass -60.18% 73.54% 
Min. participants -9.30% 1.12% 
(h) Margin over original revenue ($) 
As Implemented 139.86% 
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